Fostering stability or creating a monster?: The rise of China and U.S. policy toward East Asia

International Security

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 81-126

  Christensen, Thomas J ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33747185849     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.81     Document Type: Article

References (233)

1. I use "zero-sum" and "positive-sum" as ideal types. Almost all relationships in international politics, even the most conflict ridden, fall somewhere along a spectrum between these two. For example, a relationship that tended heavily toward the zero-sum end of the spectrum was the highly competitive U.S.-Soviet economic, diplomatic, and military relationship during the Cold War. But even that relationship had important positive-sum aspects. The entire notion of mutually assured destruction (MAD) was based on a positive-sum premise that each side preferred coexistence to a war that would annihilate both sides. For the best review of the concept of MAD, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), chap. 3.
2. For relevant works, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214;
3. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), chap. 3;
4. Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of Security Cooperation," in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 58-69;
5. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999);
6. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991);
7. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001);
8. Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-495;
9. and Thomas J. Christensen and Jack L. Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168.
10. On the debate between offensive and defensive realists, see Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161;
11. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., The. Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix-xii;
12. Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. xiv-xx;
13. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182.
14. For a powerful remedy to this misperception, see Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90;
15. and Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (November 1997), pp. 1-32.
16. Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7-45.
17. Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80.
18. For an excellent recent book on China's grand strategy, see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005);
19. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Brzezinski and John J. Mearsheimer, "Clash of the Titans," Foreign Policy, No. 146 (January/February 2005), pp. 46-50;
20. and Jennifer M. Lind and Thomas J. Christensen, "Correspondence: Spirals, Security, and Stability in East Asia," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 190-195.
21. See, for example, Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, chap. 8.
22. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33;
23. and Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80.
24. For relevant works that claim that power concerns are unlikely to lead to conflict in the absence of other institutional or psychological variables that increase mutual tensions, see James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414;
25. Van Evera, Causes of War;
26. Snyder, Myths of Empire;
27. Ikenberry, After Victory;
28. and various essays in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).
29. For the classic work on perceptions and their role in fostering spirals of tension, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, chap. 3.
30. For the classic statement of this position, see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
31. See Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?" International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 149-164;
32. and Amitav Acharya, "The Role of Regional Organizations: Are Views Changing?" paper prepared for the "Pacific Symposium, 2004," National Defense University, Washington, D.C., April 22-23, 2004.
33. See Thomas Berger, "Set for Stability? Prospects for Cooperation and Conflict in East Asia," Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 408-428.
34. For works that combine multiple factors, see Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry";
35. John Duffield, "Asia-Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective," in Ikenberry and Mastanduno, International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific, pp. 243-270;
36. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Era of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
37. and Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia."
38. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry."
39. Even in its title, the article is consciously more beholden to the liberal take on post-Cold War European security - as argued in Stephen Van Evera's "Primed for Peace"-than it is to John J. Mearsheimer's pessimistic neorealist piece "Back to the Future," which considers the end of Cold War bipolarity dangerous even for Western Europe. Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57;
40. and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.
41. Van Evera, "Primed for Peace."
42. This description of the U.S. role in the region is generally attributed to Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew. See, for example, Roger Buckley, The United States in the Asia-Pacific since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. v.
43. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia";
44. and Victor D. Cha, "Multilateral Security in Asia and the U.S.-Japan Alliance," in G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 141-162.
45. Even Robert Ross's straightforward defensive realist account builds part of its optimistic argument about future stability in the region on the assumption of continuity in the strong U.S. military presence in East Asia. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace," pp. 114-118.
46. On the U.S.-Japan Guidelines Review, see Michael M. Green and Mike M. Mochizuki, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Twenty-first Century," Study Group Papers (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), pp. 55-72.
47. On Japan's more assertive security policy under Prime Minister Koizumi, see Michael H. Armacost, "Japan: Tilting Closer to Washington," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, with Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia, 2003-04 (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), pp. 81-108;
48. and Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's Security Policy, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the 'War on Terror': Incrementalism Confirmed or Radical Leap?" Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 4 (December 2004), pp. 427-445.
