Military responses to refugee disasters

International Security

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 72-111

  Posen, Barry R ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030523454     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.21.1.72     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. For a comprehensive introduction to the problem, see Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The State of the World's Refugees, In Search of Solutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees, The Challenge of Protection (New York: Penguin, 1993); Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper 268 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1992).
2. For a comprehensive introduction to the problem, see Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The State of the World's Refugees, In Search of Solutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees, The Challenge of Protection (New York: Penguin, 1993); Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper 268 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1992).
3. For a comprehensive introduction to the problem, see Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The State of the World's Refugees, In Search of Solutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees, The Challenge of Protection (New York: Penguin, 1993); Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper 268 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1992).
4. For a comprehensive introduction to the problem, see Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The State of the World's Refugees, In Search of Solutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees, The Challenge of Protection (New York: Penguin, 1993); Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper 268 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1992).
5. As in the analysis of war, where one finds distinctions between light, medium, and heavy casualties, the analysis of political killing of unarmed civilians requires rough distinctions in the scale of death. Even in a world where civilian deaths have been measured in the hundreds of thousands, the killing of tens of thousands or even thousands may be sufficient to induce mass flight.
6. Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, pp. 52-53.
7. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 147-148. The initial flow of refugees from the Pakistani crackdown consisted of Bengali Muslims, but the composition quickly shifted to 80 percent Hindu. See also Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh: A Political and Historical Analysis of the 1971 War (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 75-76, who concurs with the suspicions of Indian officials. By June nearly seven million refugees had reached India.
8. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 147-148. The initial flow of refugees from the Pakistani crackdown consisted of Bengali Muslims, but the composition quickly shifted to 80 percent Hindu. See also Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh: A Political and Historical Analysis of the 1971 War (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 75-76, who concurs with the suspicions of Indian officials. By June nearly seven million refugees had reached India.
9. Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 97-106.
10. See Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977): "Transports into the Western zones in the summers of 1946 and 1947 were relatively organized and gave rise to considerably fewer casualties," p. 104. Elsewhere he notes that "if there had been no 'organized transfers' and if all the Germans had been expelled in the brutal manner that characterized the 1945 expulsions, the loss of life attributable to the flight and expulsion would not have been 2 million but perhaps 3 million or even more," p. 124. See also Alfred M. de Zayas, A Terrible Revenge (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 113-116.
11. See Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977): "Transports into the Western zones in the summers of 1946 and 1947 were relatively organized and gave rise to considerably fewer casualties," p. 104. Elsewhere he notes that "if there had been no 'organized transfers' and if all the Germans had been expelled in the brutal manner that characterized the 1945 expulsions, the loss of life attributable to the flight and expulsion would not have been 2 million but perhaps 3 million or even more," p. 124. See also Alfred M. de Zayas, A Terrible Revenge (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 113-116.
12. Terry Atlas, "Haiti Tide May Force U.S. Hand," Chicago Tribune, July 4, 1994, p. 1.
13. The opposite can happen: apparently during Desert Storm civilians occasionally moved toward the sights and sounds of battle, because that was the best way to find the coalition troops, who might be prevailed upon for protection or sustenance.
14. In his memoir of service in Vietnam, Tobias Wolff writes, "You could never have too many mines. Fifty thousand wouldn't have been too many for me. Given the chance, I'd have lived smack in the middle of a minefield twenty miles wide." Tobias Wolff, In Pharoah's Army: Memories of the Lost War (New York: Vintage, 1994), p. 17.
15. Paul Davies and Nick Dunlop, War of the Mines (London: Pluto Press, 1994); see esp. Rae McGrath, "Landmines - The Global Problem," chapter 7, p. 126; and "The Reality of the Present Use of Mines by Military Forces," Appendix 3. "In some areas virtually all mountain grazing land was remotely mined and the whole agricultural infrastructure brought to a halt by the widespread mining," p. 156.
