A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms

Algorithmica (New York)

Volumn 55, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 729-740

  Christodoulou, George ^a   Koutsoupias, Elias ^b   Vidali, Angelina ^b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATICS   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS   (Greece)

Author keywords

Algorithmic mechanism design; Lower bound; Scheduling unrelated machines

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN; APPROXIMATION RATIOS; LOWER BOUND; LOWER BOUNDS; MECHANISM DESIGN; SCHEDULING MECHANISM; SCHEDULING TASKS; UNRELATED MACHINES;

CONTROL THEORY; SCHEDULING;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 69249216693     PISSN: 01784617     EISSN: 14320541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-008-9165-3     Document Type: Article

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