49. For this evolution in the 1990s, see Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia";
50. Wu Xinbo, "The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005-2006), pp. 119-130;
51. Wu Xinbo, "Taihai: Ri Xiang tong Mei 'Bingjian Zuozhan'" [The Taiwan Strait: Japan thinks it will fight shoulder to shoulder with the United States], Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times], June 20, 2005;
52. and Liu Jiangyong, "Xin 'RiMei Fangwei Hezuo Zhwhen' Heyi lingren Youlu" [Why the new U.S.-Japan joint defense cooperation guidelines arouse concern], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 11 (November 1997), pp. 7-12.
53. Takashi Inoguchi, "Arguing the Regional Community Building in Northeast Asia," paper presented at the Beijing Forum, Beijing, China, November 16-18, 2005, p. 2.
54. See also Shamshad Akhtar, director general, Southeast Asia Department, Asian Development Bank, "Economic Integration of East Asia: Trends, Challenges, and Opportunities," speech given at "The Challenges and Opportunities of Economic Integration in East Asia" symposium, Royal Society, London, England, October 27, 2004, http://www.adb.org/Documents/ Speeches/2004/sp2004033.asp.
55. For discussion of the growth in intraregional trade in the early part of this decade and China's central role in it, see World Bank, "Looking Beyond Short-Term Shocks: East Asia's Urban Transformation," East Asia Update, April 2003, http://www.indofo.nl/economie/03.18.l.pdf.
56. A lower figure of 40 percent for intraregional exports is also used. See Takatoshi Kato, "Can the East Asia Miracle Persist?" remarks at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, December 2, 2004. Kato is deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund. The difference between the 53 percent figure for 2004 and Kato's figure of 40 percent might be explained in part by the fact that the higher figure double-counts transit trade through Hong Kong. I am grateful to Helen Milner for help in analyzing these data.
57. Thomas Lum and Dick K. Kanto, China's Trade with the United States and the World, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, updated April 29, 2005), Order Code RL31403.
58. For coverage of these statistics, see Heather Smith, Garth Day, Brian Thomas, and Luke Yeaman, "The Changing Pattern of East Asia's Growth," http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/958/PDF/05_changing_pattern.pdf, especially p. 49.
59. Sino-Indian trade grew to $13.6 billion in 2004 (an increase of more than 70 percent), and China made key concessions on border disputes over the province of Sikkim during an April 2005 visit to India by Premier Wen Jiabao. See "Trade Powers India-China Ties," BBC News, April 8, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4425831.stm.
60. U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "China-Southeast Asia Relations," unpublished report distributed to the "Conference on China's Relations with Southeast Asia," Singapore, August 23-24, 2005. The compiled figures are based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.
61. See also Michael Glosny, "Heading toward a Win-Win Future? Recent Developments in China's Policy toward Southeast Asia," Asian Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 2006), pp. 24-57.
62. Smith et al., "The Changing Pattern of East Asia's Growth," pp. 50-51.
63. Lum and Kanto, "China's Trade with the United States and the World," p. 37.
64. Lum and Kanto, "China's Trade with the United States and the World," p. 37. Ibid.
65. Helen V. Milner, "Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the U.S. in the 1970s," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Autumn 1987), pp. 639-657;
66. and Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999), pp. 646-670.
67. See, for example, Eric Teo Chu Cheow, "China as the Center of Asian Economic Integration," China Brief, Vol. 4, No. 15 (July 22, 2004), http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id?395&issue_id= 3025&article_id=2368296.
68. Making this point in a Chinese journal is Malaysian scholar Kuik Cheng-chee, "Zhongguo Canyu Dongmeng xhudao de Diqu Jiahi de Liyi Fenxi" [Analyzing China's interest in joining regional structures led by ASEAN], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], No. 9 (2004), pp. 53-59, at p. 53.
69. For the evolution of China's attitudes toward multilateral security forums in the 1990s, see Alastair lain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Organizations," in Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 235-272.
70. Lyle Goldstein, "China in the New Central Asia: The Fen (RMB) Is Mightier Than the Sword," Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 13-34.
