The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century

International Security

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 81-118

  Ross, Robert S ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033450458     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.23.4.81     Document Type: Article

References (208)

1. For pessimistic analyses, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," ibid., pp. 34-77; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 62-66. See also Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the Constrainment of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; and Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, A U.S. Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-Power System in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 229 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1995). Samuel Huntington argues that Chinese hegemony is all but inevitable, so that the United States must accommodate China. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
2. For pessimistic analyses, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," ibid., pp. 34-77; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 62-66. See also Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the Constrainment of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; and Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, A U.S. Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-Power System in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 229 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1995). Samuel Huntington argues that Chinese hegemony is all but inevitable, so that the United States must accommodate China. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
3. For pessimistic analyses, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," ibid., pp. 34-77; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 62-66. See also Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the Constrainment of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; and Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, A U.S. Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-Power System in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 229 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1995). Samuel Huntington argues that Chinese hegemony is all but inevitable, so that the United States must accommodate China. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
4. For pessimistic analyses, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," ibid., pp. 34-77; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 62-66. See also Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the Constrainment of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; and Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, A U.S. Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-Power System in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 229 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1995). Samuel Huntington argues that Chinese hegemony is all but inevitable, so that the United States must accommodate China. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
5. For pessimistic analyses, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," ibid., pp. 34-77; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 62-66. See also Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the Constrainment of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; and Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, A U.S. Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-Power System in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 229 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1995). Samuel Huntington argues that Chinese hegemony is all but inevitable, so that the United States must accommodate China. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
6. For pessimistic analyses, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," ibid., pp. 34-77; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 62-66. See also Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the Constrainment of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; and Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, A U.S. Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance-of-Power System in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 229 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1995). Samuel Huntington argues that Chinese hegemony is all but inevitable, so that the United States must accommodate China. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
7. The classic geopolitical treatment of the emerging postwar order and from which the title of this article is taken is Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of the Pease (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944). See also Walter Lippmann's contribution, U.S. War Aims (Boston: Little, Brown, 1944).
8. The classic geopolitical treatment of the emerging postwar order and from which the title of this article is taken is Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of the Pease (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944). See also Walter Lippmann's contribution, U.S. War Aims (Boston: Little, Brown, 1944).
9. William T.R. Fox, The Superpowers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union - Their Responsibility for Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944), pp. 20-21. See also Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky), p. 45. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 230-232. For analyses of interplay between global and regional orders, see David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); and Barry Buzan, "A Framework for Regional Security Analysis," in Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 3-33.
10. William T.R. Fox, The Superpowers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union - Their Responsibility for Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944), pp. 20-21. See also Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky), p. 45. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 230-232. For analyses of interplay between global and regional orders, see David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); and Barry Buzan, "A Framework for Regional Security Analysis," in Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 3-33.
11. William T.R. Fox, The Superpowers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union - Their Responsibility for Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944), pp. 20-21. See also Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky), p. 45. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 230-232. For analyses of interplay between global and regional orders, see David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); and Barry Buzan, "A Framework for Regional Security Analysis," in Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 3-33.
12. William T.R. Fox, The Superpowers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union - Their Responsibility for Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944), pp. 20-21. See also Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky), p. 45. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 230-232. For analyses of interplay between global and regional orders, see David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); and Barry Buzan, "A Framework for Regional Security Analysis," in Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 3-33.
13. William T.R. Fox, The Superpowers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union - Their Responsibility for Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944), pp. 20-21. See also Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky), p. 45. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 230-232. For analyses of interplay between global and regional orders, see David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); and Barry Buzan, "A Framework for Regional Security Analysis," in Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 3-33.
14. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Deising, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 462-470; Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-My Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Robert S. Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretic Analysis," World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 4 (July 1981), pp. 485-515; and R.J. Rummel, "Triadic Struggle and Accommodation in Perspective," in Ilpyong Kim, ed., The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union (New York: Paragon House, 1987).
15. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Deising, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 462- 470; Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-My Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Robert S. Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretic Analysis," World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 4 (July 1981), pp. 485-515; and R.J. Rummel, "Triadic Struggle and Accommodation in Perspective," in Ilpyong Kim, ed., The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union (New York: Paragon House, 1987).
16. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Deising, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 462- 470; Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-My Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Robert S. Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretic Analysis," World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 4 (July 1981), pp. 485-515; and R.J. Rummel, "Triadic Struggle and Accommodation in Perspective," in Ilpyong Kim, ed., The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union (New York: Paragon House, 1987).
17. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Deising, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 462- 470; Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-My Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Robert S. Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretic Analysis," World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 4 (July 1981), pp. 485-515; and R.J. Rummel, "Triadic Struggle and Accommodation in Perspective," in Ilpyong Kim, ed., The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union (New York: Paragon House, 1987).
18. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Deising, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 462- 470; Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-My Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Robert S. Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretic Analysis," World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 4 (July 1981), pp. 485-515; and R.J. Rummel, "Triadic Struggle and Accommodation in Perspective," in Ilpyong Kim, ed., The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union (New York: Paragon House, 1987).
19. See, for example, Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov, "Military Reform," Mirovaya Ekomonika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya 4 [World economy and international relations], July 17, 1997, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), July 18, 1997 (UMA-97-136-S); Sovetskaya Rossiya [Soviet Russia], July 9, 1998, in FBIS, July 10, 1998 (SOV-98-190); Interfax, December 4, 1997, in FBIS, December 5, 1997 (UMA-97-338);
20. See, for example, Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov, "Military Reform," Mirovaya Ekomonika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya 4 [World economy and international relations], July 17, 1997, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), July 18, 1997 (UMA-97-136-S); Sovetskaya Rossiya [Soviet Russia], July 9, 1998, in FBIS, July 10, 1998 (SOV-98-190); Interfax, December 4, 1997, in FBIS, December 5, 1997 (UMA-97-338);
21. See, for example, Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov, "Military Reform," Mirovaya Ekomonika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya 4 [World economy and international relations], July 17, 1997, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), July 18, 1997 (UMA-97-136-S); Sovetskaya Rossiya [Soviet Russia], July 9, 1998, in FBIS, July 10, 1998 (SOV-98-190); Interfax, December 4, 1997, in FBIS, December 5, 1997 (UMA-97-338);
22. and NTV (Moscow), February 6, 1998, in FBIS, February 17, 1998 (UMA-98-44).
23. See also Stephen J. Blank, "Who's Minding the State?: The Failure of Russian Security Policy," Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 45, No. 2 (March-April 198), pp. 3-11.
24. On recent improvement in PLA (People's Liberation Army) training, see June Teufel Dryer, "The New Officer Corps; Implications for the Future," China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996), pp. 315-335; and Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapkis, and John F. Corbett, Jr., "Training Tomorrow's PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks," ibid., pp. 448-524.
25. On recent improvement in PLA (People's Liberation Army) training, see June Teufel Dryer, "The New Officer Corps; Implications for the Future," China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996), pp. 315-335; and Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapkis, and John F. Corbett, Jr., "Training Tomorrow's PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks," ibid., pp. 448-524.
26. On the evolution of Thai security policy, see Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Dictates of Security: Thailand's Relations with the PRC," in Joyce K. Kallgren, Noordin Sopiee, and Soedjati Djiwandono, eds., ASEAN and China: An Evolving Relationship (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988); and Khein Theeravit, "The United States, Thailand, and the Indochinese Conflict," in Hans H. Indort, ed., Thai-American Relations in Contemporary Affairs (Singapore: Executive Publications, 1982).
