Standard breach remedies, quality thresholds, and cooperative investments

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 337-359

  Stremitzer, Alexander ^a,b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855875287     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewq007     Document Type: Article

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