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Tim Groseclose is the Marvin Hoffenberg Professor of American Politics at UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, 90095. Jeffrey Milyo is the Frederick A. Middlebush Chair in the Social Sciences at the University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, 65211
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Tim Groseclose is the Marvin Hoffenberg Professor of American Politics at UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, 90095. Jeffrey Milyo is the Frederick A. Middlebush Chair in the Social Sciences at the University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, 65211.
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