27. On the evolution of Thai security policy, see Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Dictates of Security: Thailand's Relations with the PRC," in Joyce K. Kallgren, Noordin Sopiee, and Soedjati Djiwandono, eds., ASEAN and China: An Evolving Relationship (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988); and Khein Theeravit, "The United States, Thailand, and the Indochinese Conflict," in Hans H. Indort, ed., Thai-American Relations in Contemporary Affairs (Singapore: Executive Publications, 1982).
28. On Vietnamese accommodation to Chinese: power,see Michael Leifer, "Vietnam's Foreing Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Coping with Vulnerability," in Robert S. Ross, ed., East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995). On China's victory in Indochina, see Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Benefits of Coercive Diplomacy," Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 12 (December 1991), pp. 1170-1185.
29. On Vietnamese accommodation to Chinese: power,see Michael Leifer, "Vietnam's Foreing Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Coping with Vulnerability," in Robert S. Ross, ed., East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995). On China's victory in Indochina, see Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Benefits of Coercive Diplomacy," Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 12 (December 1991), pp. 1170-1185.
30. Walter Lippmann foresaw this development in 1944. See Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, p. 93.
31. Korea Herald, August 22, 1997, in FBIS, August 26, 1997 (EAS-97-234); and Yonhap News Agency, August 19, 1997, in FBIS, August 21, 1997 (EAS-97-231). On China-South Korea ties, see Victor D. Cha, "Engaging China: The View from Korea," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: Management of a Rising Power (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
32. Korea Herald, August 22, 1997, in FBIS, August 26, 1997 (EAS-97-234); and Yonhap News Agency, August 19, 1997, in FBIS, August 21, 1997 (EAS-97-231). On China-South Korea ties, see Victor D. Cha, "Engaging China: The View from Korea," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: Management of a Rising Power (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
33. Korea Herald, August 22, 1997, in FBIS, August 26, 1997 (EAS-97-234); and Yonhap News Agency, August 19, 1997, in FBIS, August 21, 1997 (EAS-97-231). On China-South Korea ties, see Victor D. Cha, "Engaging China: The View from Korea," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: Management of a Rising Power (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
34. For the Pentagon's explanation of its naval strategy, see United States Department of Defense, East Asia Strategy Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1995); testimony of Admiral Charles R. Larson, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, to the Armed Forces
35. Committee, U.S. Senate, March 2, 1994, which includes a discussion of "places" and "bases"; s statement of Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, Committee on National Security, U.S. House of Representatives, March 4, 1998. Note also that Washington has reached a status-of-forces agreement with the Philippines, the first step toward access to facilities at Subic Bay. See the statement in Manila by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, January 14, 1998. The most recent agreement with Singapore is reported in Jane's Defence Weekly, November 18, 1998, p. 15.
36. On the Chinese air force, see Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China's Air Force Enters the Twenty-first Century (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995); and Paul H.B. Godwin, "PLA Doctrine, Strategy, and Capabilities toward 2000," China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996), pp. 464-487.
37. On the Chinese air force, see Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China's Air Force Enters the Twenty-first Century (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995); and Paul H.B. Godwin, "PLA Doctrine, Strategy, and Capabilities toward 2000," China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996), pp. 464-487.
38. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 16-19.
39. For an enlightening discussion of Russian frustration in trying to overcome the geographic obstacles to expansion into the Far East, see Walter A. McDougall, Let the Sea Make a Noise: A History of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
40. See the treatment of the territorial conflict in S.C.M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 52-57, 87-88.
41. John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press), pp. 57, 84-85; and David Wolff, "Russia Finds Its Limits: Crossing Borders into Manchuria," in Stephen Kotkin and Wolff, Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russian Far East (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 42.
42. John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press), pp. 57, 84-85; and David Wolff, "Russia Finds Its Limits: Crossing Borders into Manchuria," in Stephen Kotkin and Wolff, Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russian Far East (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 42.
43. Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power (New York: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 204-210, 216-223, chaps. 11, 12.
44. Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 163; and Hara Teruyuki, "Japan Moves North: The Japanese Occupation of Northern Sakhalin (1920s)," in Kotkin and Wolff, Rediscovering Russia in Asia. The definitive work on the Japanese defeat at Nomohan is Alvin D. Coox, Nomohan: Japan against Russia, 1939, Volumes 1 and 2 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1939).
45. Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 163; and Hara Teruyuki, "Japan Moves North: The Japanese Occupation of Northern Sakhalin (1920s)," in Kotkin and Wolff, Rediscovering Russia in Asia. The definitive work on the Japanese defeat at Nomohan is Alvin D. Coox, Nomohan: Japan against Russia, 1939, Volumes 1 and 2 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1939).
46. Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 163; and Hara Teruyuki, "Japan Moves North: The Japanese Occupation of Northern Sakhalin (1920s)," in Kotkin and Wolff, Rediscovering Russia in Asia. The definitive work on the Japanese defeat at Nomohan is Alvin D. Coox, Nomohan: Japan against Russia, 1939, Volumes 1 and 2 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1939).
47. On the Baikal-Amur railway, see Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 266; and Delovy Mir [Business world], July 25-July 29, 1997, in FBIS, August 18, 1997 (SOV-97-0157-S). On Soviet naval facilities, see George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: 1890-1990 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). On conventional deployments, see Paul F. Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia in a Global Context: Strategic Issues for the Soviet Union," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986); Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Motives and Prospects," in ibid.; and Gelman,The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking against China (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1982).
48. On the Baikal-Amur railway, see Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 266; and Delovy Mir [Business world], July 25-July 29, 1997, in FBIS, August 18, 1997 (SOV-97-0157-S). On Soviet naval facilities, see George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: 1890-1990 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). On conventional deployments, see Paul F. Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia in a Global Context: Strategic Issues for the Soviet Union," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986); Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Motives and Prospects," in ibid.; and Gelman,The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking against China (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1982).
49. On the Baikal-Amur railway, see Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 266; and Delovy Mir [Business world], July 25-July 29, 1997, in FBIS, August 18, 1997 (SOV-97-0157-S). On Soviet naval facilities, see George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: 1890-1990 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). On conventional deployments, see Paul F. Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia in a Global Context: Strategic Issues for the Soviet Union," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986); Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Motives and Prospects," in ibid.; and Gelman,The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking against China (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1982).
50. On the Baikal-Amur railway, see Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 266; and Delovy Mir [Business world], July 25-July 29, 1997, in FBIS, August 18, 1997 (SOV-97-0157-S). On Soviet naval facilities, see George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: 1890-1990 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). On conventional deployments, see Paul F. Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia in a Global Context: Strategic Issues for the Soviet Union," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986); Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Motives and Prospects," in ibid.; and Gelman,The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking against China (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1982).
51. On the Baikal-Amur railway, see Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 266; and Delovy Mir [Business world], July 25-July 29, 1997, in FBIS, August 18, 1997 (SOV-97-0157-S). On Soviet naval facilities, see George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: 1890-1990 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). On conventional deployments, see Paul F. Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia in a Global Context: Strategic Issues for the Soviet Union," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986); Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Motives and Prospects," in ibid.; and Gelman,The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking against China (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1982).
52. On the Baikal-Amur railway, see Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 266; and Delovy Mir [Business world], July 25-July 29, 1997, in FBIS, August 18, 1997 (SOV-97-0157-S). On Soviet naval facilities, see George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: 1890-1990 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). On conventional deployments, see Paul F. Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia in a Global Context: Strategic Issues for the Soviet Union," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986); Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Motives and Prospects," in ibid.; and Gelman,The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking against China (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1982).
