Testing guilt aversion

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 95-107

  Ellingsen, Tore ^a   Johannesson, Magnus ^a   Tjøtta, Sigve ^b   Torsvik, Gaute ^b  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN   (Norway)

Author keywords

Beliefs; Experiments; Generosity; Guilt aversion

Indexed keywords

EID: 72049094535     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.021     Document Type: Article

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