Regret based dynamics: Convergence in weakly acyclic games

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 194-201

  Marden, Jason R ^a   Arslan, Gürdal ^b   Shamma, Jeff S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b University of Hawaii at Manoa   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperative distributed problem solving; Emergent behavior; Game theory; Learning algorithms; Multiagent learning

Indexed keywords

ADDITIONAL STRUCTURES; ALMOST SURE CONVERGENCES; COLLECTIVE BEHAVIORS; COOPERATIVE DISTRIBUTED PROBLEM SOLVING; DECISION PROCESS; EMERGENT BEHAVIOR; MULTIAGENT LEARNING; OPERATING CONDITIONS; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

AGENTS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; CONVERGENCE OF NUMERICAL METHODS; EDUCATION; FUZZY CLUSTERING; GAME THEORY; LEARNING SYSTEMS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

LEARNING ALGORITHMS;

EID: 60349095462     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1329125.1329175     Document Type: Conference Paper

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