Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 788-808

  Marden, Jason R ^a   Shamma, Jeff S ^b  

^a UCB 450   (United States)

^b GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Distributed control; Equilibrium selection; Potential games

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860623901     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.006     Document Type: Article

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