Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity

EC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 252-261

  Lavi, Ron ^a   Swamy, Chaitanya ^b  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Approximation algorithms; Mechanism design; Scheduling

Indexed keywords

CYCLE MONOTONICITY; FRACTIONAL RELAXATION; MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SCHEDULING; TRUTHFUL MECHANISM DESIGN;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; GRAPH THEORY; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOM PROCESSES;

SCHEDULING;

EID: 36448938665     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1250910.1250947     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (26)

1. N. Andelmaxi, Y. Azar, and M. Sorani. Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines. In Proc. 22nd STACS, 69-82, 2005.
2. A. Archer. Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents. PhD thesis, Cornell University, 2004.
3. A. Archer and É. Tardos. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In Proc. 42nd FOCS, pages 482-491, 2001.
4. V. Auletta, R. De-Prisco, P. Penna, and G. Persiano. Deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling related machines. In Proc. 21st STACS, pages 608-619, 2004.
5. I. Bezáková and V. Dani. Allocating indivisible goods. In ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2005.
6. S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterjee, R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, N. Nisan, and A. Sen. Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation. Econometrica, 74:1109-1132, 2006.
7. P. Briest, P. Krysta, and B. Vocking. Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design. In Proc. 37th STOC, pages 39-48, 2005.
8. G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, and A. Vidali. A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms. In Proc. 18th SODA, pages 1163-1170, 2007.
9. E. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 8:17-33, 1971.
10. T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617-631, 1973.
11. H. Gui, R. Muller, and R. V. Vohra. Characterizing dominant strategy mechanisms with multi-dimensional types, 2004. Working paper.
12. L. A. Hall. Approximation algorithms for scheduling. In D. Hochbaum, editor, Approximation Algorithms for NP-Hard Problems. PWS Publishing, MA, 1996.
13. A. Kovács. Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines. In Proc. 13th ESA, pages 616-627, 2005.
14. V. S. A. Kumar, M. V. Marathe, S. Parthasarathy, and A. Srinivasan. Approximation algorithms for scheduling on multiple machines. In Proc. 46th FOCS, pages 254-263, 2005.
15. R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, and N. Nisan. Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 44th FOCS, pages 574-583, 2003.
16. R. Lavi and C. Swamy. Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming. In Proc. 46th FOCS, pages 595-604, 2005.
17. D. Lehmann, L. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. Journal of the ACM, 49:577-602, 2002.
18. J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, and É. Tardos. Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines. Math. Prog., 46:259-271, 1990.
19. R. J. Lipton, E. Markakis, E. Mossel, and A. Saberi. On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods. In Proc. 5th EC, page's 125-131, 2004.
20. A. Mu'alem and M. Schapira. Setting lower bounds on truthfulness. In Proc. 18th SODA, 1143-1152, 2007.
21. R. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58-73, 1981.
22. N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Econ. Behavior, 35:166-196, 2001.
23. J. C. Rochet. A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16:191-200, 1987.
24. M. Saks and L. Yu. Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains. In Proc. 6th EC, pages 286-293, 2005.
25. D. B. Shmoys and É. Tardos. An approximation algorithm for the generalized assignment problem. Mathematical Programming, 62:461-474, 1993.
26. W. Vickrey. Counterspeculations, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance, 16:8-37, 1961.