Graceful decline? The surprising success of great power retrenchment

International Security

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 7-44

  MacDonald, Paul K ^a   Parent, Joseph M ^b  

^a WILLIAMS COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953754700     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00034     Document Type: Article

References (201)

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3. For a theoretical justification of this position, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 192-197, 232.
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6. See Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), pp. 211-212.
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11. For the logic behind this view, see Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 279-303.
12. Paul M. Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 21.
13. Hendrik Spruyt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 22-29.
14. Miles Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 27-32, 60-64.
15. See David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 14.
16. G. John Ikenberry, "The Rise of China: Power, Institutions, and theWestern Order," in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 112-113.
17. Stephen S. Cohen and J. Bradford DeLong, The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money (New York: Basic Books, 2010), pp. 143-148.
18. See Christopher A. Preble, The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009), chaps. 2-3.
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20. See Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 268-274.
21. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New York: New Press, 2003), pp. 24-26.
22. Roger C. Altman and Richard N. Haass, "American Profligacy and American Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6 (November/December 2010), pp. 25-26.
23. See Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (New York: Verso, 2003), pp. 206-251.
24. Chalmers Johnson, Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006), pp. 157-162, 243-244.
25. Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008), pp. 3-12.
26. On great power expansion, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), chap. 3.
27. Christopher Layne, "The 'Poster Child for Offensive Realism': America as a Global Hegemon," Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 120-164.
28. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 35-41.
29. For a discussion of these options, see Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 12.
30. Samuel P. Huntington, "Coping with the Lippmann Gap," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 3 (May/June 1988), p. 456.
31. Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 465-469.
32. See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, chap. 5.
33. Charles P. Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy, 1500-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 190.
34. Steven E. Lobell, "The Grand Strategy of Hegemonic Decline: Dilemmas of Strategy and Finance," Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2000), pp. 86-111.
35. See Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s," International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 148-181.
36. Daniel Treisman, "Rational Appeasement," International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 345-373.
37. Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), pp. 10-14.
38. See G. John Ikenberry, "The State and Strategies of International Adjustment," World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1986), pp. 53-77.
39. Peter Trubowitz, "Geography and Strategy: The Politics of American Naval Expansion," in Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Rhodes, eds., The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 105-138.
40. Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), chap. 1.
41. See Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 2-21.
42. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 40-54.
43. Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 9-13.
44. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 194.
45. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, pp. 40, 49.
46. See Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 10, 67.
47. Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 32.
48. Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 1-2.
49. For a contrasting view, see Anne E. Sartori, Deterrence by Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 5.
50. See Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2 (June 1999), pp. 43-44.
51. Vesna Danilovic, "The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 3 (June 2001), pp. 341-369.
52. States may not develop reputations for weakness, but leaders can develop reputations for dishonest bluffing.
53. See Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith, "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 175-200.
54. Mark J.C. Crescenzi, "Reputation and Interstate Conflict," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 2007), pp. 382-396.
55. Quoted in Press, Calculating Credibility, p. 114.
56. See Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 559.
57. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 190.
58. See Roy K. Flint, "The Truman-MacArthur Conflict," in Richard H. Kohn, ed., The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989 (New York: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 246-251.
59. See Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Realism, Power Shifts, and Major War," Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Summer 2001), pp. 145-178.
60. Robert A. Pape, "Empire Falls," National Interest, No. 99 (January/February 2009), pp. 21-34.
61. See Richard K. Betts, "Suicide from Fear of Death?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (January/February 2003), pp. 34-43.
62. See Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motive for War," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107.
63. Steve Chan, "Exploring Puzzles in Power-Transition Theory: Implications for Sino-American Relations," Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring 2004), pp. 103-141.
64. See Friedberg, The Weary Titan, pp. 18-19, 116-117, 134-138, 290-291.
65. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 539-540.
66. Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy, p. 21.
67. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 271, 340-342.
68. See Spruyt, Ending Empire, pp. 22-29, 264-265.
69. See also Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Action and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 28-29.
70. See, for example, Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 13-17.
71. Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 15-18.
72. John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 48-62.
73. For different ways of breaking down domestic coalitions, see Steven E. Lobell, The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), pp. 26-29.
74. Mark R. Brawley, Afterglow or Adjustment? Domestic Institutions and Responses to Overstretch (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 12-17.
75. Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 277.
76. See also Jack Snyder, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, "Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home," World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2009), pp. 155-187.
77. Spruyt, Ending Empire, pp. 11-38.
78. For similar conceptions of domestic coalitional inhibitions on grand strategy, see Schweller, Unanswered Threats, pp. 47-49.
79. Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 11-32.
80. See Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 102-103.
81. Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 48-61.
82. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), chap. 6.
83. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 2.
84. Neorealists take conflicting positions on how rational states are. We incline toward Waltz's skepticism of states as highly rational.
85. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118.
86. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 330.
87. For a contrasting view, see John J. Mearsheimer, "Reckless States and Realism," International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2009), pp. 241-256.
88. See Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), pp. 7-8.
89. For classic works on decline, see Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (New York: Everyman, 1993), chaps. 2, 31, 38.
90. Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1965), pp. 91-96, 167-174.
91. For various views on neorealist theories of foreign policy, see Snyder, Myths of Empire, chap. 2.
92. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), chap. 2.
93. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), chap. 2.
94. SeeWaltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 125.
95. Elizabeth Pond and Kenneth N.Waltz, "Correspondence: International Politics, Viewed from the Ground," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 198-199.
96. Kenneth N. Waltz, personal correspondence with Joseph M. Parent, June 8, 2010.
97. See Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not a Neorealist Theory of Foreign Policy?" Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 12, 48.
98. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 163-172.
99. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-138.
100. James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security," International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 207-233.
101. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 127-128.
102. João Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 5-6.
103. Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 153.
104. Friedrich Meinecke, The Age of German Liberation, 1795-1815, trans. Peter Paret and Helmuth Fischer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 38-39, 95-96.
105. Our data come from Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris: Development Center of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995).
106. Angus Maddison, Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
107. We use a slightly different coding of what constitutes a great power than the Correlates of War. Specifically, we consider the following countries to be great powers: Austria 1870-1918.
108. China 1950-2001; France 1870-1940, 1945-2001; Germany 1870-1918, 1925-1945, 1955-2001; Italy 1870-1943; Japan 1870-1945, 1952-2001; Russia/Soviet Union 1870-1917, 1922-2001; United Kingdom 1870-2001; and United States 1870-2001.
109. Angus Maddison's estimates for Imperial Russia, for example, omit certain years. We filled these gaps using Maddison's industry of origin method, which measures output based on volume estimates of physical indicators such as agricultural and industrial production.
110. See Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, pp. 141-142.
111. Raymond W. Goldsmith, "The Economic Growth of Tsarist Russia, 1860-1913," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 9, No. 3 (April 1961), pp. 450, 462-463.
112. R.W. Davies, ed., From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy: Continuity and Change in the Economy of the USSR (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 279.
113. See William D. Grampp, "What Did Smith Mean by the Invisible Hand?" Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 3 (June 2000), pp. 441-465.
114. See, for example, Allan Mitchell, The German Influence in France after 1870: The Formation of the French Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 119.
115. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, pp. 44-50, 67, 81.
116. See, for example, Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 275, 289-291.
117. Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 223-234.
118. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 30.
119. Our large and medium categories correspond with what Colin Dueck calls first-and secondorder changes in grand strategy. Our small category is similar to his description of "minor tinkering.".
120. See Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, pp. 12-13.
121. Richard Rosecrance, "Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conflict: The 'Goldilocks Problem' in International Strategy (A Review Essay)," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 145-163.
122. We use military personnel data from Correlates of War, "National Material Capabilities" data set, ver. 3.02.
123. See J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985," International Interactions, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May 1988), pp. 115-132.
124. We use alliance agreement data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project, ver. 3.
125. See Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long, "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944," International Interactions, Vol. 28, No. 3 (July 2002), pp. 237-260.
126. We use data from Correlates of War, "Militarized Interstate Disputes" data set, ver. 3.1.
127. See Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 163-213.
128. See, for example, Benjamin E. Goldsmith, "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47, No. 5 (October 2003), pp. 551-573.
129. See, for example, John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett, and Michael L. Berbaum, "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 371-393.
130. See retrenchment_appendix.pdf at https://public.me.com/pkmacdonald.
131. There are three cases of regime transition in the sample-1873 France, 1931 Germany, and 1987 Soviet Union-but the data are not suggestive. The Soviet Union aggressively pared back its commitments despite internal upheaval, while France charted a minimalist foreign policy in part because of it.
132. A potential second case, 1872 France, experienced acute relative decline after the French had been defeated by Germany. This suggests an additional problem with theories of hegemonic transition-in many cases, transition is produced by war rather than vice versa.
133. See Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino, "Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory," International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 2009), pp. 389-410.
134. See Jack Snyder, "Review of The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, by Aaron L. Friedberg," American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 2 (June 1990), p. 719.
135. In the following analysis, we exclude the 1931 Germany case, which was an enormous outlier because of Adolf Hitler's staggering rearmament program following his renunciation of the restrictions imposed by the Versailles treaty. Between 1932 and 1936, for example, Germany increased its military personnel fivefold and its military spending fifteenfold. Although it is an interesting case, 1931 Germany is so unlike any foreseeable retrenching great power that including it would only obscure general, more relevant tendencies.
