Strategyproof approximation of the minimax on networks

Mathematics of Operations Research

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 513-526

  Alon, Noga ^a,b   Feldman, Michal ^a,c   Procaccia, Ariel D ^d   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^a,e  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^d HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^e TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Approximation; Facility location; Mechanism design; Minimax

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION; APPROXIMATION RATIOS; FACILITY LOCATION; MECHANISM DESIGN; MINIMAX; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; STRATEGY PROOFS; UPPER BOUND;

LOCATION; MACHINE DESIGN;

TREES (MATHEMATICS);

EID: 77956635961     PISSN: 0364765X     EISSN: 15265471     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1100.0457     Document Type: Article

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