Diplomatic calculus in anarchy: How communication matters

American Political Science Review

Volumn 104, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 347-368

  Trager, Robert F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77958506206     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055410000158     Document Type: Article

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