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Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 256-276

The uncovered set and the limits of legislative action

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 23844551536     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mph018     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (40)

References (39)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.