The impact of empirical tests of transaction cost economics on the debate on the nature of the firm

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 461-476

  Carter, Richard ^a   Hodgson, Geoffrey M ^b  

^a Independent User Consultant   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asset specificity; Capabilities; Competences; Firms; Oliver Williamson; Transaction cost economics

Indexed keywords

CODES (STANDARDS); COST EFFECTIVENESS; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

ASSET SPECIFICITY; FIRMS; OLIVER WILLIAMSON; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 33646263117     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.531     Document Type: Article

References (72)

1. Alchian A, Demsetz H. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review 62(December): 777-795.
2. Anderson E. 1985. The sales person as outside agent or employee: a transaction cost analysis. Marketing Science 4(3): 234-254.
3. Anderson E. 1996. Transaction cost analysis and marketing. In Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond, Groenewegen J (ed). Kluwer: Boston, MA; 65-83.
4. Anderson E, Coughlan AT. 1987. International market entry and expansion via independent or integrated channels of distribution. Journal of Marketing 51(January): 71-82.
5. Anderson E, Schmittlein DC. 1984. Integration of the sales force: an empirical examination. RAND Journal of Economics 15(Autumn): 385-395.
6. Anderson E, Weitz B. 1992. The use of pledges to build and sustain commitment in distribution channels. Journal of Marketing Research 29(February): 18-34.
7. Argyres NS. 1996. Evidence on the role of firm capabilities in vertical integration decisions. Strategic Management Journal 17(1): 129-150.
8. Balakrishnan S, Wernerfelt B. 1986. Technical change, competition and vertical integration. Strategic Management Journal 7(4): 347-359.
9. Boerner CS, Macher JT. 2003. Transaction cost economics: an assessment of empirical work in the social sciences. Working paper, Georgetown University.
10. Buckley P, Casson M. 1976. The Future of Multinational Enterprise. Macmillan: London.
11. Bucklin LP, Sengupta S. 1993. Organizing successful comarketing alliances. Journal of Marketing 57(April): 32-46.
12. Carroll GR, Teece DJ. 1999. Firms, markets, and hierarchies: introduction and overview. In Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, Carroll GR, Teece DJ (eds). Oxford University Press: London; 3-13.
13. Carter R. 2002. Empirical work in transaction cost economics: critical assessments and alternative interpretations. PhD dissertation, Cambridge University, Cambridge, U.K.
14. Combs JG, Ketchen DJ Jr. 1999. Explaining interfirm cooperation and performance: toward a reconciliation of predictions from the resource-based view and organizational economics. Strategic Management Journal 20(9): 867-888.
15. Crocker KJ, Masten SE. 1996. Regulation and administered contracts revisited: lessons from transaction-cost economics for public utility regulation. Journal of Regulatory Economics 9: 5-39.
16. Cronin B. 1984. The Citation Process: The Role and Significance of Citations in Scientific Communication. Taylor Graham: London.
17. David RJ, Han S-K. 2004. A systematic assessment of the empirical support for transaction cost economics. Strategic Management Journal 25(1): 39-58.
18. Dyer JH. 1996. Does governance matter? Keiretsu alliances and asset specificity as sources of Japanese competitive advantage. Organization Science 7(6): 649-656.
19. Eccles RG. 1981. The quasifirm in the construction industry. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2: 335-357.
20. Erramilli MK, Rao CP. 1993. Service firms' international entry-mode choice: a modified transaction-cost analysis approach. Journal of Marketing 57(July): 19-38.
21. Foss NJ. 1993. Theories of the firm: contractual and competence perspectives. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 3(2): 127-144.
22. Foss NJ, Knudsen C (eds). 1996. Towards a Competence Theory of the Firm. Routledge: London.
23. Gatignon H, Anderson E. 1988. The multinational corporation's degree of control over foreign subsidiaries: an empirical test of a transaction cost explanation. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4(2): 305-336.
24. Gilbert GN. 1977. Referencing as persuasion. Social Studies of Science 1: 113-122.
25. Heide JB, John G. 1988. The role of dependence balancing in safeguarding transaction-specific assets in conventional channels. Journal of Marketing 52(January): 20-35.
26. Heide JB, John G. 1990. Alliances in industrial purchasing: the determinants of joint action in buyer-supplier relationships. Journal of Marketing Research 27(February): 24-36.
27. Heide JB, John G. 1992. Do norms matter in marketing relationships? Journal of Marketing 56(April): 32-44.
28. Hennart J-F. 1982. A Theory of Multinational Enterprise. University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, MI.
29. Hennart J-F. 1988. A transaction costs theory of equity joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal 9(4): 361-374.
30. Hennart J-F. 1991. A transaction costs theory of joint ventures: an empirical study of Japanese subsidiaries in the United States. Management Science 37(4): 483-497.
31. Hodgson GM. 1998. Evolutionary and competence-based theories of the firm. Journal of Economic Studies 25(1): 25-56.
32. Hodgson GM. 2002. The legal nature of the firm and the myth of the firm-market hybrid. International Journal of the Economics of Business 9(1): 37-60.
33. John G, Weitz B A. 1988. Forward integration into distribution: an empirical test of transaction cost analysis. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4(2): 337-355.