71. The first meeting of ASEAN plus Three was in December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur. The group was formally institutionalized in Manila in November 1999. Acharya, "The Role of Regional Organizations."
72. One report claims that China-ASEAN trade surpassed $100 billion in 2004. See "China, ASEAN Trade over 100 Billion in 2004 (2005/02/04)," http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/zgbd/t182607.htm.
73. This reflected a growth of 30 percent over the previous year, along with a 40 percent growth in China's trade with South Korea. U.S. trade with ASEAN stood at $136 billion, according to Christopher R. Hill in testimony to the Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 7, 2005, http://www.usembassy.org.uk/china153.html.
74. On China's proactive posture in 2005, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Will China Become a 'Responsible Stakeholder'? The Six Party Talks, Taiwan Arms Sales, and Sino-Japanese Relations," China leadership Monitor, No. 16 (Fall 2005), http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/16/tc.pdf.
75. In addition, since the early 1990s China has been more active in the UN Security Council and has joined-or at least agreed to comply with - several major arms control agreements (e.g., the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, both the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). China has also settled several of its land border disputes and is in the process of settling others. For a concise review, see David C. Gompert, François Godemont, Evan S. Medeiros, and James C. Mulvenon, China on the Move: A Franco-American Analysis of Emerging Chinese Strategic Policies and Their Consequences for Transatlantic Relations, RAND Conference Proceedings (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2005), pp. 30-32.
76. See M. Taylor Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 46-83.
77. For a review of these issues, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Have Old Problems Trumped New Thinking? China's Relations with Taiwan, Japan, and North Korea," China leadership Monitor, No. 14 (Spring 2005), http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20052/tc.html.
78. For a discussion of the impact of the December 2004 Taiwan elections on cross-strait stability, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Taiwan's Legislative Yuan Elections and Cross-Strait Security Relations: Reduced Tensions and Remaining Challenges," China Leadership Monitor, No. 13 (Winter 2005), http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20051/tc/html.
79. Wu, "Taihai."
80. Wang Xinjun, "Mei Weihe Guchui 'Zhongguo Junshi Weixie'" [Why the United States plays up the "China Military Threat"], Hwnqiu Shibao [Global Times], June 13, 2005, p. 11.
81. See also Liu Yantang, "Political Bureau Study Session," Liaowang (Beijing), June 6, 2005, pp. 12-15, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), June 9, 2005, doc. CPP20050609000084.
82. For a review of Sino-Japanese relations in the last quarter of 2005, see James J. Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: Yasakuni Stops Everything," Comparative Connections, Vol. 7, No. 4 (January 2006), pp. 109-122.
83. For the documents expressing Japanese concern over Taiwan, see U.S. Department of State, "Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee," February 19, 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2005/42490.htm.
84. For the full text of the report, see "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," October 29, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2005/d20051029document.pdf.
85. U.S. Department of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98.
86. Robert Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, September 21, 2005, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm.
87. The most prominent examples of what has been labeled "offensive realism" - the school that portrays great power transitions as largely zero-sum competitions - are John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001);
88. and Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
89. Although not all scholars working in the traditions of power transition theory and structural realism view international relations as a purely zero-sum game, many emphasize the importance of relative gains and relative costs (as opposed to absolute gains and absolute costs), thereby leaning toward the zero-sum side of the spectrum. For works espousing or debating this theoretical position, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979);
90. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981);
91. Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 171-194;
92. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-508;
93. Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 313-344;
94. Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David Baldwin, ed., Neoliberalism and Neorealism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993);
95. and Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Challenge after the Cold War," in Baldwin, Neoliberalism and Neoliberalism.
96. For such predictions of a Sino-American competition for power in East Asia, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics;
97. Richard J. Bernstein and Ross Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-32;
98. Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Struggle for Mastery in Asia," Commentary, Vol. 110, No. 4 (November 2000), pp. 17-26;
99. Robert Kagan, "The Illusion of 'Managing' China," Washington Post, May 15, 2005;
100. Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 244;
101. and Joseph M. Grieco, "China and America in the World Polity," in Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of China in Asia (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), pp. 24-48.
