A framework for unifying formal and empirical analysis

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 783-797

  Granato, Jim ^a   Lo, Melody ^b   Wong, M C S ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954835376     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: 15405907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00460.x     Document Type: Article

References (67)

1. Achen Christopher H. An Agenda for the New Political Methodology: Microfoundations and ART. Annual Review of Political Science 2002, 5:423-50.
2. Achen Christopher H. Let's Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong. Conflict Management and Peace Science 2005, 22(4):327-39.
3. Achen Christopher H. Expressive Bayesian Voters, Their Turnout Decisions, and Double Probit: Empirical Implications of a Theoretical Model. 2006, Princeton University, Typescript
4. Aldrich John H. Before the Convention: Strategies and Choices in Presidential Nomination Campaigns 1980, Chicago, University of Chicago Press
5. Aldrich John. Autonomy. Oxford Economic Papers 1989, 41(1):15-34.
6. Alesina Alberto, Rosenthal Howard. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy 1995, New York, Cambridge University Press
7. Arrow Kenneth. Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences. Policy Sciences 1951, 129-54. Lerner DanielLasswell Harold D., Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press
8. Bamber Donald, van Santen Jan P H. How Many Parameters Can a Model Have and Still Be Testable. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 1985, 29(4):443-73.
9. Bamber Donald, van Santen Jan P H. How to Assess a Model's Testability and Identifiability. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 2000, 44(1):20-40.
10. Bartels Larry M, Brady Henry E. The State of Quantitative Political Methodology. Political Science: The State of the Discipline II 1993, 121-59. Finifter Ada, Washington, DC, American Political Science Association
11. Bernanke Ben S, Laubach Thomas, Mishkin Frederick S, Posen Adam S. Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience 1999, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press
12. Blais Andrthomampersa, Nadeau Richard, Gidengil Elisabeth, Nevitte Neil. The Formation of Party Preferences: Testing the Proximity and Directional Models. European Journal of Political Science 2001, 40(1):81-91.
13. Brady Henry E, Collier David. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards 2004, Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield
14. Cardenas Juan-Camilo. How Do Groups Solve Local Commons Dilemmas? Lessons from Experimental Economics in the Field. Environment, Development and Sustainability 2000, 2(3-4):305-22.
15. Cardenas Juan-Camilo, Stranlund John K, Willis Cleve E. Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out. World Development 2000, 28(10):1719-33.
16. Casari Marco, Plott Charles R. Decentralized Management of Common Property Resources: Experiments with a Centuries-Old Institution. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2003, 51(2):217-47.
17. Chappell Henry W, Keech William R. Welfare Consequences of the Six-Year Presidential Term Evaluated in the Context of a Model of the U.S. Economy. American Political Science Review 1983, 77(1):75-91.
18. Christ Carl F. The Cowles Commission's Contributions to Econometrics at Chicago, 1939-1955. Journal of Economic Literature 1994, 62(1):30-59.
19. Clarida Richard H, Gali Jordi, Gertler Mark. Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2000, 115(1):147-80.
20. Converse Philip. Of Time and Partisan Stability. Comparative Political Studies 1969, 2(2):139-71.
21. Downs Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy 1957, New York, Harper and Row
22. Drazen Allan. Political Economy in Macroeconomics 2000, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press
23. Engle Robert F, Hendry David F, Richard Jean-Francois. Exogeneity. Econometrica 1983, 51(2):277-304.
24. Erikson Robert S, Mackuen Michael B, Stimson James A. The Macro Polity 2002, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
25. Evans George W, Honkapohja Seppo. Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics 2001, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press
26. Fisher Franklin. The Identification Problem in Econometrics 1966, New York, McGraw-Hill
27. Freeman John, Houser Daniel. A Computable Equilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economy. American Journal of Political Science 1998, 42(2):628-60.
28. Freeman John, Lin Tsethomampersan, Williams John. Vector Autoregression and the Study of Politics. American Journal of Political Science 1989, 33(4):842-77.
29. Fuhrer Jeffrey. The Persistence of Inflation and the Cost of Disinflation. New England Economic Review 1995, 3-16. Jan./Feb
30. Fuhrer Jeffrey, Moore George. Inflation Persistence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1995, 110(1):127-59.
31. Granato Jim, Guse Eran, Wong M C Sunny. Learning from the Expectations of Others. Macroeconomic Dynamics 2008, 12(3):345-77.
