메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 72, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 60-73

Sincere versus sophisticated voting in congress: Theory and evidence

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 77951214255     PISSN: 00223816     EISSN: 14682508     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022381609990478     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (41)

References (39)
  • 1
    • 84974151702 scopus 로고
    • Sophisticated sincerity: Voting over endogenous agendas
    • Austen-Smith, David. 1987. "Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over Endogenous Agendas." American Political Science Review 81: 1323-1329
    • (1987) American Political Science Review , vol.81 , pp. 1323-1329
    • Austen-Smith, D.1
  • 6
    • 84972203356 scopus 로고
    • Strategy and sophisticated voting in the senate
    • Calvert, Randall L., and Richard F. Fenno. 1994. "Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate." Journal of Politics 56 (May): 349-376
    • (1994) Journal of Politics , vol.56 , Issue.MAY , pp. 349-376
    • Calvert, R.L.1    Fenno, R.F.2
  • 9
    • 0035614697 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A theory of presidents' public agenda setting
    • Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. "A Theory of Presidents' Public Agenda Setting." Journal of Theoretical Politics 13 (2): 183-208.
    • (2001) Journal of Theoretical Politics , vol.13 , Issue.2 , pp. 183-208
    • Canes-Wrone, B.1
  • 10
  • 11
    • 84976103277 scopus 로고
    • Saving amendments, killer amendments, and an expected utility theory of sophisticated voting
    • Enelow, James. 1981. "Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and an Expected Utility Theory of Sophisticated Voting." Journal of Politics 43: 1062-1098
    • (1981) Journal of Politics , vol.43 , pp. 1062-1098
    • Enelow, J.1
  • 12
    • 84971720899 scopus 로고
    • The amendment in legislative strategy: Sophisticated voting in the U.S. congress
    • Enelow, James, and David H. Koehler. 1980. "The Amendment in Legislative Strategy: Sophisticated Voting in the U.S. Congress." Journal of Poltiics 42: 396-413.
    • (1980) Journal of Poltiics , vol.42 , pp. 396-413
    • James, E.1    Koehler, D.H.2
  • 13
  • 14
    • 0035529091 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The politics of blame: Bargaining before an audience
    • Groseclose, Tim, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience." American Journal of Political Science 45 (January): 100-119
    • (2001) American Journal of Political Science , vol.45 , Issue.JANUARY , pp. 100-119
    • Tim, G.1    McCarty, N.2
  • 17
    • 0007071572 scopus 로고
    • Circumventing formal structure through commitment: Presidential influence and agenda control
    • Ingberman, Daniel, and Dennis Yao. 1991a. "Circumventing Formal Structure Through commitment: Presidential Influence and Agenda Control." Public Choice 70: 151-179
    • (1991) Public Choice , vol.70 , pp. 151-179
    • Daniel, I.1    Yao, D.2
  • 18
    • 84934454071 scopus 로고
    • Presidential commitment and the veto
    • Ingberman, Daniel, and Dennis Yao. 1991b. "Presidential Commitment and the Veto." American Journal of Political Science 35 (2): 357-389
    • (1991) American Journal of Political Science , vol.35 , Issue.2 , pp. 357-389
    • Daniel, I.1    Yao, D.2
  • 19
    • 0038673170 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Investigating the incidence of killer amendments in congress
    • Jenkins, Jeffrey A., and Michael C. Munger. 2003. "Investigating the Incidence of Killer Amendments in Congress." Journal of Politics 65 (May): 498-517.
    • (2003) Journal of Politics , vol.65 , Issue.MAY , pp. 498-517
    • Jenkins, J.A.1    Munger, M.C.2
  • 20
    • 84935982260 scopus 로고
    • Presidential influence on congressional appropriations decisions
    • Kiewiet, Roderick, and Mathew McCubbins. 1988. "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions." American Journal of Political Science 32: 713-736
    • (1988) American Journal of Political Science , vol.32 , pp. 713-736
    • Roderick, K.1    McCubbins, M.2
  • 21
    • 0030543315 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Institutional and partisan sources of gridlock: A theory of divided and unified government
    • Krehbiel, Keith. 1996. "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government." Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (1): 7-39.
    • (1996) Journal of Theoretical Politics , vol.8 , Issue.1 , pp. 7-39
    • Krehbiel, K.1
  • 23
    • 21344482534 scopus 로고
    • Coalitions in congressional voting
    • Ladha, Krishna K. 1994. "Coalitions in Congressional Voting." Public Choice 78: 43-64.
