The Chinese family and economic development: Obstacle or engine?

Economic Development and Cultural Change

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-30

  Whyte, Martin King ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CHINESE BUSINESS; CHINESE SOCIETY; CULTURAL CHANGE; CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT; DEVELOPING REGION; DEVELOPMENT FACTOR; ENTREPRENEURIAL FAMILISM; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; FAMILY STRUCTURE;

CHINA; HONG KONG; SINGAPORE; TAIWAN;

EID: 0030439820     PISSN: 00130079     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/452256     Document Type: Article

References (114)

1. The classic statement is William J. Goode, World Revolution and Family Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1963). Central to Goode's work is the claim that modernization produces converging trends in societies around the world toward a more "conjugal" emphasis in family life, which means that husbands and wives make decisions about how to organize their lives and raise their children with little interference from their parents or other extended kin. Most families in Western societies were fairly conjugal, in this sense, even before the Industrial Revolution.
2. It should be noted that Goode, in his classic work on the topic, did discuss the view that relatively "conjugal" family patterns helped to explain why capitalism arose first in Western Europe, although his primary concern was with the impact of modernization on family patterns.
3. The fact that industrialization occurred first in the West and altered family patterns there widened the differences between Chinese and Western family patterns. However, even in the preindustrial era, Western family patterns were quite different from those in agrarian China. For example, young people in preindustrial England tended to have substantial freedom of mate choice, they often lived and worked separately from their parents before form-ing their own families, there was no joint family ideal, kinship was traced bilaterally rather than patrilineally, and corporate lineage structures of the type found in China did not exist. See John Hajnal, "Two Kinds of Pre-Industrial Household Formation Systems," Population and Development Review 8 (September 1982): 449-94; Alan MacFarlane, Marriage and Love in England: Modes of Reproduction, 1300-1840 (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Jack Goody has devoted much of the last 3 decades to arguing that the differences among family systems in all of Eurasia, from England to Japan, were minor in comparison with the qualitative differences between the family patterns of Eurasia and sub-Saharan Africa. See, e.g., Jack Goody, The Oriental, the Ancient, and the Primitive (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). While accepting Goody's argument about the contrasts between Eurasia and Africa, I would still contend that the differences between northwestern European and Chinese family patterns prior to industrialization were systematic enough to be considered qualitative rather than simply quantitative.
4. The fact that industrialization occurred first in the West and altered family patterns there widened the differences between Chinese and Western family patterns. However, even in the preindustrial era, Western family patterns were quite different from those in agrarian China. For example, young people in preindustrial England tended to have substantial freedom of mate choice, they often lived and worked separately from their parents before form-ing their own families, there was no joint family ideal, kinship was traced bilaterally rather than patrilineally, and corporate lineage structures of the type found in China did not exist. See John Hajnal, "Two Kinds of Pre-Industrial Household Formation Systems," Population and Development Review 8 (September 1982): 449-94; Alan MacFarlane, Marriage and Love in England: Modes of Reproduction, 1300-1840 (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Jack Goody has devoted much of the last 3 decades to arguing that the differences among family systems in all of Eurasia, from England to Japan, were minor in comparison with the qualitative differences between the family patterns of Eurasia and sub-Saharan Africa. See, e.g., Jack Goody, The Oriental, the Ancient, and the Primitive (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). While accepting Goody's argument about the contrasts between Eurasia and Africa, I would still contend that the differences between northwestern European and Chinese family patterns prior to industrialization were systematic enough to be considered qualitative rather than simply quantitative.
5. The fact that industrialization occurred first in the West and altered family patterns there widened the differences between Chinese and Western family patterns. However, even in the preindustrial era, Western family patterns were quite different from those in agrarian China. For example, young people in preindustrial England tended to have substantial freedom of mate choice, they often lived and worked separately from their parents before form-ing their own families, there was no joint family ideal, kinship was traced bilaterally rather than patrilineally, and corporate lineage structures of the type found in China did not exist. See John Hajnal, "Two Kinds of Pre-Industrial Household Formation Systems," Population and Development Review 8 (September 1982): 449-94; Alan MacFarlane, Marriage and Love in England: Modes of Reproduction, 1300-1840 (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Jack Goody has devoted much of the last 3 decades to arguing that the differences among family systems in all of Eurasia, from England to Japan, were minor in comparison with the qualitative differences between the family patterns of Eurasia and sub-Saharan Africa. See, e.g., Jack Goody, The Oriental, the Ancient, and the Primitive (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). While accepting Goody's argument about the contrasts between Eurasia and Africa, I would still contend that the differences between northwestern European and Chinese family patterns prior to industrialization were systematic enough to be considered qualitative rather than simply quantitative.
6. Charles Madge, "The Relevance of Family Patterns in the Process of Modernization in East Asia," in Social Organization and the Applications of Anthropology, ed. Robert J. Smith (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 164.
7. The central works on the topic by Max Weber are The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930 [originally 1904-5]), and The Religion of China (Glencoe, I11.: Free Press, 1951 [originally 1916]). For Talcott Parsons, see his The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1937), The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), and Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956). For Marion Levy, Jr., consult The Family Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949) , and "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," in Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, ed. S. Kuznets, W. Moore, and J. Spengler (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955). For Albert Feuerwerker, consult his first book, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).
8. The central works on the topic by Max Weber are The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930 [originally 1904-5]), and The Religion of China (Glencoe, I11.: Free Press, 1951 [originally 1916]). For Talcott Parsons, see his The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1937), The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), and Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956). For Marion Levy, Jr., consult The Family Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949) , and "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," in Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, ed. S. Kuznets, W. Moore, and J. Spengler (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955). For Albert Feuerwerker, consult his first book, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).
9. The central works on the topic by Max Weber are The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930 [originally 1904-5]), and The Religion of China (Glencoe, I11.: Free Press, 1951 [originally 1916]). For Talcott Parsons, see his The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1937), The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), and Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956). For Marion Levy, Jr., consult The Family Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949) , and "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," in Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, ed. S. Kuznets, W. Moore, and J. Spengler (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955). For Albert Feuerwerker, consult his first book, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).