32. Granato Jim, Lo Melody, Wong M C Sunny. The Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM): A Framework for Methodological Unification. Política y gobierno 2010, 17(1):25-57.
33. Granato Jim, Scioli Frank. Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Consequences of the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM). Perspectives on Politics 2004, 2(2):313-23.
34. Granato Jim, Wong M C Sunny. The Role of Policymakers in Business Cycle Fluctuations 2006, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
35. Haavelmo Trygve. The Probability Approach in Econometrics. Supplement to Econometrica 1944, 12:S1-115. July
36. Heckman James. Causal Parameters and Policy Analysis in Economics: A Twentieth Century Retrospective. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2000, 115(1):45-97.
37. Hendry David. Dynamic Econometrics 1995, New York, Oxford University Press
38. Hibbs Douglas. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review 1977, 71(4):1467-87.
39. Hotelling Harold. Stability and Competition. Economic Journal 1929, 39(153):41-59.
40. Jasso Guillermina. Formal Theory. Handbook of Sociological Theory 2002, 37-68. Turner Jonathan H., New York, Kluwer Academic/Plenum
41. Kedar Orit. When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections. American Political Science Review 2005, 99(2):185-99.
42. Kramer Gerald. The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate versus Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections and Sociotropic Voting. American Political Science Review 1983, 77(1):92-111.
43. Krugman Paul. The Rise and Fall of Development Economics. Rethinking the Development Experience 1994, 39-58. Rodwin LloydSchon Donald A., Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution and Cambridge: The Lincoln Institute for Land Policy
44. Krugman Paul. Two Cheers for Formalism. The Economic Journal 1998, 108(451):1829-36.
45. Kydland Finn, Prescott Edward. Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations. Econometrica 1982, 50(6):1345-70.
46. Leamer Edward. Let's Take the 'Con' Out of Econometrics. American Economic Review 1983, 73(1):31-43.
47. Lijphart Arend. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Democracies 1984, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press
48. Lin Tse-min. The Historical Significance of Economic Voting, 1872-1996. Social Science History 1999, 23(4):561-91.
49. Lucas Robert E. Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique. Carnegie-Rochester Conference on Public Policy 1976, 1(1):19-46.
50. Manski Charles. Identification Problems in the Social Sciences 1995, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press
51. McCallum Bennett T. On Nonuniqueness in Linear Rational Expectations Models: An Attempt at Perspective. Journal of Monetary Economics 1983, 11(2):134-68.
52. McCallum Bennett T. Multiple-Solution Indeterminacies in Monetary Policy Analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 2003, 50(5):1153-75.
53. Mebane Walter, Sekhon Jasjeet. Coordination and Policy Moderation at Midterm. American Political Science Review 2002, 96(1):141-57.
54. Morgan Mary. The History of Econometric Ideas 1990, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
55. Morton Rebecca B. Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science 1999, New York, Cambridge University Press
56. Ostrom Elinor. Revising Theory in Light of Experimental Findings. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2010, 73(1):68-72.
57. Ostrom Elinor, Walker James, Gardner Roy. Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible. American Political Science Review 1992, 86(2):404-17.
58. Pearl Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference 2000, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
59. Poteete Amy R, Janssen Marco A, Ostrom Elinor. Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice 2010, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press
60. Powell Robert. In the Shadow of Power 1999, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press
61. Signorino Curt. Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict. American Political Science Review 1999, 93(2):279-97.
62. Sims Christopher. Macroeconomics and Reality. Econometrica 1980, 48(1):1-48.
63. Suzuki Motoshi, Chappell Henry W. The Rationality of Economic Voting Revisited. Journal of Politics 1996, 58(1):224-36.
64. Taylor John. Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 1993, 39(1):195-214.
65. Taylor John. A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules. Monetary Policy Rules 1999, 319-41. Taylor J B., Chicago, University of Chicago Press
66. Wagner R Harrison. War and the State: The Theory of International Politics 2007, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press
67. Wang Miao, Wong M C Sunny. Learning Dynamics in Monetary Policy: The Robustness of an Aggressive Inflation Stabilizing Policy. Journal of Macroeconomics 2005, 27(1):143-51.