    • (1994) Public Choice , vol.78 , pp. 43-64
    • Ladha, K.K.1
  • 24
    • 84928854618 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • New York: Cambridge University Press
    • Mackie, Gerry. 2003. Democracy Defended. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    • (2003) Democracy Defended
    • MacKie, G.1
  • 25
    • 0000444721 scopus 로고
    • Veto threats: Rhetoric in a bargaining game
    • Matthews, Steven. 1989. "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game." iQuarterly Journal of Economics 104: 347-369
    • (1989) IQuarterly Journal of Economics , vol.104 , pp. 347-369
    • Matthews, S.1
  • 27
    • 0031419999 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Presidential reputation and the veto
    • McCarty, Nolan. 1997. "Presidential Reputation and the Veto." Economics and Politics 9 (1): 1-26.
    • (1997) Economics and Politics , vol.9 , Issue.1 , pp. 1-26
    • McCarty, N.1
  • 28
    • 77951230851 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Presidential vetoes in the early republic
    • forthcoming
    • McCarty, Nolan. 2009. "Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic." Journal of Politics. forthcoming.
    • (2009) Journal of Politics
    • McCarty, N.1
  • 29
    • 21844521143 scopus 로고
    • Veto power and legislation: An empirical analysis of executive- legislative bargaining from 1961-1986
    • McCarty, Nolan, and Keith Poole. 1995. "Veto power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive-Legislative Bargaining from 1961-1986." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (2): 282-312.
    • (1995) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , vol.11 , Issue.2 , pp. 282-312
    • Nolan, M.1    Poole, K.2
  • 30
    • 84970482157 scopus 로고
    • A paradox of voting: Cylical majorities and the case of muscle shoals
    • Newfeld, John L., William J. Hausman, and Ronald B. Rapoport. 1994. "A Paradox of Voting: Cylical Majorities and the case of muscle shoals." Political Research Quarterly 47: 423-438
    • (1994) Political Research Quarterly , vol.47 , pp. 423-438
    • Newfeld, J.L.1    Hausman, W.J.2    Rapoport, R.B.3
  • 32
    • 0036387566 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Rethinking political bargaining: Policymaking with a single proposer
    • Primo, David M. 2002. "Rethinking Political Bargaining: Policymaking with a Single Proposer." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18 (2): 411-427
    • (2002) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , vol.18 , Issue.2 , pp. 411-427
    • Primo, D.M.1
  • 35
    • 0001887423 scopus 로고
    • Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
    • Romer, Thomas, and Rosenthal, Howard. 1978. "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo." Public Choice 33: 27-44.
    • (1978) Public Choice , vol.33 , pp. 27-44
    • Thomas, R.1    Howard, R.2
  • 36
    • 0032219940 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Sophisticated voting in supermajoritarian settings
    • Volden, Craig. 1998. "Sophisticated Voting in Supermajoritarian Settings," iJournal of Politics 60 (February): 149-173
    • (1998) IJournal of Politics , vol.60 , Issue.FEBRUARY , pp. 149-173
    • Volden, C.1
  • 37
    • 0036006529 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A formal model of the politics of delegation in a separation of powers system
    • Volden, Craig. 2002. "A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System." American Journal of Political Science 46 (1): 111-133
    • (2002) American Journal of Political Science , vol.46 , Issue.1 , pp. 111-133
    • Volden, C.1
  • 38
    • 0033239349 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 'Killer' amendments in congress
    • Wilkerson, John D. 1999. " 'Killer' Amendments in Congress." American Political Science Review 93 (September): 535-552
    • (1999) American Political Science Review , vol.93 , Issue.SEPTEMBER , pp. 535-552
    • Wilkerson, J.D.1
  • 39
    • 77951226253 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Tim Groseclose is the Marvin Hoffenberg Professor of American Politics at UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, 90095. Jeffrey Milyo is the Frederick A. Middlebush Chair in the Social Sciences at the University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, 65211
    • Tim Groseclose is the Marvin Hoffenberg Professor of American Politics at UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, 90095. Jeffrey Milyo is the Frederick A. Middlebush Chair in the Social Sciences at the University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, 65211.


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.