16. Paul Davies and Nick Dunlop, War of the Mines (London: Pluto Press, 1994); see esp. Rae McGrath, "Landmines - The Global Problem," chapter 7, p. 126; and "The Reality of the Present Use of Mines by Military Forces," Appendix 3. "In some areas virtually all mountain grazing land was remotely mined and the whole agricultural infrastructure brought to a halt by the widespread mining," p. 156.
17. Paul Davies and Nick Dunlop, War of the Mines (London: Pluto Press, 1994); see esp. Rae McGrath, "Landmines - The Global Problem," chapter 7, p. 126; and "The Reality of the Present Use of Mines by Military Forces," Appendix 3. "In some areas virtually all mountain grazing land was remotely mined and the whole agricultural infrastructure brought to a halt by the widespread mining," p. 156.
18. A variant on this solution would be to arm the victims so extensively that they could repel the side whose actions had precipitated or were about to precipitate mass flight. The practical question is whether or not military assistance can be delivered quickly enough to affect the actions that produce refugees. Generally, the provision of weapons alone is unlikely to prove an expeditious solution to refugee problems, since the victims are probably in trouble because their military organization is weak or non-existent. Weapons alone do not an army make.
19. William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's Press for the Stimson Center, 1993), pp. 327, 333, on the first eleven months of the UN effort in the Congo. On Lebanon, see Mona Ghali, "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon," ibid., pp. 199-200. See also United Nations, The Blue Helmets, 2d ed. (New York: United Nations, 1990); on ONUC see pp. 226-229 and on UNIFIL pp. 143-146.
20. William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's Press for the Stimson Center, 1993), pp. 327, 333, on the first eleven months of the UN effort in the Congo. On Lebanon, see Mona Ghali, "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon," ibid., pp. 199-200. See also United Nations, The Blue Helmets, 2d ed. (New York: United Nations, 1990); on ONUC see pp. 226-229 and on UNIFIL pp. 143-146.
21. The State of the World's Refugees 1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 128-129.
22. William J. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo," in Durch, Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, pp. 315-352. Special Representative Dayal called it "massive intervention in the guise of non-intervention," p. 346.
23. Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), pp. 118-119, 122-123. See also Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, pp. 148; 177-178. The Indians, however, refused to cooperate with any UN initiatives to encourage voluntary repatriation of refugees to East Pakistan. The only solution to the refugee problem acceptable to India was the political restoration of the Awami League to power in East Pakistan, which would for all intents and purposes have split Pakistan in two, a great geopolitical victory for India. Thus, it would not be accurate to say that the refugee problem caused the 1971 war; it was rather the occasion for it. Sisson and Rose, pp. 188-191. See also Jackson, South Asian Crisis, pp. 66-69.
24. Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), pp. 118-119, 122-123. See also Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, pp. 148; 177-178. The Indians, however, refused to cooperate with any UN initiatives to encourage voluntary repatriation of refugees to East Pakistan. The only solution to the refugee problem acceptable to India was the political restoration of the Awami League to power in East Pakistan, which would for all intents and purposes have split Pakistan in two, a great geopolitical victory for India. Thus, it would not be accurate to say that the refugee problem caused the 1971 war; it was rather the occasion for it. Sisson and Rose, pp. 188-191. See also Jackson, South Asian Crisis, pp. 66-69.
25. Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), pp. 118-119, 122-123. See also Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, pp. 148; 177-178. The Indians, however, refused to cooperate with any UN initiatives to encourage voluntary repatriation of refugees to East Pakistan. The only solution to the refugee problem acceptable to India was the political restoration of the Awami League to power in East Pakistan, which would for all intents and purposes have split Pakistan in two, a great geopolitical victory for India. Thus, it would not be accurate to say that the refugee problem caused the 1971 war; it was rather the occasion for it. Sisson and Rose, pp. 188-191. See also Jackson, South Asian Crisis, pp. 66-69.
26. Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), pp. 118-119, 122-123. See also Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, pp. 148; 177-178. The Indians, however, refused to cooperate with any UN initiatives to encourage voluntary repatriation of refugees to East Pakistan. The only solution to the refugee problem acceptable to India was the political restoration of the Awami League to power in East Pakistan, which would for all intents and purposes have split Pakistan in two, a great geopolitical victory for India. Thus, it would not be accurate to say that the refugee problem caused the 1971 war; it was rather the occasion for it. Sisson and Rose, pp. 188-191. See also Jackson, South Asian Crisis, pp. 66-69.
27. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69-79.
28. The domestic constitutions of the rescuers will also affect the odds of success. Democracies may be easily motivated to consider or even initiate intervention due to their openness to information about terrible events, and their commitment to political principle and humanitarianism. Modern democracies, however, have also schooled their citizens to the basic paradigm of cost and benefit. The statesman's criterion of "vital interest" comes rather easily to the citizenry. The employment of modern military power costs a lot of money, inconveniences many people, and usually costs some lives.
29. The UN is often the vehicle of choice for these projects, which creates additional difficulties. It is often already preoccupied with several analogous problems. The UN decision-making system permits states with little, no, or contradictory interests in a given problem to have a say. The UN peace-keeping system relies on the voluntary contributions of troops, equipment, and money from its members as each contingency arises. Thus, though the UN may be the most politically attractive structure for a humanitarian coalition, it is a slow and unwieldy instrument.
30. Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 5-33, for an analysis of the difference between nuclear and conventional deterrence. His observations are relevant to conventional compellence as well, and I have drawn on them liberally.
31. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January-February 1994), pp. 109-124, reviews both the real and presumed lessons of air power from the Desert Storm experience. He wryly observes, "The lopsided struggle with Iraq has already affected the way Americans understand modern war, inducing the ornithological miracle of doves becoming hawks. More than one distinguished commentator who had reservations about aerial bombardment in the Persian Gulf expressed a newfound belief in its utility as a tool of American foreign policy in the Balkans" (p. 110). He refers mainly to the New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis; ibid., fn. 2.
32. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January-February 1994), pp. 109-124, reviews both the real and presumed lessons of air power from the Desert Storm experience. He wryly observes, "The lopsided struggle with Iraq has already affected the way Americans understand modern war, inducing the ornithological miracle of doves becoming hawks. More than one distinguished commentator who had reservations about aerial bombardment in the Persian Gulf expressed a newfound belief in its utility as a tool of American foreign policy in the Balkans" (p. 110). He refers mainly to the New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis; ibid., fn. 2.
33. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January-February 1994), pp. 109-124, reviews both the real and presumed lessons of air power from the Desert Storm experience. He wryly observes, "The lopsided struggle with Iraq has already affected the way Americans understand modern war, inducing the ornithological miracle of doves becoming hawks. More than one distinguished commentator who had reservations about aerial bombardment in the Persian Gulf expressed a newfound belief in its utility as a tool of American foreign policy in the Balkans" (p. 110). He refers mainly to the New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis; ibid., fn. 2.
34. See the open letter presented to President Clinton on September 1, 1993, reprinted as "What the West Must Do In Bosnia," Wall Street Journal, September 2, 1993, p. A2, and signed by such notable figures as Margaret Thatcher, George Shultz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Albert Wohlstetter. It seems to call mainly for the destruction of military targets in Serbia. Anthony Lewis, "Speak for America," New York Times, April 26, 1993, p. A 17, suggests hitting "supply lines and other military targets, including some in Serbia itself. " Richard Burt and Richard Perle, "The Next Act in Bosnia," New York Times, February 11, 1994, suggests hitting "strategic targets in Serbia itself."
35. See the open letter presented to President Clinton on September 1, 1993, reprinted as "What the West Must Do In Bosnia," Wall Street Journal, September 2, 1993, p. A2, and signed by such notable figures as Margaret Thatcher, George Shultz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Albert Wohlstetter. It seems to call mainly for the destruction of military targets in Serbia. Anthony Lewis, "Speak for America," New York Times, April 26, 1993, p. A 17, suggests hitting "supply lines and other military targets, including some in Serbia itself. " Richard Burt and Richard Perle, "The Next Act in Bosnia," New York Times, February 11, 1994, suggests hitting "strategic targets in Serbia itself."