53. On the Baikal-Amur railway, see Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 266; and Delovy Mir [Business world], July 25-July 29, 1997, in FBIS, August 18, 1997 (SOV-97-0157-S). On Soviet naval facilities, see George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: 1890-1990 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). On conventional deployments, see Paul F. Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia in a Global Context: Strategic Issues for the Soviet Union," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986); Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Motives and Prospects," in ibid.; and Gelman,The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking against China (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1982).
54. On Sino-Russian border relations, see James Clay Moltz, "Regional Tensions in the Russo-Japanese Rapprochement," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 6 (June 1995), pp. 511-527, Gilbert Rozma, "Northeast China: Waiting for Regionalism," Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 45 No. 4 (July- August 1998), pp. 3-13; and Rozman, "The Crisis of the Russian Far East: Who Is to blame?" Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 44, No. 5 (September-October 1997), pp. 3-12.
55. On Sino-Russian border relations, see James Clay Moltz, "Regional Tensions in the Russo- Japanese Rapprochement," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 6 (June 1995), pp. 511-527, Gilbert Rozma, "Northeast China: Waiting for Regionalism," Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 45 No. 4 (July-August 1998), pp. 3-13; and Rozman, "The Crisis of the Russian Far East: Who Is to blame?" Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 44, No. 5 (September-October 1997), pp. 3-12.
56. On Sino-Russian border relations, see James Clay Moltz, "Regional Tensions in the Russo- Japanese Rapprochement," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 6 (June 1995), pp. 511-527, Gilbert Rozma, "Northeast China: Waiting for Regionalism," Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 45 No. 4 (July- August 1998), pp. 3-13; and Rozman, "The Crisis of the Russian Far East: Who Is to blame?" Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 44, No. 5 (September-October 1997), pp. 3-12.
57. Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1967), pp. 173-174; and Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
58. Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1967), pp. 173-174; and Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
59. Aaron L. Friedberg, The Wearu Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London: Athlone, 1966); and John King Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 555-556.
60. Aaron L. Friedberg, The Wearu Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London: Athlone, 1966); and John King Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 555-556.
61. Aaron L. Friedberg, The Wearu Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London: Athlone, 1966); and John King Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 555-556.
62. Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Longman, 1985); Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, pp. 555-556, 692-693, 755-756; and Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War. For a discussion of Japanese activities in Manchuria during the Russian Revolution, see James William Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957).
63. Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Longman, 1985); Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, pp. 555-556, 692-693, 755-756; and Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War. For a discussion of Japanese activities in Manchuria during the Russian Revolution, see James William Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957).
64. Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Longman, 1985); Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, pp. 555-556, 692-693, 755-756; and Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War. For a discussion of Japanese activities in Manchuria during the Russian Revolution, see James William Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957).
65. Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Longman, 1985); Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, pp. 555-556, 692-693, 755-756; and Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War. For a discussion of Japanese activities in Manchuria during the Russian Revolution, see James William Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957).
66. Iriye, Across the Pacific, pp. 207-208; and Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, pp. 91-94, 156, 198-203.
67. Iriye, Across the Pacific, pp. 207-208; and Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, pp. 91-94, 156, 198-203.
68. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, pp. 67-75, 154. See Robert Scalapino's discussion of the strategic context of Japan's failure in Scalapino, "Southern Advance: Introduction," James William Morley, ed., The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1943 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 121-123.
69. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, pp. 67-75, 154. See Robert Scalapino's discussion of the strategic context of Japan's failure in Scalapino, "Southern Advance: Introduction," James William Morley, ed., The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1943 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 121-123.
70. See Michael M. May, "Correspondence: Japan as a Superpower?" International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 182-187; and May, Energy and Security in East Asia (Stanford, Calif.: Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 1998).
71. See Michael M. May, "Correspondence: Japan as a Superpower?" International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 182-187; and May, Energy and Security in East Asia (Stanford, Calif.: Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 1998).
72. Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970), pp. 106-] 107. On the role of the navy in the bombing of Japan, see Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 262-272. On the British Channel, see Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (Westport, Conn.: Greenword Press, 1981), pp. 55-57.
73. Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970), pp. 106-] 107. On the role of the navy in the bombing of Japan, see Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 262-272. On the British Channel, see Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (Westport, Conn.: Greenword Press, 1981), pp. 55-57.
74. Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970), pp. 106-] 107. On the role of the navy in the bombing of Japan, see Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 262-272. On the British Channel, see Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (Westport, Conn.: Greenword Press, 1981), pp. 55-57.
75. Jonathan E. Sinton, David G. Fridley, and James Dorian, "China's Energy Future: The Role of Energy in Sustaining Growth," in Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, ed, China's Economic Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); David Blumenthal and Gary Sasser, "Fuel for the Next Century," China Business Review (July-August 1998), pp. 34-38; and Jeffery Logan and William Chandler, "Natural Gas Gains Momentum," ibid., pp. 40-45.
76. Jonathan E. Sinton, David G. Fridley, and James Dorian, "China's Energy Future: The Role of Energy in Sustaining Growth," in Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, ed, China's Economic Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); David Blumenthal and Gary Sasser, "Fuel for the Next Century," China Business Review (July-August 1998), pp. 34-38; and Jeffery Logan and William Chandler, "Natural Gas Gains Momentum," ibid., pp. 40-45.
77. Jonathan E. Sinton, David G. Fridley, and James Dorian, "China's Energy Future: The Role of Energy in Sustaining Growth," in Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, ed, China's Economic Future (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); David Blumenthal and Gary Sasser, "Fuel for the Next Century," China Business Review (July-August 1998), pp. 34-38; and Jeffery Logan and William Chandler, "Natural Gas Gains Momentum," ibid., pp. 40-45.
78. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 55.
79. Barry Naughton, "'The Third Front': Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior," China Quarterly, No. 115 (September 1988), pp. 351-386.
80. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 62.
81. Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power, p. 71.
82. Ibid., pp. 45, 47.
83. This paragraph and the next one draw from Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). On maritime power as "facilitator" generally and during World War II, see Colin S. Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 18-20.
84. This paragraph and the next one draw from Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). On maritime power as "facilitator" generally and during World War II, see Colin S. Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 18-20.
85. For the International Monetary Fund's reassessment of China's GDP in 1993 based on purchasing power parity methodologies; see New York Times, May 20, 1993; and Far Eastern Economic Review, July 15, 1993. For a particularly generous estimate of Chinese growth, Charles Wolf, K.C. Yeh, A. Bamezai, D.P. Henry, and Michael Kennedy, Long-Term Economic and Military Trends, 1994-2035: The United States and Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995).
86. For the International Monetary Fund's reassessment of China's GDP in 1993 based on purchasing power parity methodologies; see New York Times, May 20, 1993; and Far Eastern Economic Review, July 15, 1993. For a particularly generous estimate of Chinese growth, Charles Wolf, K.C. Yeh, A. Bamezai, D.P. Henry, and Michael Kennedy, Long-Term Economic and Military Trends, 1994-2035: The United States and Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995).
87. For the International Monetary Fund's reassessment of China's GDP in 1993 based on purchasing power parity methodologies; see New York Times, May 20, 1993; and Far Eastern Economic Review, July 15, 1993. For a particularly generous estimate of Chinese growth, Charles Wolf, K.C. Yeh, A. Bamezai, D.P. Henry, and Michael Kennedy, Long-Term Economic and Military Trends, 1994-2035: The United States and Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995).
88. Economic Report of the President: 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), pp. 216-217.
89. U.S. statistics are from U.S. Department of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 580-582. On Japan, see May, Enery and Security in East Asia, p. 11.