102. Friedberg, "The Struggle for Mastery in Asia," pp. 18-19.
103. In this decade, China has also become South Korea's largest export market and largest target for foreign direct investment. See Lum and Kanto, "China's Trade with the United States and the World," pp. 10-12.
104. See Richard Halloran, "A Reluctant Alliance Grows Even More So," Taipei Times, June 10, 2005;
105. and Jong-Heon Lee, "Analysis: USFK and Taiwan Strait Conflict," Washington Times, December 1, 2004.
106. See Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies, Policy Studies Monograph, No. 16 (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center, 2005).
107. Friedberg, "The Struggle for Mastery in Asia," pp. 24-25.
108. On improvement in PRC-Philippines relations on security issues, see, for example, Jaime Laude, "Chinese Defense Official Due in Manila for Dialogue," Philippine Star, May 22, 2005. SinoPhilippine trade increased by an average of 26.6 percent per year from 2000 to 2004, with a $2.16 billion surplus in Manila's favor. In 2004 China and the Philippines also agreed to joint development of energy resources in the disputed waters around the Spratly Islands. Filipino President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has also discussed greater security cooperation with the Chinese leadership.
109. See Bruce Vaughn, China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, updated February 8, 2005), p. 18, Order Code RL32688. Singapore remains a major U.S. security partner, but in 2005 China improved its relations with Singapore as well.
110. See Clarissa Oon, "Singapore, China to Step Up Defence Ties," Straits Times, November 17, 2005. Sino-South Korean relations have improved not only in economics and diplomacy but also in the cultural arena.
111. See Antaneta Bezlova, "China, South Korea Hip to Each Other," Asia Times, June 23, 2005. A public opinion poll had "76% of Thai respondents choosing China as Thailand's closest friend, with only 8% naming Japan (Thailand's top trading and foreign investment partner) and 9% choosing the U.S., the world's leading importer of Thai products." U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "China-Southeast Asia Relations,"
112. See unpublished report distributed to conference on China's Relations with Southeast Asia, Singapore, August 23-24, 2005.
113. For a concise expression of such a concern, see Randall Schriver, "The China Challenge," paper presented to the Center for Strategic and International Studies working group With One Hand Tied: Dealing with China during a Period of Preoccupation, Washington, D.C., June 13, 2005, pp. 6-7.
114. Goldstein, "China in the New Central Asia."
115. For the original SCO declaration, see "Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization," July 5, 2005 http://www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=5008 LanguageID=2.
116. For the removal of any remaining veil as to whom the SCO was referring to and what Beijing's position on the matter is, see "Deadline Expected of Anti-terrorism Military Presence," People's Daily Online, July 13, 2005;
117. and Marina Volkova, "Shanghai Cooperation against Terrorism," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 6, 2005, in FBIS, July 6, 2005, doc. 200507061477.
118. For a tough reaction to the SCO declaration from then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers, see Ann Scott Tyson, "Pentagon Pressured to Pull Out of Uzbek, Kyrgyy. Bases: Russia and China Bullying Central Asia, U.S. Says," Washington Post, July 15, 2005.
119. For a sharp Chinese rebuke of Myers's statement, see "Mei Jun Canlianhui Zhu Xi Maiersi Dihui Zhong E Qiling Zhong Ya Xiaoguo [U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Myers slanders China and Russia on the bullying of small Central Asian nations], Qianlong Network, July 15, 2005, http://www.qianlong. com/.
120. Recently the SCO has expanded the number of observers in the organization to include India, Iran, and Pakistan, a trend that concerns the U.S. Army War College's Stephen Blank from a geostrategic perspective. See Blank, "New Turns in Chinese Policy towards Central Asia," Central AsiaCaucasus Analyst, June 15, 2005.
121. Joshua Kurlantzick, "How China Is Changing Global Diplomacy: Cultural Revolution," New Republic, June 27, 2005, p. 16.
