False targets efficiency in defense strategy

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 194, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 155-162

  Levitin, Gregory ^a   Hausken, Kjell ^b  

^a ISRAEL ELECTRIC CORPORATION   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

Attack; Contest success function; Decoy; Defense; False targets; Game theory; Protection; Vulnerability

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY;

ATTACK; CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTION; DECOY; DEFENSE; FALSE TARGETS; PROTECTION; VULNERABILITY;

TARGETS;

EID: 54049110511     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.11.060     Document Type: Article

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