90. U.S. statistics are from U.S. Department of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 580-582. On Japan, see May, Enery and Security in East Asia, p. 11.
91. On the positive and negative aspect of bipolarity, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1973), chap. 8; and Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 346-349.
92. On the positive and negative aspect of bipolarity, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1973), chap. 8; and Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 346-349.
93. On Beijing's economic pragmatism, see Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
94. On Beijing's economic pragmatism, see Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
95. On the politics of reform, see Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Economic Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).
96. On China's management of its regional environment, see Robert S. Ross, "China and the Stability of East Asia," in Ross, East Asia in Transition.
97. On the U.S.-Japan alliance, see Mike Mochizuki, ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1997). For an authoritative discussion of the China focus of U.S. policy toward Japan, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "An Engaging China Policy," Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1997.
98. On the U.S.-Japan alliance, see Mike Mochizuki, ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1997). For an authoritative discussion of the China focus of U.S. policy toward Japan, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "An Engaging China Policy," Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1997.
99. On the advantages of bipolarity versus multipolarity in developing a security order, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 195-199, 204-209.
100. For a discussion of why bipolarity produces heightened great power tension, including intervention in the developing world, see Robert Jervis, Systems Affects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 118-122. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chap. 8, for the application of bipolar arguments to the Cold War.
101. For a discussion of why bipolarity produces heightened great power tension, including intervention in the developing world, see Robert Jervis, Systems Affects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 118-122. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chap. 8, for the application of bipolar arguments to the Cold War.
102. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, chap. 1, on realist and neorealist variables in great power dynamics. For the effect of geography on balance-of-power incentives for offensive or defensive military doctrines, see Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1984), especially pp. 65-71, 78, 237-239. The importance of capabilities and geography for the security dilemma is also discussed in Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-215; Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; and Thomas J. Christensen and jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Protecting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168. Walter Lippmann argued that the continental interests of China and the maritime interests of the United States do not conflict and that "each can rest in its own element. There is no reason why they should fight." Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, p. 103.
103. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, chap. 1, on realist and neorealist variables in great power dynamics. For the effect of geography on balance-of-power incentives for offensive or defensive military doctrines, see Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1984), especially pp. 65-71, 78, 237-239. The importance of capabilities and geography for the security dilemma is also discussed in Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-215; Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; and Thomas J. Christensen and jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Protecting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168. Walter Lippmann argued that the continental interests of China and the maritime interests of the United States do not conflict and that "each can rest in its own element. There is no reason why they should fight." Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, p. 103.
104. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, chap. 1, on realist and neorealist variables in great power dynamics. For the effect of geography on balance-of-power incentives for offensive or defensive military doctrines, see Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1984), especially pp. 65-71, 78, 237-239. The importance of capabilities and geography for the security dilemma is also discussed in Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-215; Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; and Thomas J. Christensen and jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Protecting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168. Walter Lippmann argued that the continental interests of China and the maritime interests of the United States do not conflict and that "each can rest in its own element. There is no reason why they should fight." Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, p. 103.
105. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, chap. 1, on realist and neorealist variables in great power dynamics. For the effect of geography on balance-of-power incentives for offensive or defensive military doctrines, see Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1984), especially pp. 65-71, 78, 237-239. The importance of capabilities and geography for the security dilemma is also discussed in Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-215; Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; and Thomas J. Christensen and jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Protecting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168. Walter Lippmann argued that the continental interests of China and the maritime interests of the United States do not conflict and that "each can rest in its own element. There is no reason why they should fight." Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, p. 103.
106. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, chap. 1, on realist and neorealist variables in great power dynamics. For the effect of geography on balance-of-power incentives for offensive or defensive military doctrines, see Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1984), especially pp. 65-71, 78, 237-239. The importance of capabilities and geography for the security dilemma is also discussed in Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-215; Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; and Thomas J. Christensen and jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Protecting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168. Walter Lippmann argued that the continental interests of China and the maritime interests of the United States do not conflict and that "each can rest in its own element. There is no reason why they should fight." Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, p. 103.
107. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, chap. 1, on realist and neorealist variables in great power dynamics. For the effect of geography on balance-of-power incentives for offensive or defensive military doctrines, see Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1984), especially pp. 65-71, 78, 237-239. The importance of capabilities and geography for the security dilemma is also discussed in Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-215; Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; and Thomas J. Christensen and jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Protecting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2. (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168. Walter Lippmann argued that the continental interests of China and the maritime interests of the United States do not conflict and that "each can rest in its own element. There is no reason why they should fight." Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, p. 103.
108. This is one of the central themes in Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt, 1936). See also Spykman, Geography of the Peace, pp. 55-57. For American strategy following World War II,
109. This is one of the central themes in Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt, 1936). See also Spykman, Geography of the Peace, pp. 55-57. For American strategy following World War II, see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992).
110. This is one of the central themes in Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt, 1936). See also Spykman, Geography of the Peace, pp. 55-57. For American strategy following World War II, see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992).
111. A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938); Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964); Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League of Nations and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1973); Iriye, Across the Pacific, chap. 7, pp. 201-204; 216-220; and Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, chap. 12.
112. A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938); Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964); Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League of Nations and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1973); Iriye, Across the Pacific, chap. 7, pp. 201-204; 216-220; and Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, chap. 12.
113. A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938); Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964); Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League of Nations and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1973); Iriye, Across the Pacific, chap. 7, pp. 201-204; 216-220; and Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, chap. 12.
114. A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938); Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964); Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League of Nations and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1973); Iriye, Across the Pacific, chap. 7, pp. 201-204; 216-220; and Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, chap. 12.
115. A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938); Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964); Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League of Nations and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1973); Iriye, Across the Pacific, chap. 7, pp. 201-204; 216-220; and Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, chap. 12.
116. For the Pentagon's assessment of the goals and prospects of China's military modernization program see the 1998 Department of Defense report to Congress Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People's Republic of China. For a cross-country analysis of the possession of critical technologies, see Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Militarily Critical Technologies List, Part 1: Weapons Systems Technology (Washington, D.C.: National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1996). For an assessment of China's technological capabilities and prospects, see Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the Twenty-first Century," paper prepared for the 1998 American Enterprise Institute conference on the People's Liberation Army, Wye Plantation, Aspen, Maryland, September 11-13, 1998. On the RMA, see Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996); and Paul Dibb, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 93-116. For a more pessimistic account, see Paul Bracken,
117. For the Pentagon's assessment of the goals and prospects of China's military modernization program see the 1998 Department of Defense report to Congress Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People's Republic of China. For a cross-country analysis of the possession of critical technologies, see Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Militarily Critical Technologies List, Part 1: Weapons Systems Technology (Washington, D.C.: National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1996). For an assessment of China's technological capabilities and prospects, see Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the Twenty-first Century," paper prepared for the 1998 American Enterprise Institute conference on the People's Liberation Army, Wye Plantation, Aspen, Maryland, September 11-13, 1998. On the RMA, see Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996); and Paul Dibb, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 93-116. For a more pessimistic account, see Paul Bracken,
118. For the Pentagon's assessment of the goals and prospects of China's military modernization program see the 1998 Department of Defense report to Congress Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People's Republic of China. For a cross-country analysis of the possession of critical technologies, see Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Militarily Critical Technologies List, Part 1: Weapons Systems Technology (Washington, D.C.: National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1996). For an assessment of China's technological capabilities and prospects, see Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the Twenty-first Century," paper prepared for the 1998 American Enterprise Institute conference on the People's Liberation Army, Wye Plantation, Aspen, Maryland, September 11-13, 1998. On the RMA, see Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996); and Paul Dibb, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 93-116. For a more pessimistic account, see Paul Bracken,
119. For the Pentagon's assessment of the goals and prospects of China's military modernization program see the 1998 Department of Defense report to Congress Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People's Republic of China. For a cross-country analysis of the possession of critical technologies, see Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Militarily Critical Technologies List, Part 1: Weapons Systems Technology (Washington, D.C.: National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1996). For an assessment of China's technological capabilities and prospects, see Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the Twenty-first Century," paper prepared for the 1998 American Enterprise Institute conference on the People's Liberation Army, Wye Plantation, Aspen, Maryland, September 11-13, 1998. On the RMA, see Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996); and Paul Dibb, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997-98), pp. 93-116. For a more pessimistic account, see Paul Bracken,
120. See the discussions in Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Ideals and Reality; Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), chap. 2; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), chap. 10; Sprout and Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 269-276, 296-297; Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 192-194; Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 76-80; Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1942), pp. 31- 34; Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp. 41-44; and Gray, The Navy in the Post - Colds War World, pp. 14-16 .
