How different are originalism and non-originalism?

Hastings Law Journal

Volumn 62, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 707-736

  Smith, Peter J ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 79955364559     PISSN: 00178322     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (351)

1. See infra Part 1.
2. See infra Part 1.
3. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965).
4. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966).
5. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134-48 (2003);
6. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. A PUB. POL'Y 599, 599-610 (2004);
7. infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
8. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 241, 242 (2009).
9. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
12. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999).
13. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 112-30 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 779-95;
18. infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
19. As will become apparent, the label "originalism" embraces a wide range of interpretive theories, see Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 241-42, but I use the term here to refer to the family of modern approaches that regard "the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present."
20. Whittington, supra note 5, at 599.
21. See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change-Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 44 (1993).
22. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973);
23. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965)
24. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
25. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966).
26. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 283-311, 351⁁72 (1977);
27. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6-10 (1971).
28. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 21, at 8;
29. Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986).
30. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 693 (1976).
31. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852-56 (1989).
32. See Bork, supra note 21, at 6-10;
33. Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J-383.394-95 (1985).
34. Whittington, supra note 5, at 599.
35. Id. at 601;
36. see also Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Turtle, Biblical Literalism and Constitutional Originalism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 31-35) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
37. See BERGER, supra note 21, at 296 ("Substitution by the Court of its own value choices for those embodied in the Constitution violates the basic principle of government by consent of the governed.");
38. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143 (1990) ("[O]Only the approach of original understanding meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy.").
39. Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, On Not Being "Not an Originalist" 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 259, 269, 274 (2010) (praising originalism as "an elegant response to a genuine problem," but rejecting it because it would "open an all but unbridgeable chasm between constitutional decision making" and all other aspects of legal practice).
40. The evolution of originalist thought has become a familiar story. For more detailed accounts, see Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 247-62;
41. Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3-26) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal);
42. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1134-48;
43. Whittington, supra note 5, at 599-610.
44. BERGER, supra note 21, at 3;
45. Bork, supra note 22, at 823;
46. Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U. L. REV. 811, 811-12 (1983);
47. Rehnquist, supra note 23, at 694-97;
48. Edwin Meese III, Att'y Gen. of the U.S., Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 15,1985), in U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK app. b at 97 (1987) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
49. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 30, at 8-13;
50. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1139-40;
51. Antonin Scalia, Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Address Before the Attorney General's Conference on Economic Liberties (June 14,1986), in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31, app. c at 106 ("I ought to campaign to change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning.").
52. Many originalists embraced a focus on the original understanding- sometimes subjective, sometimes objective-during the journey from original intent to original meaning. See Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 250-52;
53. Colby, supra note 30, at 12-13.
54. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 209-22 (1980).
55. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985).
56. See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1132, 1147;
57. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
58. See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1132;
59. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 25 (2001).
60. Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1090 (1989) (noting that Powell's evidence demonstrated that the common law method of interpreting text focused on the language's objective meaning in the document, not its author's subjective intent).
61. Whittington, supra note 5, at 602-10.
62. Id. at 609.
63. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (2009);
64. Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism 1 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-067, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1235722;
65. Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism 16-28 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-028, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1150447.
66. Compare Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2007) ("[T]he most common and most influential justification for originalism[] [is] popular sovereignty and the judicially enforced will of the people."),
67. with Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 26 (Univ. of 111. Coll. of Law 111. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1120244 (grounding originalism in the philosophy of language).
68. Compare Scalia, supra note 24, at 863-64 (arguing that originalism constrains judges, because it "establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually" distinct from the judge's own preferences), with
69. John Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. A PUB. POL'Y 473, 473-76 (2008) ("Can originalism, or any methodology, keep interpreters from interpreting the Constitution along the lines that they think good? ... [I]t cannot...").
70. See Colby, supra note 30, at 34; infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1127-28 (defending objective original meaning as the object of interpretation but acknowledging that it is legitimate "not to treat 'this Constitution' as authoritative");
72. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes... and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1835 (!997) ("[I]nterpreting the Constitution and applying the Constitution are two different enterprises.");
73. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 53 (2006) (describing the question whether we should "follow the instructions in the Constitution" as a "question of political morality, not of interpretive theory");
74. Solum, supra note 41, at 30 ("What words mean is one thing; what we should do about their meaning is another.").
75. See, e.g. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr. eds., 1958) ("The question [is] whether one generation of men has a right to bind another....");
76. see also Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 358-60 (2007) ("[N] onoriginalists are plagued by anxiety about the dead hand of the past-and think we need to update and affirm the document's underlying principles if it is to be binding on anyone living today.");
77. Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 192 (2008) ("[G]overning the population of the United States today according to the constitutional understandings of people long since dead should not be understood as showing respect for democratic-enactment authority.").
78. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1985) ("What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to the vision of our time....Our Constitution was not intended to preserve a preexisting society but to make a new one....");
79. Leib, supra note 45, at 358-60.
80. See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1127-28;
81. Lawson, supra note 44, at 1824;
82. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 44, at 53;
83. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not to), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2062 (2006).