10. The central works on the topic by Max Weber are The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930 [originally 1904-5]), and The Religion of China (Glencoe, I11.: Free Press, 1951 [originally 1916]). For Talcott Parsons, see his The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1937), The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), and Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956). For Marion Levy, Jr., consult The Family Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949) , and "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," in Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, ed. S. Kuznets, W. Moore, and J. Spengler (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955). For Albert Feuerwerker, consult his first book, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).
11. The central works on the topic by Max Weber are The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930 [originally 1904-5]), and The Religion of China (Glencoe, I11.: Free Press, 1951 [originally 1916]). For Talcott Parsons, see his The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1937), The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), and Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956). For Marion Levy, Jr., consult The Family Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949) , and "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," in Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, ed. S. Kuznets, W. Moore, and J. Spengler (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955). For Albert Feuerwerker, consult his first book, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).
12. The central works on the topic by Max Weber are The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930 [originally 1904-5]), and The Religion of China (Glencoe, I11.: Free Press, 1951 [originally 1916]). For Talcott Parsons, see his The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1937), The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), and Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956). For Marion Levy, Jr., consult The Family Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949) , and "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," in Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, ed. S. Kuznets, W. Moore, and J. Spengler (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955). For Albert Feuerwerker, consult his first book, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).
13. The central works on the topic by Max Weber are The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930 [originally 1904-5]), and The Religion of China (Glencoe, I11.: Free Press, 1951 [originally 1916]). For Talcott Parsons, see his The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1937), The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), and Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956). For Marion Levy, Jr., consult The Family Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949) , and "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," in Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, ed. S. Kuznets, W. Moore, and J. Spengler (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955). For Albert Feuerwerker, consult his first book, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).
14. The central works on the topic by Max Weber are The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930 [originally 1904-5]), and The Religion of China (Glencoe, I11.: Free Press, 1951 [originally 1916]). For Talcott Parsons, see his The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1937), The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), and Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956). For Marion Levy, Jr., consult The Family Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949) , and "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," in Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, ed. S. Kuznets, W. Moore, and J. Spengler (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955). For Albert Feuerwerker, consult his first book, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).
15. Clark Kerr, J. Dunlop, F. Harbison, and C. Myers, Industrialism and Industrial Man (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1973), p. 94 (originally Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), quoted in S. L. Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings," in In Search of an East Asian Development Model, ed. P. Berger and H. H. M. Hsiao (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 134.
16. Clark Kerr, J. Dunlop, F. Harbison, and C. Myers, Industrialism and Industrial Man (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1973), p. 94 (originally Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), quoted in S. L. Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings," in In Search of an East Asian Development Model, ed. P. Berger and H. H. M. Hsiao (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 134.
17. William Jenner, The Tyranny of History: The Roots of China's Crisis (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 110.
18. Again, these are not problems unique to Chinese family firms. One thinks, e.g., of the way in which the Ford Motor Company lost its early lead in car sales to other companies when the patriarch, Henry Ford, refused to listen to advice and kept producing the same models year after year and in only one color - black.
19. Geographic mobility generally has an important beneficial impact on income distribution and the transmission of knowledge in society at large, and insofar as such mobility is impeded, the gaps between rich regions and poor ones are likely to widen. On the beneficial effects in the case of Taiwan, see Susan Greenhalgh, "Networks and Their Nodes: Urban Society on Taiwan," China Quarterly 99 (September 1984): 529-52.
20. Susan Greenhalgh, "Land Reform and Family Entrepreneurialism in East Asia," in Rural Development and Population: Institutions and Policies, ed. G. McNicoll and M. Cain (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 86.
21. See, e.g., Sybil van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions of Manchu China (London: Athlone, 1962); Morton Fried, The Fabric of Chinese Society (New York: Praeger, 1953); Ambrose Y. King, "Kuan-hsi [guanxi] and Network Building," Daedalus 120 (Spring 1991): 63-84.
22. See, e.g., Sybil van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions of Manchu China (London: Athlone, 1962); Morton Fried, The Fabric of Chinese Society (New York: Praeger, 1953); Ambrose Y. King, "Kuan-hsi [guanxi] and Network Building," Daedalus 120 (Spring 1991): 63-84.
23. See, e.g., Sybil van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions of Manchu China (London: Athlone, 1962); Morton Fried, The Fabric of Chinese Society (New York: Praeger, 1953); Ambrose Y. King, "Kuan-hsi [guanxi] and Network Building," Daedalus 120 (Spring 1991): 63-84.
24. See the discussion in Feuerwerker (n. 5 above); see also Sherman Cochran, Big Business in China: Sino-American Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890-1930 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
25. Jenner (n. 7 above), p. 80. Sociologist S. L. Wong, based on his research on textile firms in Hong Kong, argues that there is a natural life cycle of family firms with four phases: emergent, centralized, segmented, and disintegrative. See Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above), pp. 140-41; also see S. L. Wong, "The Chinese Family Firm: A Model," British Journal of Sociology 36 (March 1985): 58-72. Once again, this tendency of family-run firms to end up being splintered by family feuds is not confined to China, as the recent bitter court battles of auto parts and bookstore magnate Herbert Haft, his estranged wife, and two sons illustrate.
26. Jenner (n. 7 above), p. 80. Sociologist S. L. Wong, based on his research on textile firms in Hong Kong, argues that there is a natural life cycle of family firms with four phases: emergent, centralized, segmented, and disintegrative. See Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above), pp. 140-41; also see S. L. Wong, "The Chinese Family Firm: A Model," British Journal of Sociology 36 (March 1985): 58-72. Once again, this tendency of family-run firms to end up being splintered by family feuds is not confined to China, as the recent bitter court battles of auto parts and bookstore magnate Herbert Haft, his estranged wife, and two sons illustrate.
27. Jenner (n. 7 above), p. 80. Sociologist S. L. Wong, based on his research on textile firms in Hong Kong, argues that there is a natural life cycle of family firms with four phases: emergent, centralized, segmented, and disintegrative. See Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above), pp. 140-41; also see S. L. Wong, "The Chinese Family Firm: A Model," British Journal of Sociology 36 (March 1985): 58-72. Once again, this tendency of family-run firms to end up being splintered by family feuds is not confined to China, as the recent bitter court battles of auto parts and bookstore magnate Herbert Haft, his estranged wife, and two sons illustrate.