122. Charles Krauthammer, "China's Moment," Washington Post, September 23, 2005.
123. For example, Randall Schriver argued in June 2005 that the only certainty about the upcoming 2005 East Asia Summit was that China was the most influential actor behind the initiative and that the United States was not invited. See Schriver, "The China Challenge."
124. For Zheng Bijian's position on nonexclusion of U.S. or European Union interests, see "China's Peaceful Rise Part of Asia Peaceful Rising, Official Says," Xinhuanet, April 22, 2005, http://www.hq.xinhuanet.com. Zheng carried a similar message to the United States during a visit in mid-June.
125. See "No Anti-U.S. Plan in Asia: China," Reuters, June 18, 2005. For Director General of the PRC Foreign Ministry's Department of Asian Affairs Cui Tiankai's statements,
126. see Zhang Yongxing, "Chinese Representative Explains China's New Concept of Security at Asian Security Conference," Xinhua News Service, June 4, 2005, in FBIS, June 5, 2005, doc. CPP20050605000027.
127. For a scholarly article on nonexclusion of outside actors to the EAS, see Zhang Yunling, "Ruhe Renshi Dongya Quyu Hezuo de Fazhan" [How to understand the development of East Asian regional cooperation], Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], No. 8 (August 2005), p. 4.
128. For example, the highly influential scholar Wang Jisi, of Peking University, argued in June 2005 that the summit should not include the United States. "Tu Kung Pao Cites PRC Scholars on China's Multilateralism in East Asia," Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao (internet version), in Chinese, in FBIS, June 21, 2005, doc. CPP20050621000061.
129. Lu Jianren, "Dongya Fenghui, Zhongguo Diwei Nan Handong" [The East Asia Summit: China's position is hard to shake], Xinhuanet, December 15, 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-12/15/content_3924348_2.html. Author discussions with knowledgeable Chinese and Japanese experts in Beijing and Tokyo, January 2006;
130. Akio Takahara, "A Japanese Perspective on China's Rise and the East Asian Order," paper presented at "The Rise of China: Theory and Practice" conference, Beijing University, January 6-7, 2006;
131. and Alan D. Romberg, "The East Asia Summit: Much Ado About Nothing - So Far," Freeman Report, Vol. 3, No. 12 (December 2005).
132. For a revealing analytic piece from a member of a Chinese government think tank, see Lu, "Dongya Fenghui, Zhongguo Diwei Nan Handong."
133. See also Bruce Vaughn, East Asian Summit: Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, December 9, 2005), pp. 2-3, Order Code RS22346;
134. and "Japan, China Clash Over East Asian Summit," Yomiuri Shimbun, November 25, 2005.
135. Friedberg, "The Struggle for Mastery in Asia," p. 26.
136. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 402. Prominent Chinese international relations experts, such as Shi Yinhong and Yan Xuetong, believe that Mearsheimer's prediction for a change in U.S.-China policy is well under way, although Mearsheimer himself may not agree.
137. See "PRC Scholar Shi Yinhong: China, U.S. 'Structural Contradictions' Deepening," Beijing Gnoji Xiancju Daobao (internet version), in FBIS, June 13, 2005, doc. CPP20050613000226.
138. For Yan's views, see "PRC's Wang Jisi: China May Leave G8 in Future; Scholars Support Multilateralism," Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong, internet version), in Chinese, in FBIS, June 22, 2005, doc. CPP20050622000094.
139. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, p. 244.
140. See, for example, Michael A. Weinstein, "Intelligence Brief: China," June 28, 2005, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac= view_report8report_id=31981anguage_id=1.
141. Kagan, "The Illusion of 'Managing' China."
142. Grieco, "China and America in the World Polity," p. 24.
143. For a sophisticated critique of the conclusion that China is necessarily heading toward increased revisionism, see Alastair lain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56.
144. Grieco, "China and America in the World Polity," pp. 36-37.
145. Author's off-the-record discussions with two former U.S. government officials; Kurlantzick, "How China Is Changing Global Diplomacy";
146. and Schriver, "The China Challenge."