84. Lawson, supra note 44, at 1824 ("[A] theory of interpretation allows us to determine what the Constitution truly means, while a theory of adjudication allows us to determine what role, if any, the Constitution's meaning should play in particular decisions.");
85. id. at 1825 ("One can be a strict interpretative originalist and forcefully deny that the Constitution has any political legitimacy."). Lawrence Solum has made a similar argument in distinguishing between "semantic originalism" and "normative originalism."
86. Solum, supra note 41, at 27-33.
87. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2009) ("[B]ecause it is not in fact controversial in the contemporary debates over American constitutional interpretation that judges should enforce the law, the non-normative variant of Originalism is not interestingly distinct... from its more common, avowedly normative, cousin.");
88. Colby, supra note 30, at 30 ("[The] response [to the dead-hand problem] is something of a cop out. Our legal system and legal culture presuppose that judges must follow the law, so if the meaning of the Constitution is its original public meaning, then it goes without saying that judges will have to follow it.");
89. Leib, supra note 45, at 359 ("[O]riginal meaning originalism... gives pride of place to the very dead hand living constitutionalists are convinced we must resist to maintain the document's present-day legitimacy."). Jack Balkin, who, as I explain infra, is a new new originalist, has nevertheless argued that, properly conceived, originalism addresses the dead-hand problem just as nimbly as does living constitutionalism.
90. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 303 (2007) ("The Constitution is a great work that spans many lifetimes, a vibrant multi-generational undertaking, in which succeeding generations pledge faith in the constitutional project and exercise fidelity to the Constitution by making the Constitution their own."); see also infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 21, at 364 ("A judicial power to revise the Constitution transforms the bulwark of our liberties into a parchment barrier.");
92. Bork, supra note 21, at 6 ("[A] legitimate Court must be controlled by principles exterior to the will of the Justices.").
93. Because the new new originalists believe that the Constitution's vague provisions require judicial construction in the formulation of legal rules, see infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport refer to their approach as "constructionist originalism." John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009).
94. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 21, at 99-116 (rejecting the "open-ended phraseology theory" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
95. Bork also advanced such a view, see BORK, supra note 28, at 166, 178-85 (rejecting the view that the Constitution's open-ended provisions authorize judges to create rights), although, as I explain infra note 76, he appears to be of two minds on this question.
96. Balkin, supra note 49, at 304-05 ("[T]he fact that adopters chose text that features general and abstract concepts is normally the best evidence that they sought to embody general and abstract principles of constitutional law, whose scope, in turn, will have to be fleshed out later on by later generations.");
97. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 549, 553 (2009) ("[Constitutional drafters] use standards or principles because they want to channel politics but delegate the details to future generations.");
98. id. at 569-75 (describing the courts' role in construction);
99. Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint- Hearted" Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 11-13, 23 (2006) [hereinafter Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity] ("That the founders and the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment drafted texts that leave some discretion in application to changing circumstances is not a bug. It's a feature.");
100. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 264 (2005) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumping Precedent] ("That the Constitution includes more open-ended or abstract provisions, and thereby delegates discretion to judges, does not justify ignoring these portions of the text.").
101. WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 7.
102. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 121 (2004);
103. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 8 (1999);
104. WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 5-14;
105. Balkin, supra note 53, at 559-60;
106. Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 53, at 264-65;
107. Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 923, 974 (2009);
108. Solum, supra note 41, at 20, 67-89.
109. Solum, supra note 55, at 967. Barnett has argued that "constitutional constructions, though not deducible immediately from the text, still may properly be connected to or constrained by it."
110. BARNETT, supra note 55, at 124-25;
111. accord Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, no (2001) ("[T]hough by definition constructions are not in the Constitution, they can be of the Constitution.").
112. WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 7. Barnett explains the relationship between interpretation and construction as follows:
113. [O]riginalism is warranted as a theory of interpretation-that is, as a method of determining the meaning of the words written in the Constitution. For better or worse, knowing the meaning of these words only takes us so far in resolving current cases and controversies. Due either to ambiguity or vagueness, the original meaning of the text may not always determine a unique rule of law to be applied to a particular case or controversy. While not indeterminate, the original meaning can be "underdeterminate." Indeed, because the framers frequently used abstract language, this will often be the case. When this happens, interpretation must be supplemented by constitutional construction-within the bounds established by original meaning. In this manner, construction fills the unavoidable gaps in constitutional meaning when interpretation has reached its limits. Barnett, supra note 56, at 108 (footnote omitted). To be sure, Whittington's claim about construction has been quite modest; he has argued that construction is as much the province of the political branches as it is the province of the courts.
114. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 7-13, 172-73.
115. But Balkin, Barnett, and Solum have all made clear that they view constitutional construction as an appropriate task for judges as well. See Balkin, supra note 53, at 569-75;
116. Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 53, at 264;
117. Solum, supra note 55, at 979-80.
118. BARNETT, supra note 55, at 121.
119. Id. at 126. In Barnett's view, constitutional legitimacy is accomplished through application of a "presumption of liberty" that promotes a libertarian vision of constitutional meaning.
