Theories of the firm-market boundary

Academy of Management Annals

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 89-133

  Zenger, Todd R ^a   Felin, Teppo ^b   Bigelow, Lyda ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960767355     PISSN: 19416520     EISSN: 19416067     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/19416520.2011.590301     Document Type: Review

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