147. For a somewhat less concerned portrayal of Chinese gains and U.S. challenges, see Evelyn Goh, "The Bush Administration and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies," in Robert M. Hathaway and Wilson Lee, eds., George W. Bush and East Asia: A First-Term Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005), pp. 183-194.
148. This was the theme of a speech by Chan Heng Chee, former Singapore ambassador to the United States, at an early 2006 conference on China and the United States in Southeast Asia. Roger Mitton, "China Scores for Its Dealings with ASEAN," Straits Times, February 6, 2006.
149. As one former U.S. official put it to me at a major international East Asian conference in Southeast Asia after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Chinese official entourage came prepared to discuss a wide variety of issues, whereas the U.S. entourage came to discuss terrorism and, even more specifically, the potential proliferation of shoulder-held antiaircraft missiles to terrorist groups. For prescriptions to rectify the image of the United States as focused only on terrorism, see Goh, "The Bush Administration and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies," p. 193.
150. Richard Baum, Kurt M. Campbell, James A. Kelly, and Robert S. Ross, "'Whither U.S.-China Relations?' Roundtable Discussion," NBR Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 2005), p. 25.
151. Richard Baum, Kurt M. Campbell, James A. Kelly, and Robert S. Ross, NBR Analysis, Ibid., p. 26.
152. For a concise and optimistic recap of continuing U.S. power in the region, see Robert Sutter, "Rising Dragon and the American Eagle, Part II: China Is On the Rise - but U.S. Influence in Asia Shows No Signs of Waning," YaleGkbal Online, April 22, 2005.
153. Hill, testimony before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
154. Kenneth Lieberthal, "Why the U.S. Malaise over China?" YaleGlabal Online, January 19, 2006.
155. Han Nai-kuo, "U.S. Adjusting Military Deployment with China in Mind: Schriver," CNA (Taipei), July 13, 2005.
156. Christensen, "Old Problems Trump New Thinking?"
157. For coverage of these issues, see my contribution to the China Leadership Monitor, No. 13 (Spring 2005), http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20053.
158. Judging from my discussions with influential experts in Beijing in early January 2006, this was clearly an intentional strategy on the PRC's part.
159. In the same vein, some Chinese commentators believe that U.S. elites perceive cooperative multilateral networks in the region as harmful to the U.S. effort to maintain U.S. supremacy. See, for example, Wang, "Mei Weihe Guchui 'Zhongguo Junshi Weixie,"' p. 11.
160. Particularly after the bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo war, the containment and hegemony themes were common in Chinese publications. See Yan Xuetong, Meiguo Baquan yu Zhongguo Anquan [U.S. hegemony and Chinese security] (Tianjin: Tianjuing People's Publishers, 2000);
161. and Liang Fang, Feng Zhaoju, and Wang Xixin, chief eds., Meiguo Endezhu Shijie Ma? [Can the United States hold down the world?] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000).
162. When Chinese interlocutors tell me that a U.S. grand strategy of containment against China has existed since the end of the Cold War, I routinely ask them to name a country that has done more in the reform era to make the PRC strong and influential than the United States. I have never received a serious reply, though I have elicited visible frustration in some cases.
163. Zoellick, "Whither China?"
164. For a brief overview of the Senior Dialogue, see "Senior Dialogue Examines Framework of U.S.-China Relationship," December 8, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Dec/08-125799.html.
165. Huang Renwei, cited in Yang Liqun, "U.S. Strategic Consideration in Militarily Containing China: PRC Scholar on U.S. Strategy of Militarily Containing China," Jiefang Ribao (Shanghai, internet version), in Chinese, June 28, 2005, FBIS, doc. CPP20050714000030.
166. For an excellent analysis of the mutual hedging between China and the United States, see Evan S. Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 145-167.
167. See also Robert Sutter, China's Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005);
168. and Liu Jianfei, "Meiguo Dui Hua Zhanlüe de Zhuanbian Quxiang" [The transformational trends in U.S. strategy toward China], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], No. 2 (February 2005), pp. 30-35.