121. See the discussions in Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Ideals and Reality; Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), chap. 2; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), chap. 10; Sprout and Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 269-276, 296-297; Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 192-194; Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 76-80; Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1942), pp. 31- 34; Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp. 41-44; and Gray, The Navy in the Post - Colds War World, pp. 14-16 .
122. See the discussions in Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Ideals and Reality; Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), chap. 2; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), chap. 10; Sprout and Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 269-276, 296-297; Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 192-194; Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 76-80; Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1942), pp. 31- 34; Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp. 41-44; and Gray, The Navy in the Post - Colds War World, pp. 14-16 .
123. See the discussions in Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Ideals and Reality; Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), chap. 2; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), chap. 10; Sprout and Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 269-276, 296-297; Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 192-194; Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 76-80; Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1942), pp. 31- 34; Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp. 41-44; and Gray, The Navy in the Post - Colds War World, pp. 14-16 .
124. See the discussions in Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Ideals and Reality; Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), chap. 2; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), chap. 10; Sprout and Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 269-276, 296-297; Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 192-194; Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 76-80; Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1942), pp. 31- 34; Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp. 41-44; and Gray, The Navy in the Post - Colds War World, pp. 14-16 .
125. See the discussions in Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Ideals and Reality; Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), chap. 2; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), chap. 10; Sprout and Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 269-276, 296-297; Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 192-194; Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 76-80; Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1942), pp. 31- 34; Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp. 41-44; and Gray, The Navy in the Post - Colds War World, pp. 14-16 .
126. See the discussions in Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Ideals and Reality; Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), chap. 2; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), chap. 10; Sprout and Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 269-276, 296-297; Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 192-194; Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 76-80; Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1942), pp. 31-34; Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp. 41-44; and Gray, The Navy in the Post - Colds War World, pp. 14-16 .
127. See the discussions in Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Ideals and Reality; Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), chap. 2; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), chap. 10; Sprout and Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 269-276, 296-297; Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 192-194; Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 76-80; Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1942), pp. 31- 34; Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp. 41-44; and Gray, The Navy in the Post - Colds War World, pp. 14-16 .
128. See the discussions in Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Ideals and Reality; Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), chap. 2; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), chap. 10; Sprout and Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 269-276, 296-297; Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 192-194; Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 76-80; Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1942), pp. 31- 34; Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp. 41-44; and Gray, The Navy in the Post - Colds War World, pp. 14-16 .
129. On dynastic expansion, see John King Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," in Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Yang Lien-sheng, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order," in ibid. On China's maritime ventures, see Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); and Louise Levanthes, When China Ruled the Seas (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). On China's continental and maritime traditions, see Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China's Quest for Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 1-4 3.
130. On dynastic expansion, see John King Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," in Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Yang Lien-sheng, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order," in ibid. On China's maritime ventures, see Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); and Louise Levanthes, When China Ruled the Seas (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). On China's continental and maritime traditions, see Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China's Quest for Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 1-4 3.
131. On dynastic expansion, see John King Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," in Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Yang Lien-sheng, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order," in ibid. On China's maritime ventures, see Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); and Louise Levanthes, When China Ruled the Seas (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). On China's continental and maritime traditions, see Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China's Quest for Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 1-4 3.
132. On dynastic expansion, see John King Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," in Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Yang Lien-sheng, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order," in ibid. On China's maritime ventures, see Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); and Louise Levanthes, When China Ruled the Seas (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). On China's continental and maritime traditions, see Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China's Quest for Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 1-4 3.
133. On dynastic expansion, see John King Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," in Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Yang Lien-sheng, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order," in ibid. On China's maritime ventures, see Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); and Louise Levanthes, When China Ruled the Seas (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). On China's continental and maritime traditions, see Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China's Quest for Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 1-4 3.
134. On China's toward the Mongol armies, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism, Strategic Culture, and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Arthur Waldron, The Great of Wall of China: From History to Myth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On China's long history of managing nomadic tribes, see, for example, Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil blackwell, 1989), Joseph F. Fletcher,"China and Central Asia, 1368-1884," in Fairbank, The Chinese World Order; and Waldron, The Great Wall of China.
135. On China's toward the Mongol armies, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism, Strategic Culture, and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Arthur Waldron, The Great of Wall of China: From History to Myth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On China's long history of managing nomadic tribes, see, for example, Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil blackwell, 1989), Joseph F. Fletcher,"China and Central Asia, 1368-1884," in Fairbank, The Chinese World Order; and Waldron, The Great Wall of China.
136. On China's toward the Mongol armies, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism, Strategic Culture, and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Arthur Waldron, The Great of Wall of China: From History to Myth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On China's long history of managing nomadic tribes, see, for example, Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil blackwell, 1989), Joseph F. Fletcher,"China and Central Asia, 1368-1884," in Fairbank, The Chinese World Order; and Waldron, The Great Wall of China.
137. On China's toward the Mongol armies, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism, Strategic Culture, and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Arthur Waldron, The Great of Wall of China: From History to Myth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On China's long history of managing nomadic tribes, see, for example, Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil blackwell, 1989), Joseph F. Fletcher,"China and Central Asia, 1368-1884," in Fairbank, The Chinese World Order; and Waldron, The Great Wall of China.
138. On China's toward the Mongol armies, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism, Strategic Culture, and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Arthur Waldron, The Great of Wall of China: From History to Myth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On China's long history of managing nomadic tribes, see, for example, Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil blackwell, 1989), Joseph F. Fletcher,"China and Central Asia, 1368-1884," in Fairbank, The Chinese World Order; and Waldron, The Great Wall of China.
139. Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958); Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks (Armonk, N.Y, M.E. Sharpe, 1998), chap. 3; and June Teufel Dryer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang," Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1994), pp. 43-44.
140. Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958); Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks (Armonk, N.Y, M.E. Sharpe, 1998), chap. 3; and June Teufel Dryer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang," Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1994), pp. 43-44.
141. Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958); Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks (Armonk, N.Y, M.E. Sharpe, 1998), chap. 3; and June Teufel Dryer, "The PLA and Regionalism in Xinjiang," Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1994), pp. 43-44.
142. On Sino-Russian relations, see Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper No. 315 (London: IISS, 1997); Stephen J. Blank Russia and China Asia," in Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997; and Blank, "Russia Looks at China," in ibid.
143. On Sino-Russian relations, see Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper No. 315 (London: IISS, 1997); Stephen J. Blank Russia and China Asia," in Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997; and Blank, "Russia Looks at China," in ibid.
144. On Sino-Russian relations, see Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper No. 315 (London: IISS, 1997); Stephen J. Blank Russia and China Asia," in Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997; and Blank, "Russia Looks at China," in ibid.
