Resource distribution in multiple attacks against a single target

Risk Analysis

Volumn 30, Issue 8, 2010, Pages 1231-1239

  Levitin, Gregory ^a,b   Hausken, Kjell ^c  

^a ISRAEL ELECTRIC CORPORATION   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ELECTRONIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA   (China)

^c UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

Attack; defense; multiple attacks; optimization; protection; target; vulnerability

Indexed keywords

ATTACK; DEFENSE; MULTIPLE ATTACKS; PROTECTION; VULNERABILITY;

OPTIMIZATION;

COMPUTER CRIME;

DEFENSE MECHANISM; OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; VULNERABILITY;

EID: 77955901755     PISSN: 02724332     EISSN: 15396924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01410.x     Document Type: Article

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