The Mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation (with applications to hold-up and risk sharing)

Econometrica

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-45

  Segal, Ilya ^a   Whinston, Michael D ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

First order approach; Implementation with renegotiation; Noncontingent contracts; Option contracts; Relationship specific investments; Risk sharing

Indexed keywords

CONFORMAL MAPPING; CONSTRAINT THEORY; CONTRACTS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; RISK MANAGEMENT; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

FIRST ORDER APPROACH; NONCONTINGENT CONTRACTS; OPTION CONTRACTS; RELATIONSHIP SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS; RENEGOTIATION; RISK SHARING;

INVESTMENTS;

EID: 0036216183     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00268     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Renegotiation design with unverifiable information
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18. Two remarks on the property-rights literature
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26. On the efficiency of privately stipulated damages for breach of contract: Entry barriers, reliance, and renegotiation