120. Id. at 259-69.
121. See Balkin, supra note 53, at 552;
122. Balkin, supra note 49, at 295.
123. Balkin, supra note 53, at 604-05.
124. See id. at 585-601.
125. Id. at 598.
126. Id. at 609.
127. WHITTINGTON, supra note 55, at 5 ("Unlike jurisprudential interpretation, construction provides for an element of creativity in construing constitutional meaning.").
128. WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 5;
129. see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 51, at 785 (arguing that choosing among possible constructions requires reference to "political morality"). Barnett objects to this characterization, because "it suggests that such constructions are themselves completely unconstrained by the determinable original meaning of the text."
130. BARNETT, supra note 55, at 124.
131. But he agrees that there can be a range of permissible constructions, and that judges must choose among them. See Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 53, at 265.
132. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 443 (2007) ("My Article... attempts to move th[e] analysis along, making salient the logical consequences of the turn to original [public] meaning.").
133. See, e.g. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 (1999) ("Perhaps most important of all, however, originalism has itself changed-from original intention to original meaning."); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1132, 1144 (coining the term "original, objective-public-meaning textualism" and defending the approach on the ground that it corrects the "jurisprudence of 'original understanding,'" which changed the "jurisprudence of 'original intent'" before that); Lawson, supra note 44, at 1834 ("[T]he Constitution's meaning is its original public meaning. Other approaches to interpretation are simply wrong."); supra note 32 and accompanying text. As a corollary to their embrace of the objective original meaning as the proper object of interpretation, most new originalists also rejected reliance on the original expected applications in determining constitutional meaning.
134. See, e.g., Stephen G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin's Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 663, 668-72 (2009);
135. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1284 (1997);
136. Paulsen, supra note 47, at 2059;
137. Antonin Scalia, Response, in MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 35, at 144. Accordingly, most new originalists claim not to interpret the Constitution by seeking to determine how the Framers of a constitutional provision would have answered a particular question of constitutional law, but instead by seeking the objective original meaning of the text, as measured by the "hypothetical understandings" of an "artificially constructed" "reasonable person" at the time of ratification.
138. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 44, at 48.
139. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 182-87;
140. id. at 187 ("The level of generality at which terms were defined is not an a priori theoretical question but a contextualized historical one.");
141. Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 359 (1992) ("Thus the question becomes the level of generality the ratifiers and other sophisticated political actors at the time would have imputed to the text.").
142. See, e.g., Calabresi & Fine, supra note 68, at 672-74 ("[Some provisions of the Constitution] employ standards and not rules....It is not an adequate answer in these situations to say, as Justice Scalia sometimes does, that originalist judges ought not to enforce Clauses of this kind because they do not lend themselves to principled judicial application.");
143. McConnell, supra note 68, at 1280-81 ("A genuine commitment to the semantic intentions of the Framers requires the interpreter to seek the level of generality at which the particular language was understood by its Framers... It is perfectly possible that, upon dispassionate historical investigation, the interpreter would discover that some provisions of the Constitution were understood at a high level of generality..."); infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
144. See Whittington, supra note 5, at 611 ("[I]t is entirely possible that the principles that the founders meant to embody in the text were fairly abstract.");
145. Balkin, supra note 53, at 553 ("If [the text of the Constitution] states a standard, we must apply the standard. And if it states a general principle, we must apply the principle.");
146. Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 53, at 263 ("[Sometimes] the original meaning is rather abstract, or at a higher level of generality.").
147. New originalists have generally embraced the objective original meaning of the text as the touchstone of interpretation. See, e.g., Kesavan & Pauken, supra note 5, at 1132;
148. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002);
149. Scalia, supra note 35, at 38. New new originalists have as well.
150. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 53, at 552-55;
151. Barnett, supra note 56, at 105;
152. Solum, supra note 55, at 940-41.
153. Balkin, supra note 67, at 494.
154. Whittington, supra note 5, at 608.
155. McConnell, supra note 68, at 1280.
156. 76. BORK, supra note 28, at 149 (arguing that the correct level of generality is the level that "the text and historical evidence warrant"). On this view, the Constitution provides only a "major premise"-that is, a "principle or stated value that the ratifiers wanted to protect"-against which the interpreter must judge the challenged action.
157. Id. at 162-63.
158. Bork famously followed this form of reasoning in attempting to defend Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), on originalist grounds.
159. See BORK, supra note 28, at 82 ("[E]quality and segregation were mutually inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not understand that....The purpose that brought the fourteenth amendment into being was equality...."). In practice, however, Bork has tended to vary the level of generality at which he seeks the original meaning without any explanation about why some provisions should be interpreted at a high level of generality and others should be interpreted at a high level of specificity. For example, he has criticized Griswold and Roe on the ground that contraception is not "covered specifically or by obvious implication by any provision of the Constitution,"
160. id. at 258, and "the right to abort, whatever one thinks of it, is not to be found in the Constitution," id. at 112. But though he has never explained why, he reads the Free Speech Clause and the Equal Protection Clause at much higher levels of abstraction.
161. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring) ("[The Framers] gave into our keeping the value of preserving free expression and, in particular, the preservation of political expression, which is commonly conceded to be the value at the core of those clauses. Perhaps the framers did not envision libel actions as a major threat to that freedom....But if, over time, the libel action becomes a threat to the central meaning of the first amendment, why should not judges adapt their doctrines?");
162. BORK, supra note 28, at 82 (Equal Protection Clause);
163. Harrison, supra note 42, at 479-80 (noting that Bork's Oilman opinion employs a sort of a "purposivism," originalism that "tak[es] as normative the original purpose" of the First Amendment);
164. David AJ. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1381-82 (1990)
165. (reviewing ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)) (arguing that Bork's high-level-of-generality analysis of Brown is inconsistent with the originalist methodology that he advocates for other questions);
166. see also Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 432 n.25 (1997) (arguing the same).
167. Steven D. Smith, Reply, Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT, (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 196) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal);
168. see also Balkin, supra note 49, at 295 ("Fidelity to the Constitution as law means fidelity to the words of the text, understood in terms of their original meaning, and to the principles that underlie the text.").
169. Smith, supra note 77.
170. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at xi ("I develop an explanation and defense of a theory of constitutional interpretation by the judiciary.");
171. Solum, supra note 41, at 2 ("This Article offers a theory of constitutional meaning that [] provides a theoretical foundation for original public meaning originalism.").
172. To be sure, Solum has used real cases to give context for the application of his theory, see, e.g., Solum, supra note 55, but his interest appears to be mostly theoretical.
173. See BARNETT, supra note 55, at 118-21 (level of generality), 121-30 (construction), 355 (libertarianism).
174. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
175. Balkin, supra note 49, at 311-52.
176. Barnett appears to have coined the term "new originalism," Barnett, supra note 68, at 620-22;
177. Colby, supra note 30, at 1 n.2, and clearly identifies as a new originalist,
178. see Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405,405-09 (2007) (describing his embrace of this form of original-meaning originalism). Balkin has tended to eschew the term, but his focus on the original semantic meaning of the text,
179. see Balkin, Framework Originalism, supra note 53, at 552, places him squarely in the new originalist tent.
180. See Barnett, supra, at 410-11.
181. Balkin has been quite aware of this implication of his work. He has argued that the "choice between original meaning and living constitutionalism... is a false choice," Balkin, supra note 49, at 293, and that the project of living constitutionalism (a synonym for non-originalism) is essentially a project of construction and thus entirely consistent with a commitment to the original meaning.
182. Balkin, supra note 53, at 559-60.
183. Barnett similarly originally described his version of originalism as an "originalism for nonoriginalists." Barnett, supra note 68;
184. see also Solum, supra note 41, at 164-67 (discussing the relationship between living constitutionalism and originalism).
185. See Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 244-45.
186. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 383, 391 n.36 (2007) ("[J]udges of various ideologies cannot be expected to reach agreement on any alternative method.");
187. Scalia, supra note 35, at 45 ("[Non-originalists] divide into as many camps as there are individual views of the good, the true, and the beautiful.");
188. Scalia, supra note 24, at 855 ("[I]t is not very helpful to tell a judge to be a 'non-originalist,' [because non-originalism] represents agreement on nothing except what is the wrong approach.").
189. Berman, supra note 49, at 24
190. ; see also DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 139 (2005) ("The characteristic and controversial move of originalism... [is] that the original understanding of the constitutional text always trumps any contrary understanding of that text in succeeding generations.").
191. See, e.g.. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31, at 7 ("[A]II [non-originalists] reject original meaning as relevant to constitutional interpretation....").
192. See Powell, supra note 29.
193. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 49, at 24-25 ("Not a single self-identifying non-originalist of whom I'm aware argues that original meaning has no bearing on proper judicial constitutional interpretation. To the contrary, even those scholars most closely identified with non-originalism... explicitly assign original meaning or intentions a significant role in the interpretive enterprise.");
194. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Political Function of Originalist Ambiguity, 19 HARV. J.L. A PUB. POL'Y 487, 488 (1996) ("[M]ost views-my own included-assume that original understanding and purposes are relevant to constitutional interpretation. Differences emerge only over how, and how weightily, these considerations enter the interpretive matrix.");
195. Farber, supra note 37, at 1086 ("Almost no one believes that the original understanding is wholly irrelevant to modern-day constitutional interpretation.");
196. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 880-81 (1996) (noting that "[virtually everyone agrees" that text and original meaning matter in constitutional interpretation).
197. See U.S. CONST, art. II, §1, cl. 5 ("[N]either shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years....");
198. see also Balkin, supra note 49, at 305 (offering this example);
199. Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 53, at 263 (same);
200. Richard Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, Nw. U. L. REV. 226, 263 (1988) (same).
201. U.S. CONST, art. IV, §4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government....").
202. PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-8 (1982);
203. see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189-90 (1987).
204. As noted above, Balkin has recognized this implication of his work. See supra note 84. Others have observed in passing that new new originalism tends to collapse the distinction between originalism and non-originalism. See James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 10, 10-11 (2007) ("[Balkin's originalism] is for all intents and purposes equivalent to Dworkin's moral reading [of the Constitution].");
205. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1371 (2009) ("An interpretive approach that can so readily produce such diametrically opposite results dissolves the distinction between originalism and living constitutionalism.");
206. Smith, supra note 77 ("[On the Balkin view,] [t]he difference between originalism and 'living Constitutionalism' has vanished...."). Solum anticipated these developments years ago, during the early days of original-meaning originalism, when he argued that there is "no meaningful distinction between originalist and nonoriginalist theories of constitutional interpretation."
207. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1603 (1989). Solum recognized that non-originalist theories still inevitably pay substantial attention to the original meaning, and that any plausible originalist theory, including one that seeks the original meaning at the level of "general principle,"
208. id. at 1612, in practice, will be forced to use non-originalist tools to decide cases. Id. at 1621-22;
209. accord Solum, supra note 41, at 166-67 (discussing the "compatabilist account" of the relationship between living constitutionalism and originalism);
210. cf. Fallon, supra note 90, at 488 ("[His version of non-originalism] stands as a stark alternative to some versions of originalism, but is rather close to several others that have claimed the designation.").
211. See Farber, supra note 37, at 1087 ("[Originalists] who focus on the framers' general principles ... may be difficult to distinguish from non-originalists...." (footnote omitted));
212. see also Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 432-33 (1998) ("This move from specific intentions to general principles... eliminates any meaningful distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism because the Constitution's broad phrases are defined at a level of generality that makes them useless in hard cases for anything other than symbolic purposes.").
213. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Balkin, supra note 67, at 483-85, 511 (referring to Bobbitt's modalities);
214. Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 063: Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL THEORY BLOG, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal-theory-lexicon/ 2008/04/legal-theoryle.html (last modified May 16, 2010) ("[T]he interpretation-construction distinction opens the door for a partial reconciliation of originalism with living constitutionalism: the Constitution can live in the 'construction zone' where the linguistic meaning of the Constitution underdetermines results.").
215. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
216. Berman, supra note 49, at 66.
217. See Leib, supra note 45, at 359-60. It is also possible for a focus on the principles underlying the text to lead to conclusions that are inconsistent with the text itself, an approach that arguably is inconsistent with new new originalism as well.
218. See Barnett, supra note 83, at 413-14.
219. See Leib, supra note 45, at 356-61 (arguing that even Balkin's originalism is fundamentally different from living constitutionalism, because it places dispositive weight on history in some cases);
220. cf. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER A JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 79-116 (2007) (arguing that Ronald Dworkin's moral reading of the Constitution is meaningfully different from all forms of originalism).
221. 101. See Colby, supra note 30, at 46-47 (arguing that non-originalists generally invoke the Constitution's underlying principles in order to "give the indeterminate text a meaning (or if you prefer, construction) that is suitable for modern circumstances"). It is perhaps more useful to conceive of approaches to constitutional interpretation as falling along a spectrum based on the weight accorded to the original meaning. Mitchell Berman, for example, has noted that non-originalism is "modest," and generally "does not hold that original meaning, when discoverable, should be irrelevant to judicial interpretation, or even that its relevance should be slight."
222. Berman, supra note 49, at 24.
223. Similarly, he notes that originalists vary in the strength of their claims about the role of original meaning in interpretation. See id. at 10-12. He concludes that what distinguishes Originalism (with a capital O) from non-originalism is the "thesis that original meaning either is the only proper target of judicial constitutional interpretation or that it has at least lexical priority over any other candidate meanings that the text might bear," and that "nothing that transpires after ratification of a particular constitutional provision, save a subsequent constitutional amendment, has operative (as opposed to evidential) bearing on what courts ought to identify as constitutional meaning."
224. Id. at 22. As Berman acknowledges, however, one can be a "strong" originalist and still conclude that some constitutional provisions were "originally understood at a level of generality too high to permit effective resolution of disputes.
225. " Id. at 30. It is with these originalists that I am concerned here. And to the extent that some of those originalists believe that there is a nontrivial number of constitutional provisions whose original meaning was objectively expressed at a high level of generality, their approach to interpretation tends to shrink the gap between originalism and non-originalism that Berman so astutely describes.
226. See Fallon, supra note 90, at 491 ("In its moderate versions, originalism appears to differ from its competitors mostly as a matter of degree....").
227. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
228. See GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTTTUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 73 (1992) ("[T]he historical record is clear that the framers often employed abstract language to express quite concrete or specific conceptions or rules.").
229. Calabresi & Fine, supra note 68, at 669 ("What judges must be faithful to is the enacted law, not the expectations of the parties who wrote the law.").
230. Id. at 672-73.
231. Id. at 698.
232. Id. at 692-98. Gregory Bassham has made a similar claim about the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In his view, although the language "may be abstract," its original meaning "was as fixed and definite as the common law could make a phrase."
233. BASSHAM, supra note 104, at 73-74
234. (quoting Charles P. Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, in EDMUND N. CAHN, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 170, 177 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
235. 109. See Paulsen, supra note 47, at 2046-48 (rejecting the view that the Ninth Amendment might protect particular unenumerated rights, and arguing that the "proper" textualist meaning of the Amendment is that the specification of rights in the Constitution did not "work a pro tanto repeal of state law rights possessed against state governments"). In addition, Justice Scalia has suggested that the Equal Protection Clause speaks with the requisite specificity to overcome the objection that Brown was wrong because segregation was accepted at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, he argued that "when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down." 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He then responded to Justice Stevens's charge that such an approach would have mandated the conclusion that segregation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause by arguing that Brown v. Board of Education does not demonstrate "the dangerous consequences of this principle," because tradition has a role "in giving content only to ambiguous constitutional text."
236. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 95, n.1 (citing 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). In his view, the Equal Protection Clause and "the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of the institution of black slavery [left] no room for doubt that laws treating people differently because of their race"-and in particular laws segregating on the basis of race-"are invalid."
237. Id.
238. See BASSHAM, supra note 104, at 74 (arguing that the Free Speech Clause contains a "clear and reasonably determinate standard").
239. See Paulsen, supra note 47, at 2056 ("[The rules of originalism] do not answer all questions, but they answer a lot of them."); Scalia, supra note 35, at 45 ("Often-indeed, I dare say usuaUy-[the original meaning of the text] is easy to discern and simple to apply.").
240. Justice Scalia has tempered this claim by acknowledging that "[s]ometimes (though not very often) there will be disagreement regarding the original meaning; and sometimes there will be disagreement as to how that original meaning applies to new and unforeseen phenomena." Scalia, supra note 35, at 45;
241. see also Scalia, supra note 24, at 856 ("[Originalism's] greatest defect... is the difficulty of applying it correctly.... [I]t is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient text.").
242. But Justice Scalia and others expect these instances to be "exceedingly rare." SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31, at 28.
243. As Justice Scalia has stated, the "originalist, if he does not have all the answers, has many of them." Scalia, supra note 35, at 46;
244. see also Kay, supra note 91, at 258 ("The good faith application of original intentions will resolve many cases in ways which are relatively free from doubt.").
245. Although Bork began as an old originalist, see Boric, supra note 22, at 826 (urging fidelity to the original intentions), he eventually appears to have embraced many of the tenets of the new originalism, a shift that he described as simply a clarification of his earlier work, see BORK, supra note 28, at 144.
246. He rejected the quest for original intent and instead urged a focus on the objective original understanding, id.,
247. and he argued that an originalist should seek the original meaning at "the level of generality that interpretation of the words, structure, and history of the Constitution fairly supports." Id. at 150;
248. see also supra note 76 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding his arguments about the level of generality, however, Bork apparently concluded that certain provisions of the Constitution were so abstract (and thus obscure) that judges should simply decline to enforce them.
249. BORK, supra note 28, at 166.
250. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1127, 1134-48 (defending "original public meaning textualism" and describing its place in the evolution of originalism);
251. id. at 1139 (using the term "new originalism" to describe "original meaning textualism").
252. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Construction?, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 881 (2009).
253. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 HARV. J.L. A PUB. POL'Y 991, 995 (2008).
254. Paulsen, supra note 47, at 2057;
255. accord Paulsen, supra note 115, at 881 ("[T]he Constitution's text itself suggests, as a practical matter, a default rule of interpretation where the constitutional text is unspecific: popular republican self-government. ");
256. see abo Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631, 633 (1993) ("The absence of a clear constitutional basis for invalidation of a political choice should mean that the choice is not invalid-");
257. Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 361 (1987) ("If the judge... concludes that he cannot tell whether a challenged governmental action is forbidden by the Constitution, then he is free to leave the determination of the legal rule to the elected authorities.").
258. 118. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 296 n.18 (2005);
259. accord Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1129-30 n.54 ("[W]here there is a range of equally legitimate interpretations, and the political branches have chosen one of them, there is no basis for the courts to invalidate the political branches' choice.");
260. Paulsen, supra note 116, at 995 ("[T]he more indeterminate or under-determinate the range of a constitutional provision, the broader the duty of the courts to defer to what the legislature has enacted.");
261. Paulsen, supra note 115, at 882 ("Unspecific texts do not warrant abstracting more specific principles. The Constitution's structure suggests the opposite rule: Unspecific texts, to the extent of their un-specificity, permit a range of legitimate interpretation and application by political decisionmakers.").
262. Paulsen bases this "rule against abstraction" on the fact that the Constitution is written and specifically identifies "this Constitution" as supreme law. Paulsen, supra note 115, at 881-82.
263. Nelson Lund similarly has recognized that the constitutional text often does not resolve concrete questions, and that in such cases, there is no "algorithm" for deciding the question. Lund, supra note 94, at 1372.
264. Unlike Paulsen and Bork, however, Lund argues that "a conscientiously originalist court has no choice but to decide the issue in light of the purpose of the provision as that purpose was understood by those who adopted it." Id.
265. Lund has nevertheless criticized Balkin's new new originalism, because a "moderately clever and determined practitioner of such 'originalism' should be able to get just about any result that a living constitutionalist might desire." Id. at 1371.
266. Paulsen, supra note 116, at 995.
267. Kay, supra note 40, at 723-24 (discussing Balkin's work).
268. Id. at 721.
269. See id. at 725 ("[R]elying on an artificial concept instead of on an actual historical event inevitably enlarges the field of such imaginative reconstructions.").
270. Id. at 721 ("The discovery of indeterminacies in otherwise originalist interpretation has been the 'little gap' through which a broad range of judicial choice has been perceived.");
271. id. at 721 n.76 ("The absence of determinate meaning has been explicitly linked to the practice of 'constitutional construction' whereby interpreters are obliged to extend the binding force of the Constitution beyond its linguistic meaning.").