36. See the open letter presented to President Clinton on September 1, 1993, reprinted as "What the West Must Do In Bosnia," Wall Street Journal, September 2, 1993, p. A2, and signed by such notable figures as Margaret Thatcher, George Shultz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Albert Wohlstetter. It seems to call mainly for the destruction of military targets in Serbia. Anthony Lewis, "Speak for America," New York Times, April 26, 1993, p. A 17, suggests hitting "supply lines and other military targets, including some in Serbia itself. " Richard Burt and Richard Perle, "The Next Act in Bosnia," New York Times, February 11, 1994, suggests hitting "strategic targets in Serbia itself."
37. See the open letter presented to President Clinton on September 1, 1993, reprinted as "What the West Must Do In Bosnia," Wall Street Journal, September 2, 1993, p. A2, and signed by such notable figures as Margaret Thatcher, George Shultz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Albert Wohlstetter. It seems to call mainly for the destruction of military targets in Serbia. Anthony Lewis, "Speak for America," New York Times, April 26, 1993, p. A 17, suggests hitting "supply lines and other military targets, including some in Serbia itself. " Richard Burt and Richard Perle, "The Next Act in Bosnia," New York Times, February 11, 1994, suggests hitting "strategic targets in Serbia itself."
38. Robert Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War,26quot; International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 103-146. Pape notes that "the inadequacy of exploiting civilian vulnerability in the Vietnam case dovetails with the historical record of coercive air power. British civilians were harassed in World War I; British, German, and Japanese civilians were slaughtered in World War II; and Egyptian civilians were terrorized in the War of Attrition. Yet the exploitation of civilian vulnerability did not determine the outcome in any of these cases." See also Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995). Pape's work has substantially influenced the discussion below.
39. Robert Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War,26quot; International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 103-146. Pape notes that "the inadequacy of exploiting civilian vulnerability in the Vietnam case dovetails with the historical record of coercive air power. British civilians were harassed in World War I; British, German, and Japanese civilians were slaughtered in World War II; and Egyptian civilians were terrorized in the War of Attrition. Yet the exploitation of civilian vulnerability did not determine the outcome in any of these cases." See also Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995). Pape's work has substantially influenced the discussion below.
40. Josef W. Konvitz, "Why Cities Don't Die," Invention & Technology, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter 1990) pp. 58-63.
41. This occurred on a small scale during the final Serb assault on the Srebenica "safe area" and a neighboring UN base in July 1995. UNPROFOR troops called for NATO close-air-support attacks against Serb tanks. "The NATO strikes stopped when Bosnian Serb commanders threatened to kill their Dutch hostages and to shell the Muslim refugees." John Pomfret, "Serbs Start Expelling Muslim Civilians From Seized U.N. Enclave," Washington Post, July 13, 1995, p. A 1; see also Chris Hedges, New York Times (News Service), July 13, 1995, "Wednesday, 1500 Bosnian Serb troops, backed by tanks, advanced at midday into Potocari. They overran the base with no resistance after they threatened to shell the refugees and kill the Dutch peacekeepers they are holding hostage if NATO warplanes intervened."
42. This occurred on a small scale during the final Serb assault on the Srebenica "safe area" and a neighboring UN base in July 1995. UNPROFOR troops called for NATO close-air-support attacks against Serb tanks. "The NATO strikes stopped when Bosnian Serb commanders threatened to kill their Dutch hostages and to shell the Muslim refugees." John Pomfret, "Serbs Start Expelling Muslim Civilians From Seized U.N. Enclave," Washington Post, July 13, 1995, p. A 1; see also Chris Hedges, New York Times (News Service), July 13, 1995, "Wednesday, 1500 Bosnian Serb troops, backed by tanks, advanced at midday into Potocari. They overran the base with no resistance after they threatened to shell the refugees and kill the Dutch peacekeepers they are holding hostage if NATO warplanes intervened."