145. See Blank, "Russia and China in Central Asia"; Ross H. Munro, "Central Asia and China," in Michael M. Mandelbaum, ed., Central Asia and the World: Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), and Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 35, 82, 108-110. On, recent instability in Xinjiang, see ITAR-TASS, January 27, 1998, in FBIS, January 29, 1998 (SOV-98-27): Novoje Pokoleniye [New generation], January 22, 1998, in FBIS, January 27, 1998 (SOV-98-25); and Delovaya Nedelya [Business week], January 16, 1998, in FBIS, January 23, 1998 (SOV-98-21). for a discussion of ethnic and religious discontent and instability in Xinjiang since 1949, see Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, chap. 6.
146. See Blank, "Russia and China in Central Asia"; Ross H. Munro, "Central Asia and China," in Michael M. Mandelbaum, ed., Central Asia and the World: Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), and Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 35, 82, 108-110. On, recent instability in Xinjiang, see ITAR-TASS, January 27, 1998, in FBIS, January 29, 1998 (SOV-98-27): Novoje Pokoleniye [New generation], January 22, 1998, in FBIS, January 27, 1998 (SOV-98-25); and Delovaya Nedelya [Business week], January 16, 1998, in FBIS, January 23, 1998 (SOV-98-21). for a discussion of ethnic and religious discontent and instability in Xinjiang since 1949, see Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, chap. 6.
147. See Blank, "Russia and China in Central Asia"; Ross H. Munro, "Central Asia and China," in Michael M. Mandelbaum, ed., Central Asia and the World: Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), and Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 35, 82, 108-110. On, recent instability in Xinjiang, see ITAR-TASS, January 27, 1998, in FBIS, January 29, 1998 (SOV-98-27): Novoje Pokoleniye [New generation], January 22, 1998, in FBIS, January 27, 1998 (SOV-98-25); and Delovaya Nedelya [Business week], January 16, 1998, in FBIS, January 23, 1998 (SOV-98-21). for a discussion of ethnic and religious discontent and instability in Xinjiang since 1949, see Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, chap. 6.
148. See Blank, "Russia and China in Central Asia"; Ross H. Munro, "Central Asia and China," in Michael M. Mandelbaum, ed., Central Asia and the World: Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), and Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 35, 82, 108-110. On, recent instability in Xinjiang, see ITAR-TASS, January 27, 1998, in FBIS, January 29, 1998 (SOV-98-27): Novoje Pokoleniye [New generation], January 22, 1998, in FBIS, January 27, 1998 (SOV-98-25); and Delovaya Nedelya [Business week], January 16, 1998, in FBIS, January 23, 1998 (SOV-98-21). for a discussion of ethnic and religious discontent and instability in Xinjiang since 1949, see Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, chap. 6.
149. See Blank, "Russia and China in Central Asia"; Ross H. Munro, "Central Asia and China," in Michael M. Mandelbaum, ed., Central Asia and the World: Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), and Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 35, 82, 108-110. On, recent instability in Xinjiang, see ITAR-TASS, January 27, 1998, in FBIS, January 29, 1998 (SOV-98-27): Novoje Pokoleniye [New generation], January 22, 1998, in FBIS, January 27, 1998 (SOV-98-25); and Delovaya Nedelya [Business week], January 16, 1998, in FBIS, January 23, 1998 (SOV-98-21). for a discussion of ethnic and religious discontent and instability in Xinjiang since 1949, see Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, chap. 6.
150. See Blank, "Russia and China in Central Asia"; Ross H. Munro, "Central Asia and China," in Michael M. Mandelbaum, ed., Central Asia and the World: Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), and Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 35, 82, 108-110. On, recent instability in Xinjiang, see ITAR-TASS, January 27, 1998, in FBIS, January 29, 1998 (SOV-98-27): Novoje Pokoleniye [New generation], January 22, 1998, in FBIS, January 27, 1998 (SOV-98-25); and Delovaya Nedelya [Business week], January 16, 1998, in FBIS, January 23, 1998 (SOV-98-21). for a discussion of ethnic and religious discontent and instability in Xinjiang since 1949, see Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, chap. 6.
151. See Blank, "Russia and China in Central Asia"; Ross H. Munro, "Central Asia and China," in Michael M. Mandelbaum, ed., Central Asia and the World: Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), and Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 35, 82, 108-110. On, recent instability in Xinjiang, see ITAR-TASS, January 27, 1998, in FBIS, January 29, 1998 (SOV-98-27): Novoje Pokoleniye [New generation], January 22, 1998, in FBIS, January 27, 1998 (SOV-98-25); and Delovaya Nedelya [Business week], January 16, 1998, in FBIS, January 23, 1998 (SOV-98-21). for a discussion of ethnic and religious discontent and instability in Xinjiang since 1949, see Benson and Svanberg, China's Last Nomads, chap. 6.
152. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1902), quoted in Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War World, p. 89. See also Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, p. 103.
153. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1902), quoted in Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War World, p. 89. See also Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, p. 103.
154. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect: Studies in International Relations (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1902), quoted in Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War World, p. 89. See also Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, p. 103.
155. For the concept of a "luxury fleet," see Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power, pp. 49, 92-93. On Chinese maritime power-projection capabilities, see Cole and Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA."
156. For the concept of a "luxury fleet," see Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power, pp. 49, 92-93. On Chinese maritime power-projection capabilities, see Cole and Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA."
157. On Russian and Soviet naval experiences, see Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, chap. 8, pp. 510-515, 557-558; A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe 1848-1918 (New York: Oxford Unoversity Press, 1954); Rene Albrecht Carrie, A Diplomatic History: Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 419-425, 432-434; Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), pp. 179-180, 330-331; and MccGwire, "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower," in John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds, Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 210-254. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 386-387, 510-511, discusses Soviet capabilities in a historical and comparative context. The quotation is from Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 421.
158. On Russian and Soviet naval experiences, see Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, chap. 8, pp. 510-515, 557-558; A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe 1848-1918 (New York: Oxford Unoversity Press, 1954); Rene Albrecht Carrie, A Diplomatic History: Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 419-425, 432-434; Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), pp. 179-180, 330-331; and MccGwire, "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower," in John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds, Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 210-254. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 386-387, 510-511, discusses Soviet capabilities in a historical and comparative context. The quotation is from Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 421.
159. On Russian and Soviet naval experiences, see Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, chap. 8, pp. 510-515, 557-558; A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe 1848-1918 (New York: Oxford Unoversity Press, 1954); Rene Albrecht Carrie, A Diplomatic History: Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 419-425, 432-434; Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), pp. 179-180, 330-331; and MccGwire, "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower," in John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds, Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 210-254. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 386-387, 510-511, discusses Soviet capabilities in a historical and comparative context. The quotation is from Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 421.
160. On Russian and Soviet naval experiences, see Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, chap. 8, pp. 510-515, 557-558; A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe 1848-1918 (New York: Oxford Unoversity Press, 1954); Rene Albrecht Carrie, A Diplomatic History: Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 419-425, 432-434; Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), pp. 179-180, 330-331; and MccGwire, "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower," in John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds, Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 210-254. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 386-387, 510-511, discusses Soviet capabilities in a historical and comparative context. The quotation is from Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 421.
161. On Russian and Soviet naval experiences, see Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, chap. 8, pp. 510-515, 557-558; A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe 1848-1918 (New York: Oxford Unoversity Press, 1954); Rene Albrecht Carrie, A Diplomatic History: Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 419-425, 432-434; Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), pp. 179-180, 330-331; and MccGwire, "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower," in John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds, Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 210-254. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 386-387, 510-511, discusses Soviet capabilities in a historical and comparative context. The quotation is from Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 421.