28. The contrast between universalism and particularism and between achieved and ascribed status are central dichotomies in Parsons's version of modernization theory. Obviously the image of modern individuals as operating as homo economicus is at the root of such images.
29. Edward Shorter claims that in this respect American society was "born modern." By this he means that from colonial times, families were small and children were raised in preparation for going off to live independently. See his book, The Making of the Modern Family (New York: Basic, 1975). See also Richard Rapson, "The American Child as Seen by British Travelers, 1845-1935," American Quarterly 17 (Fall 1965): 520-34. Even if American society from earliest times displayed these tendencies in particularly clear form, they were characteristic of preindustrial northwestern Europe as well, as stressed in the work of Peter Laslett. See his book, The World We Have Lost (London: Methuen, 1965). Consult also MacFarlane (n. 3 above). On the relation between nuclear family structures and independence training of children, see Herbert Barry, Irvin Child, and Margaret Bacon, "Relation of Child Training to Subsistence Economy," American Anthropologist 61 (January 1959): 51-63; John Whiting and Irvin Child, Child Training and Personality (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953).
30. Edward Shorter claims that in this respect American society was "born modern." By this he means that from colonial times, families were small and children were raised in preparation for going off to live independently. See his book, The Making of the Modern Family (New York: Basic, 1975). See also Richard Rapson, "The American Child as Seen by British Travelers, 1845-1935," American Quarterly 17 (Fall 1965): 520-34. Even if American society from earliest times displayed these tendencies in particularly clear form, they were characteristic of preindustrial northwestern Europe as well, as stressed in the work of Peter Laslett. See his book, The World We Have Lost (London: Methuen, 1965). Consult also MacFarlane (n. 3 above). On the relation between nuclear family structures and independence training of children, see Herbert Barry, Irvin Child, and Margaret Bacon, "Relation of Child Training to Subsistence Economy," American Anthropologist 61 (January 1959): 51-63; John Whiting and Irvin Child, Child Training and Personality (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953).
31. Edward Shorter claims that in this respect American society was "born modern." By this he means that from colonial times, families were small and children were raised in preparation for going off to live independently. See his book, The Making of the Modern Family (New York: Basic, 1975). See also Richard Rapson, "The American Child as Seen by British Travelers, 1845-1935," American Quarterly 17 (Fall 1965): 520-34. Even if American society from earliest times displayed these tendencies in particularly clear form, they were characteristic of preindustrial northwestern Europe as well, as stressed in the work of Peter Laslett. See his book, The World We Have Lost (London: Methuen, 1965). Consult also MacFarlane (n. 3 above). On the relation between nuclear family structures and independence training of children, see Herbert Barry, Irvin Child, and Margaret Bacon, "Relation of Child Training to Subsistence Economy," American Anthropologist 61 (January 1959): 51-63; John Whiting and Irvin Child, Child Training and Personality (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953).
32. Edward Shorter claims that in this respect American society was "born modern." By this he means that from colonial times, families were small and children were raised in preparation for going off to live independently. See his book, The Making of the Modern Family (New York: Basic, 1975). See also Richard Rapson, "The American Child as Seen by British Travelers, 1845-1935," American Quarterly 17 (Fall 1965): 520-34. Even if American society from earliest times displayed these tendencies in particularly clear form, they were characteristic of preindustrial northwestern Europe as well, as stressed in the work of Peter Laslett. See his book, The World We Have Lost (London: Methuen, 1965). Consult also MacFarlane (n. 3 above). On the relation between nuclear family structures and independence training of children, see Herbert Barry, Irvin Child, and Margaret Bacon, "Relation of Child Training to Subsistence Economy," American Anthropologist 61 (January 1959): 51-63; John Whiting and Irvin Child, Child Training and Personality (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953).
33. Edward Shorter claims that in this respect American society was "born modern." By this he means that from colonial times, families were small and children were raised in preparation for going off to live independently. See his book, The Making of the Modern Family (New York: Basic, 1975). See also Richard Rapson, "The American Child as Seen by British Travelers, 1845-1935," American Quarterly 17 (Fall 1965): 520-34. Even if American society from earliest times displayed these tendencies in particularly clear form, they were characteristic of preindustrial northwestern Europe as well, as stressed in the work of Peter Laslett. See his book, The World We Have Lost (London: Methuen, 1965). Consult also MacFarlane (n. 3 above). On the relation between nuclear family structures and independence training of children, see Herbert Barry, Irvin Child, and Margaret Bacon, "Relation of Child Training to Subsistence Economy," American Anthropologist 61 (January 1959): 51-63; John Whiting and Irvin Child, Child Training and Personality (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953).
34. See the discussion in Parsons and Smelser (n. 5 above); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism," Business History Review 58 (Winter 1984): 473-503, reprinted in The Sociology of Economic Life, ed. M. Granovetter and R. Swedberg (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992). 17. Feuerwerker (n. 5 above), p. 243.
35. See the discussion in Parsons and Smelser (n. 5 above); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism," Business History Review 58 (Winter 1984): 473-503, reprinted in The Sociology of Economic Life, ed. M. Granovetter and R. Swedberg (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992). 17. Feuerwerker (n. 5 above), p. 243.
36. See the discussion in Parsons and Smelser (n. 5 above); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism," Business History Review 58 (Winter 1984): 473-503, reprinted in The Sociology of Economic Life, ed. M. Granovetter and R. Swedberg (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992). 17. Feuerwerker (n. 5 above), p. 243.
37. See the discussion in Parsons and Smelser (n. 5 above); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism," Business History Review 58 (Winter 1984): 473-503, reprinted in The Sociology of Economic Life, ed. M. Granovetter and R. Swedberg (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992). 17. Feuerwerker (n. 5 above), p. 243.
38. In his book The Chinese Family and the Communist Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1959), p. 19, sociologist C. K. Yang spoke of the "incompatibility between [an industrial society built on a socialist pattern] and the kinship-oriented structure." Cited in Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above), p. 135.
