Joint strategy fictitious play with inertia for potential games

IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 208-220

  Marden, Jason R ^a   Arslan, Gürdal ^b   Shamma, Jeff S ^c  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b University of Hawaii at Manoa   (United States)

^c GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Fictitious play (FP); Joint strategy fictitious play (JSFP)

Indexed keywords

TRAFFIC CONGESTION;

COMPUTATIONAL BURDENS; COMPUTATIONAL CAPABILITIES; CONGESTION GAMES; DECISION-MAKING MODELS; FICTITIOUS PLAY (FP); HIGH-DIMENSIONAL; HISTORICAL DATUM; INFORMATION GATHERINGS; JOINT STRATEGY FICTITIOUS PLAY (JSFP); POTENTIAL GAMES; PROBABILITY SPACES; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM; REPEATED GAMES; STRATEGY SPACES; TRAFFIC ROUTING;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 61349086863     PISSN: 00189286     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2008.2010885     Document Type: Article

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