Deterrence, compellence, and prospect theory

Political Psychology

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 389-411

  Schaub Jr , Gary ^a,b  

^a USAF   (United States)

^b Maxwell Gunter AFB   (United States)

Author keywords

Coercion; Compellence; Decision making; Deterrence; Expected utility; Prospect theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942720760     PISSN: 0162895X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00377.x     Document Type: Article

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