39. In his book The Chinese Family and the Communist Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1959), p. 19, sociologist C. K. Yang spoke of the "incompatibility between [an industrial society built on a socialist pattern] and the kinship-oriented structure." Cited in Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above), p. 135.
40. In modern societies generally the poor tend to have more children than do the prosperous. However, there is at least some evidence that in China the opposite was the case in the nineteenth century and presumably earlier, with the wealthy having more children than the poor. See, e.g., H. D. Lamson, "A Study of the Relationship of Education to Family Size," China Critic 3 (August 1930): 799-802.
41. See, e.g., Yung-teh Chow, Social Mobility in China (New York: Atherton, 1966); Francis L. K. Hsu, Under the Ancestor's Shadow (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).
42. See, e.g., Yung-teh Chow, Social Mobility in China (New York: Atherton, 1966); Francis L. K. Hsu, Under the Ancestor's Shadow (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).
43. This argument was stressed particularly by Marion Levy, Jr., in his article "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan" (n. 5 above).
44. See, e.g., Chow Tse-tung, The May Fourth Movement (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960); Deng Yingchao, "The Spirit of the May Fourth Movement," in Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook, 2d ed., ed. and trans. P. Ebrey (New York: Free Press, 1993). Mao Zedong in 1919 in one of his first publications bitterly attacked the system of arranged marriage that had led to the suicide of a young woman from a prominent family. See Roxanne Witke, "Mao Tse-tung, Women, and Suicide in the May Fourth Era," in Women in China, ed. M. Young (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Chinese Studies, 1973). Lu Hsun, China's most famous modern writer, attacked Confucian culture during this period as essentially cannibalistic, devouring the young in order to conserve the old ways.
45. See, e.g., Chow Tse-tung, The May Fourth Movement (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960); Deng Yingchao, "The Spirit of the May Fourth Movement," in Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook, 2d ed., ed. and trans. P. Ebrey (New York: Free Press, 1993). Mao Zedong in 1919 in one of his first publications bitterly attacked the system of arranged marriage that had led to the suicide of a young woman from a prominent family. See Roxanne Witke, "Mao Tse-tung, Women, and Suicide in the May Fourth Era," in Women in China, ed. M. Young (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Chinese Studies, 1973). Lu Hsun, China's most famous modern writer, attacked Confucian culture during this period as essentially cannibalistic, devouring the young in order to conserve the old ways.
46. See, e.g., Chow Tse-tung, The May Fourth Movement (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960); Deng Yingchao, "The Spirit of the May Fourth Movement," in Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook, 2d ed., ed. and trans. P. Ebrey (New York: Free Press, 1993). Mao Zedong in 1919 in one of his first publications bitterly attacked the system of arranged marriage that had led to the suicide of a young woman from a prominent family. See Roxanne Witke, "Mao Tse-tung, Women, and Suicide in the May Fourth Era," in Women in China, ed. M. Young (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Chinese Studies, 1973). Lu Hsun, China's most famous modern writer, attacked Confucian culture during this period as essentially cannibalistic, devouring the young in order to conserve the old ways.
47. These themes reemerged strongly in the 1988 PRC television documentary series Heshang (River Elegy), which echoed May 4th reformers in contrasting the vibrant and individualist West with the static and more collectivist China. The series was eventually banned from the airwaves, and the leading figures who produced it ended up in exile in the West after 1989.
48. The 80% estimate (for the 1980s) is cited in Hung-chao Tai, "The Oriental Alternative: A Hypothesis on East Asian Culture and Economy," Issues and Studies 25 (March 1989): 10-36 (estimate on p. 25). Greenhalgh estimates for the same period that 97.4% of manufacturing firms on Taiwan were family based. See Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development," in Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan, ed. E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1988), p. 239. In the same article, Greenhalgh discusses the recurring Republic of China government attacks on family firms.
49. The 80% estimate (for the 1980s) is cited in Hung-chao Tai, "The Oriental Alternative: A Hypothesis on East Asian Culture and Economy," Issues and Studies 25 (March 1989): 10-36 (estimate on p. 25). Greenhalgh estimates for the same period that 97.4% of manufacturing firms on Taiwan were family based. See Susan Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development," in Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan, ed. E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1988), p. 239. In the same article, Greenhalgh discusses the recurring Republic of China government attacks on family firms.
50. This contention gained added force from the fact that the Meiji Restoration led to a "Confucianization" of family patterns throughout Japanese society, with customs such as arranged marriages, which had been confined generally to the samurai and other elites, spreading to ordinary townspeople and peasants as well. It was during this period, when Japanese families were becoming more similar to those found in China, that Japanese development began to take off.
51. See the discussion in Levy, "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan" (n. 5 above); Robert J. Smith, "Small Families, Small Households, and Residential Instability: Town and City in 'Pre-Modern' Japan," in Household and Family in Past Time, ed. P. Laslett and R. Wall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
52. See the discussion in Levy, "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan" (n. 5 above); Robert J. Smith, "Small Families, Small Households, and Residential Instability: Town and City in 'Pre-Modern' Japan," in Household and Family in Past Time, ed. P. Laslett and R. Wall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
53. The other "mini-dragon" is South Korea, and many of the same arguments that have been made about Chinese families can be and have been made about the Confucian-influenced families in South Korea. See the discussion in The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
54. See the discussion in Greenhalgh, "Land Reform and Family Entrepreneurship in East Asia" (n. 10 above).
55. Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above), p. 146. See also S. L. Wong, Emigrant Entrepreneurs: Shanghai Industrialists in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988). Prominent among the proponents of the engine argument are sociologists such as Wong and Ezra Vogel; anthropologists Greenhalgh, Stevan Harrell, Myron Cohen, and Donald DeGlopper; historians Wellington Chan and Andrea McElderry; economist Ramon Myers; political scientist Hung-chao Tai; and management specialist S. Gordon Redding. See in particular Reading's book, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990). However, there are important differences among these advocates of the engine view, which will be discussed in a subsequent section of this article.
56. Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above), p. 146. See also S. L. Wong, Emigrant Entrepreneurs: Shanghai Industrialists in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988). Prominent among the proponents of the engine argument are sociologists such as Wong and Ezra Vogel; anthropologists Greenhalgh, Stevan Harrell, Myron Cohen, and Donald DeGlopper; historians Wellington Chan and Andrea McElderry; economist Ramon Myers; political scientist Hung-chao Tai; and management specialist S. Gordon Redding. See in particular Reading's book, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990). However, there are important differences among these advocates of the engine view, which will be discussed in a subsequent section of this article.
57. Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above), p. 146. See also S. L. Wong, Emigrant Entrepreneurs: Shanghai Industrialists in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988). Prominent among the proponents of the engine argument are sociologists such as Wong and Ezra Vogel; anthropologists Greenhalgh, Stevan Harrell, Myron Cohen, and Donald DeGlopper; historians Wellington Chan and Andrea McElderry; economist Ramon Myers; political scientist Hung-chao Tai; and management specialist S. Gordon Redding. See in particular Reading's book, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990). However, there are important differences among these advocates of the engine view, which will be discussed in a subsequent section of this article.
58. M. Wolf, The House of Lim (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 37, cited in Stevan Harrell, "Why Do the Chinese Work So Hard?" Modern China 11 (April 1985): 206.
59. M. Wolf, The House of Lim (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 37, cited in Stevan Harrell, "Why Do the Chinese Work So Hard?" Modern China 11 (April 1985): 206.
60. Greenhalgh, "Land Reform and Family Entrepreneurialism in East Asia" (n. 10 above), p. 90.
61. Harrell; Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above); Newsweek (October 25, 1993), p. 37, similarly observes that the PRC is in the midst of a "great economic hyperventilation," with everyone trying to set up companies and get rich.
62. Harrell; Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above); Newsweek (October 25, 1993), p. 37, similarly observes that the PRC is in the midst of a "great economic hyperventilation," with everyone trying to set up companies and get rich.
63. The causes and nature of both the fertility declines and the reduced attractiveness of political careers vary among the various Chinese populations in question. Fertility control has been imposed in a draconian fashion in the PRC, but in a more voluntary form elsewhere; aversion to politics stems from a variety of factors - e.g., due to colonial rule in Hong Kong, mainlander discrimination against Taiwanese in Taiwan, and the declining prestige of the Chinese Communist Party in the PRC.
64. This argument has been articulated most directly about Japan, rather than China, by Ezra Vogel. See his book, Japan as Number 1: Lessons for America (New York: Harper & Row, 1979). See also James Fallows, Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System (New York: Pantheon, 1994), p. 414. Analysts of Chinese families present a somewhat different view, which will be discussed below.
65. This argument has been articulated most directly about Japan, rather than China, by Ezra Vogel. See his book, Japan as Number 1: Lessons for America (New York: Harper & Row, 1979). See also James Fallows, Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System (New York: Pantheon, 1994), p. 414. Analysts of Chinese families present a somewhat different view, which will be discussed below.
66. "Special Issue: Greater China," China Quarterly, vol. 136 (December 1993).
67. See the discussion in Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development" (n. 24 above); Greenhalgh agrees with the view that Taiwan may be entering a period in which the dominance of family firms will decline in favor of larger, nonfamily enterprises. However, she acknowledges that as of the mid-1980s there was little sign of such a decline. Since then there has been a major shift of investment by Taiwan firms into factories located in mainland China, and particularly in Fujian Province. It is unclear whether this shift has had any impact on the role played by family firms in Taiwan.
68. See, e.g., Norma Diamond, "Women under Kuomintang Rule: Variations on the Feminine Mystique," Modern China 1 (January 1975): 3-45; Janet Salaff, Working Daughters of Hong Kong: Filial Piety or Power in the Family? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Susan Greenhalgh, "Sexual Stratification: The Other Side of 'Growth with Equity' in East Asia," Population and Development Review 11 (June 1985): 265-314, and "De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm," American Ethnologist 21 (November 1994): 746-75.
69. See, e.g., Norma Diamond, "Women under Kuomintang Rule: Variations on the Feminine Mystique," Modern China 1 (January 1975): 3-45; Janet Salaff, Working Daughters of Hong Kong: Filial Piety or Power in the Family? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Susan Greenhalgh, "Sexual Stratification: The Other Side of 'Growth with Equity' in East Asia," Population and Development Review 11 (June 1985): 265-314, and "De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm," American Ethnologist 21 (November 1994): 746-75.
70. See, e.g., Norma Diamond, "Women under Kuomintang Rule: Variations on the Feminine Mystique," Modern China 1 (January 1975): 3-45; Janet Salaff, Working Daughters of Hong Kong: Filial Piety or Power in the Family? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Susan Greenhalgh, "Sexual Stratification: The Other Side of 'Growth with Equity' in East Asia," Population and Development Review 11 (June 1985): 265-314, and "De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm," American Ethnologist 21 (November 1994): 746-75.
71. See, e.g., Norma Diamond, "Women under Kuomintang Rule: Variations on the Feminine Mystique," Modern China 1 (January 1975): 3-45; Janet Salaff, Working Daughters of Hong Kong: Filial Piety or Power in the Family? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Susan Greenhalgh, "Sexual Stratification: The Other Side of 'Growth with Equity' in East Asia," Population and Development Review 11 (June 1985): 265-314, and "De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm," American Ethnologist 21 (November 1994): 746-75.
72. See Friedrich Engels, On the Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State (Chicago: Charles Kerr, 1902).
73. P. Berger, "An East Asian Development Model?" in In Search of an East Asian Development Model, ed. P. Berger and H. H. M. Hsiao (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 7.
74. See Yhi-min Ho, "The Production Structure of the Manufacturing Sector and Its Distribution Implications," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (January 1980): 321-43; Samuel P. Ho, "Small Scale Industries in Two Rapidly Growing Less Developed Economies: Korea and Taiwan - a Study of the Characteristics, Competitive Bases, and Productivity," in Studies in Employment and Rural Development, no. 53 (Washington: World Bank, 1978). (Both studies are cited in Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development" [n. 24 above], p. 229.) The growing dominance of small Taiwan firms during the 1960s and 1970s is documented in Alice Amsden, "Big Business and Urban Congestion in Taiwan: The Origins of Small Enterprise and Regionally Decentralized Industry (Respectively)," World Development 19 (September 1991): 1121-35, as cited in Greenhalgh, "De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm," p. 764. Similarly, data from Hong Kong indicate that the number of employees in the average manufacturing firm in the colony dropped from 44.6 in 1954 to only 18.4 in 1984. (Figures cited in S. Gordon Redding, "The Role of the Entrepreneur in the New Asian Capitalism," in Berger and Hsiao, eds., p. 106.)
