Testing the predictions of the multidimensional spatial voting model with roll call data

Political Analysis

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 179-196

  Jeong, Gyung Ho ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 43149121579     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: 14764989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpm023     Document Type: Article

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