Asset ownership and contractibility of interaction

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 787-802

  Roider, Andreas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17044385810     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1593774     Document Type: Article

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