Using roll call estimates to test models of politics

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 15, Issue , 2012, Pages 79-99

  Clinton, Joshua D ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

empirical implications of theoretical models; formal theory; ideal point estimation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861447905     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-043010-095836     Document Type: Review

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