75. See Yhi-min Ho, "The Production Structure of the Manufacturing Sector and Its Distribution Implications," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (January 1980): 321-43; Samuel P. Ho, "Small Scale Industries in Two Rapidly Growing Less Developed Economies: Korea and Taiwan - a Study of the Characteristics, Competitive Bases, and Productivity," in Studies in Employment and Rural Development, no. 53 (Washington: World Bank, 1978). (Both studies are cited in Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development" [n. 24 above], p. 229.) The growing dominance of small Taiwan firms during the 1960s and 1970s is documented in Alice Amsden, "Big Business and Urban Congestion in Taiwan: The Origins of Small Enterprise and Regionally Decentralized Industry (Respectively)," World Development 19 (September 1991): 1121-35, as cited in Greenhalgh, "De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm," p. 764. Similarly, data from Hong Kong indicate that the number of employees in the average manufacturing firm in the colony dropped from 44.6 in 1954 to only 18.4 in 1984. (Figures cited in S. Gordon Redding, "The Role of the Entrepreneur in the New Asian Capitalism," in Berger and Hsiao, eds., p. 106.)
76. See Yhi-min Ho, "The Production Structure of the Manufacturing Sector and Its Distribution Implications," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (January 1980): 321-43; Samuel P. Ho, "Small Scale Industries in Two Rapidly Growing Less Developed Economies: Korea and Taiwan - a Study of the Characteristics, Competitive Bases, and Productivity," in Studies in Employment and Rural Development, no. 53 (Washington: World Bank, 1978). (Both studies are cited in Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development" [n. 24 above], p. 229.) The growing dominance of small Taiwan firms during the 1960s and 1970s is documented in Alice Amsden, "Big Business and Urban Congestion in Taiwan: The Origins of Small Enterprise and Regionally Decentralized Industry (Respectively)," World Development 19 (September 1991): 1121-35, as cited in Greenhalgh, "De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm," p. 764. Similarly, data from Hong Kong indicate that the number of employees in the average manufacturing firm in the colony dropped from 44.6 in 1954 to only 18.4 in 1984. (Figures cited in S. Gordon Redding, "The Role of the Entrepreneur in the New Asian Capitalism," in Berger and Hsiao, eds., p. 106.)
77. See Yhi-min Ho, "The Production Structure of the Manufacturing Sector and Its Distribution Implications," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (January 1980): 321-43; Samuel P. Ho, "Small Scale Industries in Two Rapidly Growing Less Developed Economies: Korea and Taiwan - a Study of the Characteristics, Competitive Bases, and Productivity," in Studies in Employment and Rural Development, no. 53 (Washington: World Bank, 1978). (Both studies are cited in Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development" [n. 24 above], p. 229.) The growing dominance of small Taiwan firms during the 1960s and 1970s is documented in Alice Amsden, "Big Business and Urban Congestion in Taiwan: The Origins of Small Enterprise and Regionally Decentralized Industry (Respectively)," World Development 19 (September 1991): 1121-35, as cited in Greenhalgh, "De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm," p. 764. Similarly, data from Hong Kong indicate that the number of employees in the average manufacturing firm in the colony dropped from 44.6 in 1954 to only 18.4 in 1984. (Figures cited in S. Gordon Redding, "The Role of the Entrepreneur in the New Asian Capitalism," in Berger and Hsiao, eds., p. 106.)
78. See Yhi-min Ho, "The Production Structure of the Manufacturing Sector and Its Distribution Implications," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (January 1980): 321-43; Samuel P. Ho, "Small Scale Industries in Two Rapidly Growing Less Developed Economies: Korea and Taiwan - a Study of the Characteristics, Competitive Bases, and Productivity," in Studies in Employment and Rural Development, no. 53 (Washington: World Bank, 1978). (Both studies are cited in Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development" [n. 24 above], p. 229.) The growing dominance of small Taiwan firms during the 1960s and 1970s is documented in Alice Amsden, "Big Business and Urban Congestion in Taiwan: The Origins of Small Enterprise and Regionally Decentralized Industry (Respectively)," World Development 19 (September 1991): 1121-35, as cited in Greenhalgh, "De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm," p. 764. Similarly, data from Hong Kong indicate that the number of employees in the average manufacturing firm in the colony dropped from 44.6 in 1954 to only 18.4 in 1984. (Figures cited in S. Gordon Redding, "The Role of the Entrepreneur in the New Asian Capitalism," in Berger and Hsiao, eds., p. 106.)
79. See Yhi-min Ho, "The Production Structure of the Manufacturing Sector and Its Distribution Implications," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (January 1980): 321-43; Samuel P. Ho, "Small Scale Industries in Two Rapidly Growing Less Developed Economies: Korea and Taiwan - a Study of the Characteristics, Competitive Bases, and Productivity," in Studies in Employment and Rural Development, no. 53 (Washington: World Bank, 1978). (Both studies are cited in Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development" [n. 24 above], p. 229.) The growing dominance of small Taiwan firms during the 1960s and 1970s is documented in Alice Amsden, "Big Business and Urban Congestion in Taiwan: The Origins of Small Enterprise and Regionally Decentralized Industry (Respectively)," World Development 19 (September 1991): 1121-35, as cited in Greenhalgh, "De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm," p. 764. Similarly, data from Hong Kong indicate that the number of employees in the average manufacturing firm in the colony dropped from 44.6 in 1954 to only 18.4 in 1984. (Figures cited in S. Gordon Redding, "The Role of the Entrepreneur in the New Asian Capitalism," in Berger and Hsiao, eds., p. 106.)
80. See J. L. Espy, "The Strategy of Chinese Industrial Enterprise in Hong Kong" (DBA diss., Harvard University, 1970), cited in Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above), p. 139.
