Higher-order evidence

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Volumn 81, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 185-215

  Christensen, David ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954381276     PISSN: 00318205     EISSN: 19331592     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Bommarito N. Rationally Self-Ascribed Anti-Expertise. Philosophical Studies 2009, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9441-3, published online first: DOI
2. Christensen D. Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News. Philosophical Review 2007a, 116:187-217.
3. Christensen D. Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2007b, 2:3-31.
4. Conee E. Utilitarianism and Rationality. Analysis 1982, 42(1):55-59. Vol, No, pp
5. Conee E. Evident, but Rationally Unacceptable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1987, 65:316-326.
6. Egan A, Elga A. I Can't Believe I'm Stupid. Philosophical Perspectives 2005, 19:77-93.
7. Elga A. Reflection and Disagreement. Noûs 2007, 41:478-502.
8. Feldman R. Respecting the Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 2005, 19:95-119.
9. Feldman R. Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement. Epistemology Futures 2006, Hetherington S. ed, New York, Oxford University Press
10. Disagreement Feldman RWarfield T. eds, forthcoming, Oxford, Oxford University Press
11. Field H. Apriority as an Evaluative Notion. New Essays on the A Priori 2000, Boghossian PPeacocke C.eds, New York, Oxford
12. Field H. Recent Debates about the A Priori. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2005, 69-88. Gendler THawthorne J. eds, Oxford University Press
13. Frances B. The Reflective Epistemic Renegade. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research forthcoming
14. Kelly T. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2005, 1:167-196.
15. Kelly T. Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence. forthcoming, in Feldman and Warfield
16. Kornblith H. Belief in the Face of Controversy. forthcoming, in Feldman and Warfield
17. Kroon F. Rationality and Paradox. Analysis 1983, 43:455-461.
18. Kroon F. Rationality and Epistemic Paradox. Synthese 1993, 94:377-408.
19. Lackey J. A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance. Social Epistemology Haddock AMillar APritchard D. forthcoming a, eds, Oxford, Oxford University Press
20. Lackey J. What Should We Do when We Disagree? Oxford Studies in Epistemology III Gendler T SHawthorne J. forthcoming b, eds, Oxford, Oxford University Press
21. Pollock J L. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge 1986, Totowa, NJ, Roman and Littlefield
22. Richter R. Ideal Rationality and Hand-Waving. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1990, 68:147-156.
23. Sorensen R A. Anti-Expertise, Instability, and Rational Choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1987, 65:301-315.
24. Sosa E. The Epistemology of Disagreement. Armchair Philosophy forthcoming, in his, Princeton University Press, 2010