The relationship among family business, corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from the Mexican stock exchange

Journal of Family Business Strategy

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 106-117

  San Martin Reyna, J M ^a   Duran Encalada, Jorge A ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS AMÉRICAS PUEBLA   (Mexico)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Family business; Firm performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861655583     PISSN: 18778585     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.03.001     Document Type: Article

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