Contract, mechanism design, and technological detail

Econometrica

Volumn 75, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 55-81

  Watson, Joel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Contract; Forcing contracts; Holdup; Implementation; Mechanism design; Renegotiation; Unverifiable information

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846660842     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00732.x     Document Type: Article

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