162. On Russian and Soviet naval experiences, see Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, chap. 8, pp. 510-515, 557-558; A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe 1848-1918 (New York: Oxford Unoversity Press, 1954); Rene Albrecht Carrie, A Diplomatic History: Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 419-425, 432-434; Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), pp. 179-180, 330-331; and MccGwire, "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower," in John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds, Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 210-254. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 386-387, 510-511, discusses Soviet capabilities in a historical and comparative context. The quotation is from Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 421.
163. On Russian and Soviet naval experiences, see Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, chap. 8, pp. 510-515, 557-558; A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe 1848-1918 (New York: Oxford Unoversity Press, 1954); Rene Albrecht Carrie, A Diplomatic History: Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 419-425, 432-434; Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), pp. 179-180, 330-331; and MccGwire, "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower," in John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds, Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 210-254. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 386-387, 510-511, discusses Soviet capabilities in a historical and comparative context. The quotation is from Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 421.
164. On Russian and Soviet naval experiences, see Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, chap. 8, pp. 510-515, 557-558; A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe 1848-1918 (New York: Oxford Unoversity Press, 1954); Rene Albrecht Carrie, A Diplomatic History: Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 419-425, 432-434; Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), pp. 179-180, 330-331; and MccGwire, "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower," in John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds, Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 210-254. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 386-387, 510-511, discusses Soviet capabilities in a historical and comparative context. The quotation is from Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 421.
165. On German naval strategy, see Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945, chap. 5; Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Ashfield Press, 1987), chap. 20; and Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, trans, William C. Kirby (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 9-21.
166. On German naval strategy, see Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945, chap. 5; Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Ashfield Press, 1987), chap. 20; and Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, trans, William C. Kirby (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 9-21.
167. On German naval strategy, see Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945, chap. 5; Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Ashfield Press, 1987), chap. 20; and Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, trans, William C. Kirby (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 9-21.
168. On China's various pipeline and energy investment projects with Central Asian countries and Russia, see Xinhua, June 4, 1997, in FBIS, June 4, 1997 (CHI-97-155); Interfax, June 27, 1997, in FBIS, June 30, 1997 (SOV-97-178); Interfax, February 18, 1998, in FBIS, February 23, 1998 (SOV-98- 50); and Wen Wei Po, February 18, 1998, in FBIS, February 21, 1998 (CHI-98-50).
169. On China's various pipeline and energy investment projects with Central Asian countries and Russia, see Xinhua, June 4, 1997, in FBIS, June 4, 1997 (CHI-97-155); Interfax, June 27, 1997, in FBIS, June 30, 1997 (SOV-97-178); Interfax, February 18, 1998, in FBIS, February 23, 1998 (SOV-98- 50); and Wen Wei Po, February 18, 1998, in FBIS, February 21, 1998 (CHI-98-50).
170. On China's various pipeline and energy investment projects with Central Asian countries and Russia, see Xinhua, June 4, 1997, in FBIS, June 4, 1997 (CHI-97-155); Interfax, June 27, 1997, in FBIS, June 30, 1997 (SOV-97-178); Interfax, February 18, 1998, in FBIS, February 23, 1998 (SOV-98-50); and Wen Wei Po, February 18, 1998, in FBIS, February 21, 1998 (CHI-98-50).
171. On China's various pipeline and energy investment projects with Central Asian countries and Russia, see Xinhua, June 4, 1997, in FBIS, June 4, 1997 (CHI-97-155); Interfax, June 27, 1997, in FBIS, June 30, 1997 (SOV-97-178); Interfax, February 18, 1998, in FBIS, February 23, 1998 (SOV-98- 50); and Wen Wei Po, February 18, 1998, in FBIS, February 21, 1998 (CHI-98-50).
172. This is the argument in Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997).
173. On China's role in regional organizations, see Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum," Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 425-440; and Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions, " in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China. On APEC, see Jiang Xiaoyan,"Dispute over APEC Development Orientation," Shijie Zhishi [World knowledge], No. 21 (November 1, 1994), in FBIS/China, November 9, 1995; Chen Fengying, "Growing APEC Resists U.S. Domination," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary international relations], No. 8 (August 20, 1996), in FBIS/China, October 17, 1996; Voice of Malaysia, November 15, 1995, in FBIS/East Asia, November 9, 1995; and The Star (Malaysia), November 22, 1995, in FBIS, December 11, 1995.
174. On China's role in regional organizations, see Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum," Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 425-440; and Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions, " in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China. On APEC, see Jiang Xiaoyan,"Dispute over APEC Development Orientation," Shijie Zhishi [World knowledge], No. 21 (November 1, 1994), in FBIS/China, November 9, 1995; Chen Fengying, "Growing APEC Resists U.S. Domination," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary international relations], No. 8 (August 20, 1996), in FBIS/China, October 17, 1996; Voice of Malaysia, November 15, 1995, in FBIS/East Asia, November 9, 1995; and The Star (Malaysia), November 22, 1995, in FBIS, December 11, 1995.
175. On China's role in regional organizations, see Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum," Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 425-440; and Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions, " in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China. On APEC, see Jiang Xiaoyan,"Dispute over APEC Development Orientation," Shijie Zhishi [World knowledge], No. 21 (November 1, 1994), in FBIS/China, November 9, 1995; Chen Fengying, "Growing APEC Resists U.S. Domination," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary international relations], No. 8 (August 20, 1996), in FBIS/China, October 17, 1996; Voice of Malaysia, November 15, 1995, in FBIS/East Asia, November 9, 1995; and The Star (Malaysia), November 22, 1995, in FBIS, December 11, 1995.
176. On China's role in regional organizations, see Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum," Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 425-440; and Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions, " in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China. On APEC, see Jiang Xiaoyan,"Dispute over APEC Development Orientation," Shijie Zhishi [World knowledge], No. 21 (November 1, 1994), in FBIS/China, November 9, 1995; Chen Fengying, "Growing APEC Resists U.S. Domination," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary international relations], No. 8 (August 20, 1996), in FBIS/China, October 17, 1996; Voice of Malaysia, November 15, 1995, in FBIS/East Asia, November 9, 1995; and The Star (Malaysia), November 22, 1995, in FBIS, December 11, 1995.
177. On China's role in regional organizations, see Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum," Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 425-440; and Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions, " in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China. On APEC, see Jiang Xiaoyan,"Dispute over APEC Development Orientation," Shijie Zhishi [World knowledge], No. 21 (November 1, 1994), in FBIS/China, November 9, 1995; Chen Fengying, "Growing APEC Resists U.S. Domination," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary international relations], No. 8 (August 20, 1996), in FBIS/China, October 17, 1996; Voice of Malaysia, November 15, 1995, in FBIS/East Asia, November 9, 1995; and The Star (Malaysia), November 22, 1995, in FBIS, December 11, 1995.
178. On China's role in regional organizations, see Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum," Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 425-440; and Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions, " in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China. On APEC, see Jiang Xiaoyan,"Dispute over APEC Development Orientation," Shijie Zhishi [World knowledge], No. 21 (November 1, 1994), in FBIS/China, November 9, 1995; Chen Fengying, "Growing APEC Resists U.S. Domination," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary international relations], No. 8 (August 20, 1996), in FBIS/China, October 17, 1996; Voice of Malaysia, November 15, 1995, in FBIS/East Asia, November 9, 1995; and The Star (Malaysia), November 22, 1995, in FBIS, December 11, 1995.
