McDowell on reasons, externalism and scepticism

European Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 273-294

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34748892779     PISSN: 09668373     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0378.00187     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Blackburn, S. (1998), 'Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism', Mind, 107: 157-81.
2. Boghossian, P. (1997), 'What an Externalist can Know A Priori', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 97: 161-75.
3. Brandom, R. (1995), 'Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: 895-908.
4. Brown, J. (1995), 'The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access', Analysis, 55: 149-56.
5. Brueckner, A. (1992a), 'Semantic Answers to Skepticism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 73: 200-19.
6. - (1992b), 'What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori', Analysis, 52: 111-8.
7. Burge, T. (1988), 'Individualism and Self-Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy, 85: 649-63.
8. Chase, J. (2001), 'Is Externalism about Content Inconsistent with Internalism about Justification?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 227-46.
9. Christensen, D. (1993), 'Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 301-21.
10. Cohen, S. (2000), 'Contextualism and Skepticism', Philosophical Issues, 10: 94-107.
11. Davidson, D. (1986), 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', in E. LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Basil Blackwell: Oxford.
12. - (1987), 'Knowing One's Own Mind', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60: 441-58.
13. Davies, M. (1998), 'Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant', in C. Macdonald, B. Smith and C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 321-61.
14. DeRose, K. (1995), 'Solving the Skeptical Problem', Philosophical Review, 104: 1-52.
15. Dretske, F. (1970), 'Epistemic Operators', The Journal of Philosophy, 67: 1007-23.
16. Greco, J. (2004), 'Externalism and Skepticism', in R. Shantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge: New Studies on Cognition and Intentionality. de Gruyter: New York.
17. Hales, S. D. (1995), 'Epistemic Closure Principles', The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 33: 185-201.
18. Kallestrup, J. and Pritchard, D. H. (2004), 'An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism', Philosophia, 31.
19. Klein, P. (1986), 'Radical Interpretation and Global Skepticism', in E. LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Basil Blackwell: Oxford.
20. - (1995), 'Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails', Philosophical Topics, 23: 213-36.
21. Lewis, D. (1996), 'Elusive Knowledge', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 549-67.
22. Macarthur, D. (2003), 'McDowell, Scepticism, and the "Veil of Perception" ', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81: 175-90.
23. McDowell, J. (1982), 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge', Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455-79.
24. - (1986), 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space', in P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context. Clarendon Press: Oxford, pp. 136-68.
25. - (1994a), 'Knowledge by Hearsay', in B.K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony. Kluwer. Dordrecht, Holland, pp. 195-224.
26. - (1994b), Mind and World. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.
27. - (1995), 'Knowledge and the Internal', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: 877-93.
28. - (2002), 'Knowledge and the Internal Revisited', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 22-30.
29. McKinsey, M. (1991), 'Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access', Analysis, 51: 9-16.
30. Moore, G. E. (1939), 'Proof of an External World', Proceedings of the British Academy, 25: 273-300.
31. Nozick, R. (1981), Philosophical Explanations. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
32. Pritchard, D. H. (2001), 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and "Hinge" Propositions', in D. Salehi (ed.), Wittgenstein-Jahrbuch 2001/2002. Peter Lang: Berlin, pp. 97-122.
33. - (2002a), 'McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments', Synthese, 130: 279-302.
34. - (2002b), 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and Closure', Theoria, 68: 129-61.
35. - (2002c), 'Recent Work on Radical Skepticism', American Philosophical Quarterly, 39: 215-57.
36. - (2002d), 'Resurrecting the Moorean Response to Scepticism', International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 10: 283-307.
37. - (2002e), 'Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism', Grazer Philosophische Studien, 64: 19-55.
38. - (2003), 'Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck', Metaphilosophy, 34: 106-30; and reprinted in Moral and Epistemic Virtues, in M. S. Brady and D. H. Pritchard (eds.), Basil Blackwell: Oxford (2003).
39. - (2004), 'Epistemic Luck', Journal of Philosophical Research, 29.
40. - (forthcoming), Externalism, Skepticism and Luck', in S. Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.
41. Putnam, H. (1981), Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
42. Sosa, E. (1999), 'How to Defeat Opposition to Moore', Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 141-54.
43. Vahid, H. (2003), 'Content Externalism and the Internalism / Externalism Debate in Justification Theory', European Journal of Philosophy, 11: 89-107.
44. Vogel, J. (1990), 'Are There Counter-Examples to the Closure Principle?', in G. Ross and M. D. Roth (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, Netherlands, pp. 20-3.
45. - (1999), 'The New Relevant Alternatives Theory', Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 155-80.
46. Warfield, T. (1998), 'A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing our Minds', Philosophical Studies, 60: 76-90.
47. Williams, M. (1988-9), 'Scepticism and Charity', Ratio (new series), 1-2: 176-94.
48. - (1991), Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Basil Blackwell: Oxford.
49. - (2003), 'Wittgenstein's Refutation of Idealism', in D. McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge: London.
50. Williamson, T. (2000a), Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
51. - (2000b), 'Scepticism and Evidence', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 613-28.
52. Wittgenstein, L. (1969), On Certainty, in G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright, D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (tr.). (eds.), Basil Blackwell: Oxford.
53. Wright, C. (1985), 'Facts and Certainty', Proceedings of the British Academy, 71: 429-72.
54. - (1994), 'On Putnam's Proof that we are not Brains in a Vat', in B. Hale and P. Clark (eds.), Reading Putnam. Basil Blackwell: Oxford, pp. 216-41.
55. - (2000), 'Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof, Philosophical Issues, 10: 140-63.
56. - (2003), 'Wittgensteinian Certainties', in D. McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge: London.