169. On U.S. pressure on Israel, see Zeev Schiff, "Israel Bows to U.S. Pressure, Will Curb Defense Exports," Haaretz, June 26, 2005;
170. and Sharon Weinberger, "New Technology Transfers to China On Hold, Pentagon Official Confirms," Defense Daily, June 16, 2005, p. 1.
171. For the PRC official reaction to the U.S. pressure on Israel, see "PRC Spokesman, U.S. Concerns over Military Cooperation with Israel 'Groundless,'" Hong Kong AFP, in FBIS, June 21, 2005, doc. CPP20050621000113.
172. See, for example, Martin Fackler, "Altered States, Breaking Taboos: Japan Redefines Its Role with China," Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2005;
173. and P.R. Kumaraswamy, "Return of the Red Card: Israel-China-U.S. Triangle," Power and Interest News Report, May 23, 2005, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=303&language_id= 1.
174. In addition to the 2 plus 2 statements cited above, Tokyo joined Washington in warning against "unilateral changes in the status quo" in response to the President Chen Shui-bian's provocative 2006 Lunar New Year's speech. See "Japan Reiterates One-China Policy," Xinhua News Agency, January 31, 2006.
175. Liu Jianfei, "Zhongguo Minzhu Zhengzhi Jianshe yu ZhongMei Guanxi [The building of democratic politics in China and Sino-U.S. relations]," Zhanlüe yu Guanli [Strategy and Management], March 2003, pp. 76-82.
176. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966);
177. James W. Davis, Threats and Promises in Coercive Diplomacy: The Pursuit of International Influence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000);
178. and Thomas J. Christensen, "The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 7-21.
179. Even if one believes that having a second-strike capability is a stabilizing factor, one might still recognize that the process of acquiring such a capability can prove destabilizing.
180. See Rozman, Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism.
181. Making this point are Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging";
182. and Sutter, China's Rise in Asia.
183. Goh, "Meeting the China Challenge," pp. 43-44;
184. and Kurlantzick, "How China Is Changing Global Diplomacy."
185. According to a 2005 Pew report, those holding a favorable opinion of the United States in Indonesia jumped from 15 percent in 2003 to 38 percent in 2005. See "U.S. Image Up Slightly, but Still Negative," June 23, 2005, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID-247.
186. On the president's November 2005 trip, see Jonathan Marcus, "Bush Trip Suggests Asia Matters," BBC News, November 19, 2005. In the first half of 2005, Michael Green of the National Security Council, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice all toured the region.
187. See, for example, Elena Nakashima, "Vietnam, U.S. to Improve Intelligence, Military Ties," Washington Post, June 17, 2005.
188. For analyses of how helpful the Zoellick trip was in rectifying the U.S. image in the region, see Evelyn Goh, "Southeast Asia Bright on U.S. Radar Screen," Asia Times, May 28, 2005.
189. To see the various speeches and press conferences that emphasized tsunami relief and economic relations during Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick's six-nation tour, see the various reports at http://usinfo.state.gov.
190. "Deputy Secretary Zoellick Holds a News Conference in Singapore, as Released by the State Department," Congressional Quarterly, FDCH Political Transcripts, May 10, 2005.
191. See, for example, Schriver, "The China Challenge."
192. Roger Mitton, "U.S., ASEAN to Boost Ties with Yearly Summit," Straits Times, February 3, 2006. The first meeting would be in November 2006 in Hanoi, before the APEC summit. This policy should help repair any regional fallout from the administration's decision not to send Secretary of State Rice to the ARF in July 2005 but rather to send Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick.
193. For regional perceptions, see Marcus, "Bush Trip Suggests Asia Matters." Zoellick's cabinet-level rank and strong reputation in the region probably helped cushion the blow in Southeast Asia; but from all accounts, protocol and perceptions are king in ASEAN, and the decision almost certainly carried some diplomatic costs for the United States. From the point of view of competitive diplomacy, however, the decisions of China and Japan not to send their foreign ministers to the ARF certainly reduced any relative costs to the United States in any alleged diplomatic competition.