43. Even in the Kurdistan case, the secession issue arose. Diplomats spent some time developing the rhetorical formula of a "safe zone" in Iraq that would not carry the implication of political sovereignty for that zone. See the report and discussion on the Public Broadcast System television program "Newshour," April 10, 1991 (EBC and GWETA), particularly the remarks of Sir Brian Urquhart, former Under Secretary of the United Nations: "government's always concerned about anything which sets a precedent for eroding sovereignty. This discussion you just had . . . about an enclave or a safe haven is a perfect example of this. It seems to many persons looking on totally unworthy of the magnitude of the disaster, but nonetheless, it's a principle which governments find very important. Sovereignty is what defines government and their powers and authority, and if you make a precedent for denting it in one case, it tends to come back to you in another case which may concern you more closely. I think it's terrible, but that is where we are, and I hope we get further than that very soon."
44. See also Lori Fisler Damrosch, "Changing Conceptions of Intervention in International Law," in Laura Reed and Carl Kaysen, eds., Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993), pp. 96-97; 100-106. Unilateral intervention, even against very murderous regimes, is still widely viewed as illegitimate. Though the UN has occasionally supported multilateral intervention for humanitarian purposes, the principle has not been clearly established. UN Resolutions authorizing humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq cited the international consequences of the refugee flows produced by Iraq's repression of the Kurds, but this is not quite a blanket authorization for humanitarian intervention. Even with this rationalization, however, the action authorized was limited; Chapter VII of the charter was not invoked because the People's Republic of China threatened a veto.
45. Operation Provide Comfort had a relatively good logistical infrastructure to support it. The large NATO air base at Incirlik, Turkey, may have been of particular importance to Iraqi calculations. During Desert Storm more than 150 U.S. aircraft were based there, in a task force dubbed "Proven Force" which flew nearly 4000 combat sorties. See U.S. Department of the Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1993), pp. 609-635. Incirlik is connected by oil pipeline to two logistical facilities on the coast. The base can thus be easily resupplied. See also Simon Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 1989), pp. 282-284; 288-291. More austere airstrips were situated closer to the Iraqi border.
46. Operation Provide Comfort had a relatively good logistical infrastructure to support it. The large NATO air base at Incirlik, Turkey, may have been of particular importance to Iraqi calculations. During Desert Storm more than 150 U.S. aircraft were based there, in a task force dubbed "Proven Force" which flew nearly 4000 combat sorties. See U.S. Department of the Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1993), pp. 609-635. Incirlik is connected by oil pipeline to two logistical facilities on the coast. The base can thus be easily resupplied. See also Simon Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 1989), pp. 282-284; 288-291. More austere airstrips were situated closer to the Iraqi border.
47. Operations in Yugoslavia are supported by a very extensive NATO base structure in Italy. Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe, pp. 195-214.
48. The French-led "Operation Turquoise" was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 929. The operation began on June 22, 1994, and by July 2 the French concluded that they could accomplish the most by declaring a safe zone in the southwestern fifth of Rwanda. Some 3000 troops were involved and 1.5-2 million people ended up in the zone. The French troops were already stationed in Africa, and organized a base of operations in neighboring Zaire. The Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) military was dissuaded from entering the zone. There are two major questions. How much good did the French do for Tutsi inside the zone: how many were saved from Hutu murderers? Second, to what extent was the intervention a surreptitious way of protecting the remnants of the extremist-dominated Hutu government of Rwanda, which had been a French client for the preceding four years, from destruction by the RPF? See "Rwanda," UN Monthly Chronicle (December 1994), pp. 6-7; Alain Destexhe, "The Third Genocide," Foreign Policy, No. 97 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 11-12.
