Mechanism design with uncertain inputs: (To err is human, to forgive divine)

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 549-558

  Feige, Uriel ^a   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^b,c  

^a WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (Israel)

^b MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^c TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

fairness; scheduling

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN;

AXIOMATIC APPROACH; DESIGN MECHANISMS; ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY; FAIRNESS; PROBABILISTIC MODELING; QUALITATIVE APPROACH; QUANTITATIVE MODELING; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

SCHEDULING;

EID: 79959705389     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1993636.1993709     Document Type: Conference Paper

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