81. See J. L. Espy, "The Strategy of Chinese Industrial Enterprise in Hong Kong" (DBA diss., Harvard University, 1970), cited in Wong, "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Sociocultural Settings" (n. 6 above), p. 139.
82. It would be difficult to collect the systematic data needed for such a test, since family-run firms are notoriously secretive about their internal organization and economic performance.
83. Quotation from Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development," p. 227. See also Gilbert Rozman, ed., The Modernization of China (New York: Free Press, 1981).
84. Quotation from Greenhalgh, "Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development," p. 227. See also Gilbert Rozman, ed., The Modernization of China (New York: Free Press, 1981).
85. See, e.g., the discussion in Robert Silin, Leadership and Values: The Organization of Large-Scale Taiwanese Enterprises (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); Lindy Li Mark, "Taiwanese Lineage Enterprises: A Study of Familial Entrepreneurship" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1972). I will assume that the reader does not need convincing that the obstacle view is also too simple, and I will not develop that proposition here.
86. See, e.g., the discussion in Robert Silin, Leadership and Values: The Organization of Large-Scale Taiwanese Enterprises (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); Lindy Li Mark, "Taiwanese Lineage Enterprises: A Study of Familial Entrepreneurship" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1972). I will assume that the reader does not need convincing that the obstacle view is also too simple, and I will not develop that proposition here.
87. The works cited earlier by Harrell and by Redding generally emphasize what I call the culturalist view. Greenhalgh, in contrast, generally espouses a more contingent, social structural view. Wong has in some writings (particularly in his article "The Applicability of Asian Family Values to Other Cultural Settings" [n. 6 above]) advocated a culturalist view, but in his book Emigrant Entrepreneurs (n. 29 above), he develops a more contingent and social structural view.
88. In this summary I am influenced by the work of Greenhalgh, who has tried to specify the conditions necessary for Chinese entrepreneurial familism. See, in particular, her article "Land Reform and Family Entrepreneurialism in East Asia" (n. 10 above).
89. One major sociological study of routes to social mobility in China during the 1930s and 1940s can be read as indicating that getting ahead often depended on luck or resorting to violence and intimidation. See Chow (n. 20 above). One case study featured in Chow's monograph involved a family that made its fortune by robbing and murdering a competitor.
90. See the discussions in William Parish and Martin Whyte, Village and Family in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Martin Whyte and William Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Robert Mitchell, Family Life in Urban Hong Kong (Taipei: Orient Cultural Service, 1972); Janet Salaff, State and Family in Singapore (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); Arland Thornton and Hui-sheng Lin, Social Change and the Family in Taiwan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). For reasons of space, my discussion in this article is in the nature of a quick overview. I do not attempt to discuss here the specific details and variations of these changes, the documentation for which can be found in the works just cited.
91. See the discussions in William Parish and Martin Whyte, Village and Family in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Martin Whyte and William Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Robert Mitchell, Family Life in Urban Hong Kong (Taipei: Orient Cultural Service, 1972); Janet Salaff, State and Family in Singapore (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); Arland Thornton and Hui-sheng Lin, Social Change and the Family in Taiwan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). For reasons of space, my discussion in this article is in the nature of a quick overview. I do not attempt to discuss here the specific details and variations of these changes, the documentation for which can be found in the works just cited.
92. See the discussions in William Parish and Martin Whyte, Village and Family in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Martin Whyte and William Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Robert Mitchell, Family Life in Urban Hong Kong (Taipei: Orient Cultural Service, 1972); Janet Salaff, State and Family in Singapore (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); Arland Thornton and Hui-sheng Lin, Social Change and the Family in Taiwan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). For reasons of space, my discussion in this article is in the nature of a quick overview. I do not attempt to discuss here the specific details and variations of these changes, the documentation for which can be found in the works just cited.
93. See the discussions in William Parish and Martin Whyte, Village and Family in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Martin Whyte and William Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Robert Mitchell, Family Life in Urban Hong Kong (Taipei: Orient Cultural Service, 1972); Janet Salaff, State and Family in Singapore (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); Arland Thornton and Hui-sheng Lin, Social Change and the Family in Taiwan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). For reasons of space, my discussion in this article is in the nature of a quick overview. I do not attempt to discuss here the specific details and variations of these changes, the documentation for which can be found in the works just cited.
94. See the discussions in William Parish and Martin Whyte, Village and Family in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978);
95. Obviously there were regional and class differences in family patterns in late imperial times, so that any account of "the traditional family" involves considerable oversimplification. Nonetheless, there was enough historical continuity and cultural coherence in the Chinese imperial system to create more uniformity in family patterns than most other societies exhibited. See the general overview discussion of the family patterns of late imperial China in Hugh Baker, Chinese Family and Kinship (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
96. Marriages in which parents make the decision and the bride and groom do not meet until the day of the wedding have virtually disappeared from all Chinese locales. Even when parents take the initiative, as is still common in rural areas of the PRC, it is generally necessary for them to arrange that the prospective bride and groom meet, and the younger generation can veto parental choices. Increasingly in the urban PRC and in Taiwan generally, not to mention in Hong Kong and Singapore, parental influence occurs via grown children asking parental opinions about romantic partners and potential spouses.
97. The extent of employment of married women outside the home does differ significantly across these locales. In urban areas of the PRC, generally 90% of married women work full time outside the home. In Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the rates of employment of married women are substantially lower, although the importance of family-run firms in these other locales means that many married women can combine family responsibilities with employment. For a general overview of the extent of sexual inequality in the PRC in comparative perspective, see Martin Why te, "Sexual Inequality under Socialism: The Chinese Case in Perspective," in Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolution China, ed. J. Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
98. See the comparative figures presented in D. Gale Johnson, "Effects of Institutions and Policies on Rural Population Growth: The Case of China," Population and Development Review 20 (September 1994): 503-31. Despite the "one child policy" enforced in the PRC since 1979, the total fertility rate for the country as a whole remained above 2 throughout the 1980s, although there is some evidence of a further tightening of the policy in the early 1990s, perhaps lowering fertility rates below replacement level. See Griffith Feeney and Yuan Jihua, "Below Replacement Fertility in China? A Close Look at the Evidence" (unpublished paper, The East-West Center, Honolulu, 1994).
