Institutional and partisan sources of gridlock: A theory of divided and unified government

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 7-40

  Krehbiel, Keith ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Congress; Divided government; Formal theory; Presidency

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030543315     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692896008001002     Document Type: Article

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