Militarized compellent threats, 1918-2001

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 377-401

  Sechser, Todd S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

bargaining; coercion; coercive diplomacy; compellence; crises; dataset; threats

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053609388     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: 15499219     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0738894211413066     Document Type: Article

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