99. See the comparative figures presented in D. Gale Johnson, "Effects of Institutions and Policies on Rural Population Growth: The Case of China," Population and Development Review 20 (September 1994): 503-31. Despite the "one child policy" enforced in the PRC since 1979, the total fertility rate for the country as a whole remained above 2 throughout the 1980s, although there is some evidence of a further tightening of the policy in the early 1990s, perhaps lowering fertility rates below replacement level. See Griffith Feeney and Yuan Jihua, "Below Replacement Fertility in China? A Close Look at the Evidence" (unpublished paper, The East-West Center, Honolulu, 1994).
100. Other changes that could be noted include the virtual elimination of concubinage, modest increases in divorce rates, some increase in premarital sexual activity, and in urban areas particularly, some weakening of the strength of the patrilineal basis of kinship relations.
101. See the discussion in Hajnal (n. 3 above). In Taiwan the proportion of women older than 50 who had ever been married declined only slightly, from over 99% in 1905 to about 97% in 1985. See Thornton and Lin (n. 48 above), p. 204.
102. Data from Taiwan indicate that for surveyed respondents 20-39 years old the proportion of widowed parents who lived with a married son declined from more than 87% in 1973 to about 79% in 1986. See Thornton and Lin, p. 318. It is unclear from these figures what the proportion of widowed parents was who were living with a married daughter or an unmarried child, rather than on their own. Figures for married elderly show modestly higher rates of independent living, and they also display a small trend toward less coresidence with sons over time.
103. For the PRC, the evidence that strong family obligations have survived traumatic changes and Party-inspired efforts to weaken such obligations is reviewed in Martin Whyte, "The Social Roots of China's Economic Development," China Quarterly 144 (December 1995): 38-58. The evidence indicates, however, that in the PRC such strong family obligations have survived better in the countryside than in the cities.
104. A particularly striking case of this sort concerns Hong Kong villagers who are now running restaurants in Great Britain, but who nonetheless continue to orient their lives to their families back in the New Territories. See the discussion in James Watson, Emigration and the Chinese Lineage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). For Taiwan, the evidence on remittances of young unmarried women workers presented in Thorn ton and Lin (n. 48 above), p. 123, indicates only a very slight decline in the percentage of such women who sent most of their earnings home to their parents - from 81% for those who married between 1955 and 1959 to 73% for those who married between 1980 and 1984.
105. The survey was carried out through a collaboration involving the Department of Sociology at the University of Michigan, the Department of Sociology at Beijing University, and the China Research Center on Aging. In the survey, a random sample of 1,002 individuals older than 50 in 30 randomly selected Baoding urban neighborhoods were interviewed, and for each older respondent a randomly selected child older than 18 and living in Baoding was also an interview target. The total of grown children interviewed was 753.
106. Some might argue that family loyalties have stayed strong precisely because of the hectic pace of social change in all these societies. Although most of the changes in Chinese families listed earlier fit nicely with Goode's argument (in World Revolution and Family Patterns [n. 1 above]) that modernization everywhere produces trends toward a more conjugal pattern of family life, the continued strength of extended family obligations arguably contradicts his thesis.
107. Greenhalgh relies on a study of 25 Taiwanese firms she studied during the 1970s to conclude, "Family obligations notwithstanding, if his father was excessively authoritarian, refusing to give him room to develop, a son might think of leaving the business to work elsewhere.... To avoid such a debacle, fathers had to find ways to make work in their businesses attractive, or at least tolerable, to their sons" (quotation from her article "De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm" [n. 37 above], p. 762).
108. The case for this claim in regard to the PRC and Taiwan has been made by Greenhalgh in her article "Land Reform and Family Entrepreneurialism in East Asia" (n. 10 above). Greenhalgh refers to the set of changes surrounding decollectivization and the household responsibility system in the PRC since 1978 as a "second land reform" (with the first in the PRC occurring during the period 1950-53). However, she also notes that the institutional structure and legal protections of cultivators in the PRC are significantly less secure than they are in Taiwan, without full private property rights in land, and with continuing vulnerability of farmers to excessive demands for taxes and fees from local officials. In Singapore and Hong Kong, of course, the legacy of the British legal system created an even more secure institutional structure within which families could operate.
109. See the discussion in Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic, 1984); Martin Kenney and Richard Florida, Beyond Mass Production (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). For alternative views, see Andrew Sayer, "Postfordism in Question," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 13 (December 1989): 666-95; Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Flexible Specialization versus Post-Fordism: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications," Economy and Society 20 (November 1991): 1-56.
110. See the discussion in Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic, 1984); Martin Kenney and Richard Florida, Beyond Mass Production (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). For alternative views, see Andrew Sayer, "Postfordism in Question," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 13 (December 1989): 666-95; Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Flexible Specialization versus Post-Fordism: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications," Economy and Society 20 (November 1991): 1-56.
111. See the discussion in Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic, 1984); Martin Kenney and Richard Florida, Beyond Mass Production (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). For alternative views, see Andrew Sayer, "Postfordism in Question," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 13 (December 1989): 666-95; Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Flexible Specialization versus Post-Fordism: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications," Economy and Society 20 (November 1991): 1-56.
112. See the discussion in Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic, 1984); Martin Kenney and Richard Florida, Beyond Mass Production (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). For alternative views, see Andrew Sayer, "Postfordism in Question," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 13 (December 1989): 666-95; Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Flexible Specialization versus Post-Fordism: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications," Economy and Society 20 (November 1991): 1-56.
113. However, the case of the PRC suggests that certain kinds of non-family-based firms may be organized in ways that discourage the expression of these positive tendencies. The large, state-owned enterprises that dominated the economy prior to 1978 were plagued by low productivity, absenteeism, and other problems, and even in the reform era, they have found it difficult to stimulate performance and improve productivity. The tendency of state workers to view their employment as an entitlement and form of security, rather than as a route to a better income, more skills, and family progress, seems a particular problem.
114. A large number of factors helping to explain China's economic success since 1978 are explored in a special issue of China Quarterly, vol. 144 (December 1995).