Setting the agenda: Responsible party government in the U.S. house of representatives

Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 1-336

  Cox, Gary W ^a   McCubbins, Mathew D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924500519     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511791123     Document Type: Book

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