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Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 22-39

After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment

(1) De Fraja, Gianni a,b

a UNIVERSITY OF YORK (United Kingdom)

b CEPR (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Renegotiation; incomplete contracts; hold up

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002651867 PISSN: 08998256 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0597 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (30)

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