Mix and match

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 305-314

  Ashlagi, Itai ^a   Fischer, Felix ^b   Kash, Ian ^b   Procaccia, Ariel D ^b  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

approximate mechanism design without money; kidney exchange

Indexed keywords

CARDINALITIES; CARDINALITY MATCHING; CLOSE-IN; DESIGN AND ANALYSIS; DISJOINT SETS; LOWER BOUNDS; MATCHING PROBLEMS; MECHANISM DESIGN; MIX-AND-MATCH; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS; SOCIAL WELFARE;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; GRAPH THEORY; HOSPITALS;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 77954746536     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1807342.1807392     Document Type: Conference Paper

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