272. Smith, supra note 40, at 1.
273. Smith, supra note 77.
274. See id. at 189 ("[Jack Balkin] has advocated... an approach which, by interpreting the Constitution's original meaning to embrace a set of open-ended principles, is able to justify pretty much any results that the most ardently progressive constitutional heart could desire.").
275. Smith instead suggests an approach that would limit constitutional meaning to "what the human beings who enacted the provision thought it meant," id. at 198, which is quite similar (even if not necessarily identical) to the original-expected-applications approach that most new originalists have rejected.
276. See supra note
277. McGinnis and Rappaport have promoted "original methods
278. This approach mediates between original-intent originalism and original-meaning originalism, see id. at 752, 758-65,
279. and rests for its normative justification in large part on the fact that the Constitution is the product of a "strict supermajoritarian process." Id. at 755;
280. see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 86, at 384-91.
281. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 51, at 773 ("[A]dvocates of construction have not provided evidence that anyone embraced construction at the time of the Constitution's enactment, and we have been able to find none. To the contrary, the evidence that we have found suggests that interpreters believed that ambiguity and vagueness could be resolved through the applicable interpretive rules, and thus through originalist methods.").
282. Id. at 784;
283. see also id. at 783 ("Because there is no legally required or even accepted method for determining how to resolve questions of construction, judges are likely to determine how to engage in construction based on their own views.").
284. See Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 258.
285. See id. at 248-55.
286. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1145-48.
287. See Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 260-62.
288. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Some Reflections on Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1986) ("I would caution against judicial choices of levels of generality. Ascending the ladder of generality obliterates those limits [on judicial power].");
289. id. at 10-11 ("Frequently there will be cases where general language is not illuminated by legislative history, where the evidence of original intention is ambiguous, looks both ways, or is altogether lacking. There the judge must, as Justice Holmes observed, legislate 'interstitially,' or as Cardozo put it, fill 'the open spaces in the law.'" (footnotes omitted)
290. (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917);
291. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921));
292. see also BERGER, supra note 21, at 99-116 (criticizing the "'open-ended' phraseology theory" of interpretation); Kay, supra note 91, at 264 (discussing the relationship between the level of generality of the constitutional text and original intentions).
293. Bork, supra note 21, at 2, 8;
294. see also Maltz, supra note 15, at 789 ("[U]nlike nonoriginalist theories, at its core originalism does not depend on extralegal, nonneutral justifications. Instead, it is premised on internal legal conventions developed without regard to some specific political agenda unrelated to the nature of judging itself.");
295. cf. Lillian R. Be Vier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. A PUB. POL'Y 283, 286 (1996) ("Integrity characterizes a judicial process based on originalism, [whereas] its lack is one of the chief deficiencies of its alternatives.").
296. Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2415 (2006) [hereinafter McConnell, derive Liberty]
297. (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005));
298. Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE LJ. 1501, 1525 (1989) [hereinafter McConnell, Role of Democratic Politics]
299. (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW (1988)) ("The appeal of originalism is that the moral principles so applied will be the foundational principles of the American Republic... and not the political-moral principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial office.");
300. see also Tara Smith, Why Originalism Won't Die-Common Mistakes in Competing Theories of Judicial Interpretation, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. A PUB. POL'Y 159, 161 (2007) ("The deeper reason that Originalism will not die, I think, is that it has staked out the moral high ground, championing the objectivity of interpretation that is essential to the ideal of the rule of law.").
301. Maltz, supra note 15, at 794.
302. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 21, at 6 ("[A] legitimate Court must be controlled by principles exterior to the will of the Justices.");
303. Scalia, supra note 24, at 863-64 (arguing that originalism limits the likelihood that "judges will mistake their own predilections for the law," because it relies on historical facts outside of any judge's particular preferences, whereas non-originalism "plays precisely to this weakness");
304. Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 106 (1989) ("A central concern of originalism is that judges be constrained by the law rather than be left free to act according to their own lights, a course that originalists regard as essentially lawless.").
305. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 135, at 286 ("Integrity characterizes a judicial process based on originalism, and its lack is one of the chief deficiencies of its alternatives.");
306. Scalia, supra note 24, at 854 ("The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism... is its incompatibility with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.");
307. McConnell, Active Liberty, supra note 136, at 2387-88 (arguing that originalists "offer a principled justification for the pattern of decisions they favor," but that non-originalists "have yet to propound a comparable theory").
308. See, e.g.. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 10-11 (1996) (explaining that historical ambiguities complicate any effort to establish one fixed constitutional meaning);
309. Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 397 (1989) (same).
310. Berger, supra note 134, at 1.
311. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 498 (1981) ("[J]udges cannot discover [the original] intention without building or adopting one conception of constitutional intention rather than another, without, that is, making the decisions of political morality they were meant to avoid.").
312. Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 29 (1985).
313. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 93, at 1213 ("[Particular interpretations of the framers' group intent... embody implicit or explicit normative judgments.").