179. On the impact of weapons systems on the security dillema, see Jervis,"Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." For the assumption of emulation, see Waltz, theory of International Politics, pp. 93, 118. On the relationship between land power and sea power, see also Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 19-25; and Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power, pp. 46-47.
180. On the impact of weapons systems on the security dillema, see Jervis,"Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." For the assumption of emulation, see Waltz, theory of International Politics, pp. 93, 118. On the relationship between land power and sea power, see also Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 19-25; and Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power, pp. 46-47.
181. On the impact of weapons systems on the security dillema, see Jervis,"Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." For the assumption of emulation, see Waltz, theory of International Politics, pp. 93, 118. On the relationship between land power and sea power, see also Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 19-25; and Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power, pp. 46-47.
182. On the impact of weapons systems on the security dillema, see Jervis,"Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." For the assumption of emulation, see Waltz, theory of International Politics, pp. 93, 118. On the relationship between land power and sea power, see also Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 19-25; and Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power, pp. 46-47.
183. On bipolarity and Cold War tension, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 171.
184. For a careful consideration of how difficult it would be for NATO to resist a Soviet attack, see Richard K. Berts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982), chap. 6. Cf., John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39. But as Jack Snyder shows, perception is more important than reality in affecting security dilemma dynamics. See Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 214-216.
185. For a careful consideration of how difficult it would be for NATO to resist a Soviet attack, see Richard K. Berts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982), chap. 6. Cf., John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39. But as Jack Snyder shows, perception is more important than reality in affecting security dilemma dynamics. See Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 214-216.
186. For a careful consideration of how difficult it would be for NATO to resist a Soviet attack, see Richard K. Berts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982), chap. 6. Cf., John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39. But as Jack Snyder shows, perception is more important than reality in affecting security dilemma dynamics. See Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 214-216.
187. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Reappraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 167-168; Warner R. Schilling, William T.R. Fox, Catharine M. Kelleher, and Donald J. Puchala, American Arms and a Changing Europe: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Disarmament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 4-15; and Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975), pp. 12-13. On arms races, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3.
188. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Reappraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 167-168; Warner R. Schilling, William T.R. Fox, Catharine M. Kelleher, and Donald J. Puchala, American Arms and a Changing Europe: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Disarmament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 4-15; and Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975), pp. 12-13. On arms races, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3.
189. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Reappraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 167-168; Warner R. Schilling, William T.R. Fox, Catharine M. Kelleher, and Donald J. Puchala, American Arms and a Changing Europe: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Disarmament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 4-15; and Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975), pp. 12-13. On arms races, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3.
190. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Reappraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 167-168; Warner R. Schilling, William T.R. Fox, Catharine M. Kelleher, and Donald J. Puchala, American Arms and a Changing Europe: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Disarmament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 4-15; and Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975), pp. 12-13. On arms races, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3.
191. On the Spratly Islands, see Greg Austin, China's Ocean Frontier: International law, Military Force, and National Development (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1998); and Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194.
192. On the Spratly Islands, see Greg Austin, China's Ocean Frontier: International law, Military Force, and National Development (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1998); and Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194.
193. See Lippmann's 1944 observation that China will inevitably dominate its "dependencies in the north" and his realist advice that the United States"should recognize that China will be the center of a third strategic system destined to include the whole of mainland Asia" Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, pp. 103, 158.
194. David M. Lampton, "china and Clinton's America: Have They Learned Anything?" Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 12 (December 1997), pp. 1099-1118; Robert S. Ross," The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Lessons for the United States, China, and Taiwan, "Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 463-470; and Robert G. Sutter, U.S. Policy toward China: An introduction to the Role of Taiwan, it is interesting to note that in 1949 the National security council, based on the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that Taiwan was not a vital interest to the United states. See Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategegy, Domestic Mobilization, and
195. David M. Lampton, "china and Clinton's America: Have They Learned Anything?" Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 12 (December 1997), pp. 1099-1118; Robert S. Ross," The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Lessons for the United States, China, and Taiwan, "Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 463-470; and Robert G. Sutter, U.S. Policy toward China: An introduction to the Role of Taiwan, it is interesting to note that in 1949 the National security council, based on the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that Taiwan was not a vital interest to the United states. See Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategegy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 106.
196. David M. Lampton, "china and Clinton's America: Have They Learned Anything?" Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 12 (December 1997), pp. 1099-1118; Robert S. Ross," The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Lessons for the United States, China, and Taiwan, "Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 463-470; and Robert G. Sutter, U.S. Policy toward China: An introduction to the Role of Taiwan, it is interesting to note that in 1949 the National security council, based on the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that Taiwan was not a vital interest to the United states. See Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategegy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 106.
197. David M. Lampton, "china and Clinton's America: Have They Learned Anything?" Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 12 (December 1997), pp. 1099-1118; Robert S. Ross," The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Lessons for the United States, China, and Taiwan, "Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 463-470; and Robert G. Sutter, U.S. Policy toward China: An introduction to the Role of Taiwan, it is interesting to note that in 1949 the National security council, based on the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that Taiwan was not a vital interest to the United states. See Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategegy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 106.
198. Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy, " International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124; Layne, "Less Is More: Minimal Realism in East Asia," National Interest, No. 43 (Spring 1996), pp. 64-78; and Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, "Come Home, America." For an analysis of the American debate over a post-Cola War foreign policy, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53.
199. Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy, " International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124; Layne, "Less Is More: Minimal Realism in East Asia," National Interest, No. 43 (Spring 1996), pp. 64-78; and Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, "Come Home, America." For an analysis of the American debate over a post-Cola War foreign policy, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53.
200. Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy, " International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124; Layne, "Less Is More: Minimal Realism in East Asia," National Interest, No. 43 (Spring 1996), pp. 64-78; and Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, "Come Home, America." For an analysis of the American debate over a post-Cola War foreign policy, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53.
201. Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy, " International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124; Layne, "Less Is More: Minimal Realism in East Asia," National Interest, No. 43 (Spring 1996), pp. 64-78; and Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, "Come Home, America." For an analysis of the American debate over a post-Cola War foreign policy, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53.
202. See, for example, Richard Samuels, Rich Nation/Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Michael J-Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Steven Vogel, "The Power behind Spin-Ons: The Military Implications of Japan's Commercial Technology," in Wayne Sandholtz, Michael Borrus, John Zysman Ken Conca Jay Stowsky, Steven Vogel, and Steven Weber, eds., The Highest Stakes: The Economic foundations of the Next Security System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
203. See, for example, Richard Samuels, Rich Nation/Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Michael J-Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Steven Vogel, "The Power behind Spin-Ons: The Military Implications of Japan's Commercial Technology," in Wayne Sandholtz, Michael Borrus, John Zysman Ken Conca Jay Stowsky, Steven Vogel, and Steven Weber, eds., The Highest Stakes: The Economic foundations of the Next Security System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
204. See, for example, Richard Samuels, Rich Nation/Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Michael J-Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Steven Vogel, "The Power behind Spin-Ons: The Military Implications of Japan's Commercial Technology," in Wayne Sandholtz, Michael Borrus, John Zysman Ken Conca Jay Stowsky, Steven Vogel, and Steven Weber, eds., The Highest Stakes: The Economic foundations of the Next Security System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
205. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, especially chap. 2, on lesser great powers in balancing.
206. See Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 25-27, 33-44, 60-62.
207. For a discussion of the benefits of primacy, see Samuel Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83.
208. For a discussion of the destabilizing potential of the Taiwan issue and the impact of theater missile defense on the security dilemma and U.S.-China relations, see Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80.