Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment

Experimental Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 103-121

  Abbink, Klaus ^a   Hennig Schmidt, Heike ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Context; Corruption; Ethical Behaviour; Experimental Instructions; Framing; Laboratory; Reciprocity; Social Norms; Trust; Valence

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744832455     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z     Document Type: Article

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