Fault tolerant mechanism design

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 172, Issue 15, 2008, Pages 1783-1799

  Porter, Ryan ^a   Ronen, Amir ^b   Shoham, Yoav ^c   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^a  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^b IBM HAIFA RESEARCH LAB   (Israel)

^c Stanford University

Author keywords

Decentralized task allocation; Game theory; Mechanism design; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

MECHANISMS; STANDARDS;

DECENTRALIZED TASK ALLOCATION; FAULT-TOLERANT MECHANISM; GAME THEORY; MECHANISM DESIGN; PRIVATE INFORMATION; TASK ALLOCATION; UNCERTAINTY;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 50649107044     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2008.06.004     Document Type: Article

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