Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks

Annals of Operations Research

Volumn 187, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 137-158

  Bier, Vicki M ^a   Haphuriwat, Naraphorn ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Cargo screening; Decision analysis; Deterrence; Game theory; Port security; Smuggling of weapons

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952694232     PISSN: 02545330     EISSN: 15729338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-009-0665-6     Document Type: Article

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