34. Joskow PL. 1985. Vertical integration and long-term contracts: the case of coal-burning electric generating plants. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1(1): 33-80.
35. Joskow PL. 1987. Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: empirical evidence from coal markets. American Economic Review 77(1): 168-185.
36. Joskow PL. 1988. Asset specificity and the structure of vertical relationships: empirical evidence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4(1): 95-117.
37. Joskow PL. 1991. The role of transaction cost economics in antitrust and public utility regulatory policies. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7(September): 53-83.
38. Klamer A, Van Dalen HP. 2002. Attention and the art of scientific publishing. Journal of Economic Methodology 9(3): 289-315.
39. Klein S, Frazier GL, Roth VJ. 1990. A transaction cost analysis model of channel integration in international markets. Journal of Marketing Research 27(May): 196-208.
40. Masten SE. 1984. The organization of production: evidence from the aerospace industry. Journal of Law and Economics 27(October): 403-417.
41. Masten SE. 1996. Empirical research in transaction cost economics: challenges, progress, directions. In Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond, Groenewegen J (ed). Kluwer: Boston, MA; 43-64.
42. Masten SE, Meehan JW Jr, Snyder EA. 1989. Vertical integration in the U.S. auto industry. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 12: 265-273.
43. Masten SE, Meehan JW Jr, Snyder EA. 1991. The costs of organization. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7(1): 1-25.
44. Masten SE, Saussier S. 2000. Economics of contracts: an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting. Revue d'economie industrielle 92(2/3): 215-236.
45. Ménard C. 2004. The economics of hybrid organizations. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160(3): 345-376.
46. Monteverde K. 1995a. Applying resource-based strategic analysis: making the model more accessible to practitioners. Working paper 95-1, College of Business and Administration, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia.
47. Monteverde K. 1995b. Technical dialog as an incentive for vertical integration in the semiconductor industry. Management Science 41(10): 1624-1638.
48. Monteverde K, Teece DJ. 1982. Supplier switching costs and vertical integration in the automobile industry. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 206-213.
49. Nelson RR, Winter SG. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
50. Noordewier TG, John G, Nevin JR. 1990. Performance outcomes of purchasing arrangements in industrial buyer-vendor relationships. Journal of Marketing 54(October): 80-93.
51. Nooteboom B. 2004. Governance and competence: how can they be combined? Cambridge Journal of Economics 28(4): 505-525.
52. Nooteboom B, Berger H, Noorderhaven NG. 1997. Effects of trust and governance on relational risk. Academy of Management Journal 40(2): 308-338.
53. Osborn RN, Baughn CC. 1990. Forms of interorganizational governance for multinational alliances. Academy of Management Journal 33(3): 503-519.
54. Parkhe A. 1993. Strategic alliance structuring: a game theoretic and transaction cost examination of interfirm cooperation. Academy of Management Journal 36(4): 794-829.
55. Penrose ET. 1959. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Basil Blackwell: Oxford.
56. Poppo L, Zenger T. 1998. Testing alternative theories of the firm: transaction cost, knowledge-based, and measurement explanations for make-or-buy decisions in information services. Strategic Management Journal 19(9): 853-877.
57. Rindfleisch A, Heide JB. 1997. Transaction cost analysis: past, present, and future applications. Journal of Marketing 61(October): 30-54.
58. Rumelt RP. 1984. Towards a strategic theory of the firm. In Competitive Strategic Management, Lamb RB. (ed). Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ; 56-70.
59. Shelanski HA. 1991. A survey of empirical work in transaction cost economics. Working paper, University of California, Berkeley.
60. Shelanski HA, Klein PG. 1995. Empirical research in transaction cost economics. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11(2): 335-361.
61. Sobrero M, Schrader S. 1998. Structuring inter-firm relationships: a meta-analytic approach. Organization Studies 19(4): 585-615.
62. Stump RL, Heide JB. 1996. Controlling supplier opportunism in industrial relationships. Journal of Marketing Research 33(November): 431-441.
63. Walker G, Weber D. 1984. A transaction cost approach to make-or-buy decisions. Administrative Science Quarterly 29(September): 373-391.
64. Whinston MD. 2003. On the transaction cost determinants of vertical integration. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 19(1): 1-23.
65. Williamson OE. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press: New York.
66. Williamson OE. 1979. Transaction cost economics: the governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics 22(October): 233-261.
67. Williamson OE. 1983. Credible commitments: using hostages to support exchange. American Economic Review 73(4): 519-540.
68. Williamson OE. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press: New York.
69. Williamson OE. 1991. Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly 36(June): 269-296.
70. Williamson OE. 1999. Strategy research: governance and competence perspectives. Strategic Management Journal 20(12): 1087-1108.
71. Williamson OE. 2000. The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature 38(3): 595-613.
72. Zaheer A, Venkatraman N. 1995. Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: an empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange. Strategic Management Journal 16(5): 373-392.