Robust game theory

Mathematical Programming

Volumn 107, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 231-273

  Aghassi, Michele ^a   Bertsimas, Dimitris ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian games; Ex post equilibria; Game theory; Robust optimization

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; INFORMATION THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTIMIZATION; ROBUSTNESS (CONTROL SYSTEMS); SET THEORY;

BAYESIAN GAMES; EX POST EQUILIBRIA; ROBUST OPTIMIZATION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33644678492     PISSN: 00255610     EISSN: 14364646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10107-005-0686-0     Document Type: Article

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