314. Scalia, supra note 31, at 106.
315. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 90, at 492 ("[Originalism is] perhaps most often a political or rhetorical stalking horse for a set of substantive positions with respect to a relatively narrow set of constitutional issues in the current age.");
316. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 561 (2006) ("As a political practice that developed in the 1980s, originalism seeks, more or less blatantly, to alter the Constitution so as to infuse it with conservative political principles.").
317. Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an "Ism," 19 HARV. J.L. A PUB. POL'Y 301, 301 (1996) ("[A]mong constitutional law scholars at elite schools, the idea of being an originalist is tantamount to being some sort of intellectual Luddite.");
318. Maltz, supra note 15, at 773.
319. Colby, supra note 30, at 34.
320. Barnett, supra note 68, at 613.
321. 150. Colby's account, which is devastating, relies in large part on the theoretical refinements described above. But although Colby acknowledges that "[o]n the ground... it is getting harder and harder to tell originalism and nonoriginalism apart," he resists the claim that these refinements have collapsed the distinction between originalism and non-originalism, stressing that "[i]n theory... the New Originalism still differs from its nonoriginalist rivals in important ways in terms of its understanding of constitutional meaning, constitutional legitimacy, and the proper role of the judiciary in our constitutional system." Colby, supra note 30, at 41.
322. This is surely correct, if one excludes new new originalism from "New Originalism." But Colby treats essentially all of the developments in originalist theory since the days of Berger-including the claims by new originalists such as Lawson and Paulsen and the more capacious claims by Barnett, Balkin, and Solum about levels of generality and construction-as the accepted wisdom of new originalism. See id. at 6-7 (acknowledging that "only a few [originalists] have explicitly embraced all of the "significant theoretical moves" that marked the evolution from the old to the new originalism, but focusing on the "collective[]" effects of these theoretical moves);
323. id. at 67 (noting that not all originalists have endorsed "the full New Originalist theoretical package").
324. He is not necessarily wrong to do so; it is, after all, becoming almost impossible to keep track of all the variations in originalist thought, and in any event, there is "no official gatekeeper" to apply a test for originalist (or new originalist) purity. See Colby & Smith, supra note 6, at 258.
325. But as I have explained, new originalism itself is becoming a deeply contested concept, and many (and perhaps most) new originalists have distanced themselves from the broader implications of the new new originalists' claims. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 672 (2009) ("I am not convinced that an originalist 'school' can be identified that has all of [the] characteristics [of the new originalism]-").
326. See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
327. There is some debate over whether the new new originalists are intentionally trying to be subversive, hoisting new originalists on their own petard and forcing them to acknowledge the logical consequences of their theory. See Barnett, supra note 83, at 414, 416 (predicting that some originalists will charge that Balkin is trying to preserve "an unvarnished living constitutionalism" while claiming the "mantle of originalism" (internal quotation marks omitted));
328. Colby, supra note 30, at 40 ("One might be tempted to speculate that what is really going on here is not that originalism has fundamentally changed, but rather that several former nonoriginalists have jumped on the originalism bandwagon, and have attempted to co-opt the 'originalist' label for their owned decidedly nonoriginalist purposes.");
329. Smith, supra note 77, at 194-95 (questioning whether Balkin's conversion to originalism is "sincere or... strategic").
330. It is true that some of the new new originalists did not identify as originalists until recently. See J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 915 (1988) ("I do not agree with Berger's theory of constitutional interpretation...");
331. Barnett, supra note 83, at 405 ("All the time I was doing my earliest writings on the Ninth Amendment and the Second Amendment, I considered myself a nonoriginalist.").
332. But precisely because the versions of originalism that they offer are modest and not significantly different than most versions of non-originalism, there is perhaps little reason to doubt the sincerity of their commitments. Smith, supra note 77, at 195, 196.
333. Several commentators have argued that originalism is more a political movement than an interpretive methodology. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 90, at 492;
334. Greene, supra note 150, at 702;
335. Post & Siegel, supra note 146, at 561.
336. 155- 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
337. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
338. See Calabresi & Fine, supra note 68, at 692-98;
339. Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1531-41 (2008);
340. Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court's Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1107-15 (2004);
341. cf. Paulsen, supra note 47, at 2047-48 (arguing that the Ninth Amendment is a narrow provision that makes clear that the enumeration of rights running against the federal government does not "work a pro tanto repeal of state law rights possessed against state governments").
342. See Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1704 n.45 (2009);
343. see also Lawson, supra note 72, at 395 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause "textually embodies a nondelegation principle").
344. See Paulsen, supra note 116, at 995;
345. supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
346. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925-29 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the original meaning of the First Amendment);
347. see also Paulsen, supra note 116, at 993 & n.9
348. (describing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), as an "atrocit[y]"). To be fair, Paulsen has been unusually willing to follow his approach to open-ended provisions, even when it leads to results that are generally anathema to political conservatives.
349. See id. at 991-95 (arguing that the faithful application of his version of original public meaning textualism requires the conclusion that "the powers conferred on the national government are huge, sweeping, overlapping, and, when taken together, very nearly comprehensive").
350. Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464 (1986).
351. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 35, at 38-39 (discussing the "Great Divide" in constitutional interpretation between originalists and non-originalists).