Entrepreneurial finance meets organizational reality: Comparing investment practices and performance of corporate and independent venture capitalists

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 31, Issue 9, 2010, Pages 990-1017

  Dushnitsky, Gary ^a   Shapira, Zur ^b  

^a LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Compensation; Corporate entrepreneurship; Incentives; Principal agent framework; Venture capital

Indexed keywords

COMPENSATION SCHEME; CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP; CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL; EQUITY INVESTMENT; MANAGERIAL ACTIONS; NEW TECHNOLOGIES; PARALLEL PATTERNS; PRINCIPAL AGENTS; VENTURE CAPITAL; VENTURE CAPITALISTS;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

INVESTMENTS;

EID: 77954493218     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.851     Document Type: Article

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