136. The difference is statistically significant at the p< 0.1 level (p = 0.0571). We use a one-tailed t-test for unpaired samples with unequal variance for each of the following tests. BothWorldWar I and World War II are excluded from these baseline calculations. This exclusion creates a harder test for neorealist theories given that the baseline figures for military personnel, alliance agreements, and militarized disputes are much higher if these wars are included.
137. This difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level (p = 0.0366).
138. This difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.217).
139. See, for example, Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons, and Wayne Sandholtz, "After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 269-271.
140. This difference is statistically significant at the p < 0.1 level (p = 0.0658).
141. The difference in militarized dispute initiation is statistically significant at the p < 0.1 level (p = 0.0641), while the differences in hostility level is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level (p = 0.0338).
142. See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 191.
143. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, p. 3.
144. Taliaferro, "Realism, Power Shifts, and Major War," p. 147.
145. On process tracing, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 85-87, 225-228.
146. John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chap. 7.
147. Richard D. Challener, "The French Foreign Office: The Era of Philippe Berthelot," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 54.
148. Judith M. Hughes, To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920's (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 145.
149. Quoted in Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The Lost Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918-1939 (New York: St. Martin's, 1981), p. 67.
150. Quoted in Edward David Keeton, Briand's Locarno Policy: French Economics, Politics, and Diplomacy, 1925-1929 (New York: Garland, 1987), p. 117.
151. The Battle of Sedan refers to a crushing military defeat of France, which largely decided the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War.
152. Quoted in Adamthwaite, The Lost Peace, p. 80.
153. Quoted in Hughes, To the Maginot Line, pp. 185-186.
154. Quoted in Keeton, Briand's Locarno Policy, pp. 94-95.
155. See also Piotr S. Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1926-1936 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 23, 55, 60.
156. Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France between Two Wars: Conflicting Strategies of Peace since Versailles (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1963), chap. 7.
157. P.M.H. Bell, France and Britain, 1900-1940: Entente and Estrangement (New York: Longman, 1996), p. 149.
158. Jacques Néré, The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945 (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 60-92.
159. On French military reforms of this period, see Hughes, To the Maginot Line, pp. 116, 122, 131-143, 159-161, 172-178.
160. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 192-193.
161. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, chap. 4.
162. Hughes, To the Maginot Line, pp. 192-193.
163. Keeton, Briand's Locarno Policy, p. 98.
164. Anthony Adamthwaite, "Britain and the World, 1945-9: The View from the Foreign Office," International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 1985), p. 226. On Britain's failure to secure cooperation from the Dominions, see ibid., pp. 228-229.
165. Elisabeth Barker, The British between the Superpowers, 1945-50 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), p. 60.
166. Quoted in Ritchie Ovendale, ed., British Defence Policy since 1945 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1994), p. 24.
167. For official concurrence, see Ritchie Ovendale, The English-speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions, and the Cold War, 1945-1951 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 40-41.
168. Quoted in William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 22, No. 3 (September 1994), p. 465.
169. Ovendale, British Defence Policy since 1945, p. 32.
170. Quoted in Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945-1951 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 252.
171. Adamthwaite, "Britain and the World," p. 227.
172. See also Barker, The British between the Superpowers, p. 52.
173. Peter Weiler, Ernest Bevin (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 181.
174. Quoted in M.W. Kirby, The Decline of British Economic Power since 1870 (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 93.
175. On British alignment in this period, see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 68.
176. James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 149.
177. Barker, The British between the Superpowers, p. 130.
178. John W. Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-1992 (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), pp. 1-27.
179. See Ikenberry, "The Rise of China," pp. 112-113.
180. Cohen and DeLong, The End of Influence, pp. 143-148.
181. Adam S. Posen, "National Security Risks from Accumulation of Foreign Debt," in C. Fred Bergsten, ed., The Long-Term International Economic Position of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009), pp. 68-71.
182. John J. Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise," Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690 (April 2006), p. 162.
183. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33.
184. Jack S. Levy, "Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China," in Ross and Feng, China's Ascent, pp. 11-33.
185. See Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 81-118.
186. Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 193-203.
187. See Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, "China: Getting the Questions Right," National Interest, No. 62 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 21-22, 29.
188. M. Taylor Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 81-83.
189. The precise estimate depends on which years one uses to project into the future
190. See Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long-Run (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1998), pp. 95-99.
191. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 25-29, 38-47.
192. Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 24-29, 42-44.
193. See Chang-hee Nam, "Relocating the U.S. Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture," Asia Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July/August 2006), pp. 627-630.
194. Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, "How to Deal with South Korea," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 77, 79-80.
195. See Thomas J. Christensen, "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia," International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 112-113.
196. See David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 90-95.
197. Joshua Kurlantzick, "Pax Asia-Pacifica? East Asian Integration and Its Implications for the United States," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Summer 2007), pp. 74-76.
198. See M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Search for Military Power," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 2008), pp. 129-135.
199. For various proposals on how the United States might implement a policy of retrenchment, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5-48.
200. Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 140-148.
201. Barry R. Posen, "The Case for Restraint," American Interest, Vol. 3, No. 2 (November/December 2007), pp. 7-17.