49. The French-led "Operation Turquoise" was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 929. The operation began on June 22, 1994, and by July 2 the French concluded that they could accomplish the most by declaring a safe zone in the southwestern fifth of Rwanda. Some 3000 troops were involved and 1.5-2 million people ended up in the zone. The French troops were already stationed in Africa, and organized a base of operations in neighboring Zaire. The Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) military was dissuaded from entering the zone. There are two major questions. How much good did the French do for Tutsi inside the zone: how many were saved from Hutu murderers? Second, to what extent was the intervention a surreptitious way of protecting the remnants of the extremist-dominated Hutu government of Rwanda, which had been a French client for the preceding four years, from destruction by the RPF? See "Rwanda," UN Monthly Chronicle (December 1994), pp. 6-7; Alain Destexhe, "The Third Genocide," Foreign Policy, No. 97 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 11-12.
50. "Rwanda," Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 31, No. 6 (June 1-30, 1994), pp. 11482-11485;
51. "Rwanda," Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 31, No. 7 (July 1-31, 1994), pp. 11499-11501;
52. "Rwanda," Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 31, No. 8 (August 1-31, 1994), p. 11560.
53. A port chosen as a safe haven would be the best possible situation from a supply point of view.
54. The payload of the aircraft will vary with both the distance the aircraft must travel, and the type of cargo. A good average payload for a C-130, the workhorse aircraft of humanitarian assistance, is about 13 or 14 short tons. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Airlift Forces, April 1979, pp. 73, 76. Accurate parachute drops require considerable skill; currently only the United States has much real capability for accurate high-altitude drops, which are often preferred in order to avoid anti-aircraft artillery fire.
55. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World's Refugees: The Challenge of Protection (New York: Penguin, 1993), "Protecting Assistance in Bosnia Herzegovina," pp. 79-82.
56. IISS, Strategic Survey 1994/95 (London: IISS, 1995), pp. 94-98.
57. John Pomfret, "Witnesses Allege Abuses by Serbs," Washington Post, July 16, 1995, p. A1. "Srbenica fell on Tuesday [July 11] after Bosnian Serb forces, defying two largely cursory NATO airstrikes, rolled into the town with tanks and foot soldiers."
58. Craig R. Whitney, "UN Yields Air-Strike Control to Military," International Herald Tribune (New York Times Service), July 27, 1995, p. 1.
59. IISS, Strategic Survey 1994/95 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1995), pp. 95-96. Interestingly, the 32,000 additional troops requested by the UNPROFOR commander when the safe havens were first suggested, plus the 8000-9000 troops already present in the designated towns, divided by six, the number of safe havens, yields a troop strength of roughly 6000-7000 per safe haven, nearly identical to the troop strength at the U.S. Marine Corps defense of Khe Sanh during the Vietnam War, a roughly analogous military exercise. See fn. 47, below. I surmise that UN commanders employ a rough rule of thumb: do not attempt a serious defense of a town without at least 6000-7000 troops, a reinforced brigade.
60. Troop strengths from IISS, The Military Balance 1994-95 (London: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 275-276.
61. See, for example, James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (Winter 1995-96), pp. 59-69.
62. See Barry R. Posen, "A Balkan Vietnam Awaits 'Peacekeepers'," Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1993. During and after the Tet offensive, when U.S. and South Vietnamese forces fought their foe to a bloody stalemate in a year of hard fighting, they probably outnumbered their enemy by 4:1. If the Bosnian Serbs were credited with 50,000 fighters, and they were optimistically considered to be the only opponents to the plan, then perhaps 200,000 troops would have been necessary to police Vance-Owen.
63. Roughly 37,000 U.S. and allied troops in UNITAF proved sufficient to bring enough order to Somalia to permit aid to move unhindered, for a soldier+police-to-population ratio of roughly 5.5:1000. This ratio is probably misleading, because the U.S.-led operation covered only 40 per cent of the country. 10:1000 might thus provide a better benchmark. Approximately 24,000 UN troops in UNISOM II, backed by 14,000 U.S. troops under national command, proved insufficient in the subsequent operation for the more ambitious objective of "rebuilding" the Somali state. See United Nations Peace-Keeping, "Information Notes Update," (New York: United Nations, May 1994), pp. 104, 122.