194. Men Honghua, "Bian Beidong Yingdui Wei Zhudong Mouhua, Weihu He Tuozhan Guojia Zhanlüe Liyi" [Changing a passive response into an active plan, protecting and developing the national strategic interest], in Hu Angang, chief ed., Zhongguo Da Zhanl̈e [The grand strategy of China] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People's Publishers, 2003), p. 86.
195. Sutter, China's Rise in Asia, p. 110.
196. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, "From Reaffirmation to Redefinition - An Agenda for the Future," in Green and Cronin, eds., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 316-318.
197. Goldstein, Rising to the Chalknge, pp. 103-104.
198. For a rich analysis of China's shifting attitudes toward multilateral institutions in the mid-1990s, see Johnston and Evans, "China's Engagement," especially pp. 258-260. Although they emphasize institutional and psychological factors in their analysis, they show convincingly that China's major advances in multilateral thinking followed the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis and the Nye initiative for strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Various documents, such as the 1998 PRC Defense White Paper, make explicit statements about how multilateral approaches to regional security are preferable to Cold War bilateralism. For an in-depth scholarly work that underscores the importance of tensions across the Taiwan Strait in determining the PRC's strategy toward multilat
199. eralism in Southeast Asia, see Xu Xin, "Taiwan and China's National Identity," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 2004.
200. See also Glosny, "Heading Toward a Win-Win Future?"
201. For a pioneering analysis of the PRC's shifting relations with ASEAN in the mid-1990s, see Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 299-322.
202. See also Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought," Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 425-440;
203. and Jing-dong Yuan, "Regional Institutional and Cooperative Security: Chinese Approaches and Policies," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn 2001), pp. 263-294.
204. Sutter, China's Rise in Asia, p. 81.
205. Xia Liping, "Lun Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlüe Zhong de Xin Anquan Guan" [A study of the new security concept in China's international strategy], in Chen Peiyao and Xia, chief eds., Xin Shiji Jiyuqi yu Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlüe [The period of opportunity in the new century and China's international strategy] (Beijing: Times Publishers, 2004), p. 58.
206. See "PRC's Wang Jisi: China May Leave G8 in Future."
207. Zhang Yunling, "Zonghe Anquan Guan Ji Dui Wo Guo Anquan de Sikao" [The comprehensive security concept and reflections on our nation's security]," in Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], No. 1 (2000), pp. 1-16.
208. See also Yong Deng, "Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the 'China Threat Theory,'" in Alastair lain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., New Approaches to China's Foreign Relations: Essays in Honor of Allen S. Whiting (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, forthcoming);
209. Thomas J. Christensen, Alastair lain Johnston, and Robert S. Ross, "Conclusion," in Johnston and Ross, New Approaches to China's Foreign Relations;
210. and Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power," pp. 32-33.
211. See also Glosny, "Heading Toward a Win-Win Future?"
212. See, for example, Zhang Xizhen, Zhongguo Dongmeng de Mulin Huxin Huoban Guanxi [The neighborly, mutually trusting partnership between China and ASEAN], Guoji Guanxi [International Relations], No. 2 (1999), pp. 26-29;
213. and Maj. Gen. Li Erbing, Zhongguo 21 Shiji Qianqi Duiwai Zhanlüe de Xuanze [China's foreign strategic choices in the early part of the 21st century] (Beijing: Times Publishers, 2004), pp. 10-11.
214. Glosny, "Heading Toward a Win-Win Future?" Cao Yunhua and Tang Chong argue that there is a consensus among Chinese scholars that such initiatives, including trade agreements, are a key way for China to reduce the regional security dilemma associated with its rising economic and military power (anquan de kunjing).
215. Cao and Tang, "Xin Zhongguo-Dongmeng Guanxi Lun" [An analysis of new Sino-ASEAN relations] (Beijing: World Knowledge Publishers, 2005), pp. 224-225, 233.
216. Allen Carlson, Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 89-90.
217. Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, p. 124.
218. Tang Shiping and Zhang Yunling, "China's Regional Strategy," in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming).
219. Zhang Yunling, chief ed., Weilai 10-15 Nian Zhongguo Zai Yatai Diqu Mianlan de Guoji Huanjing [The security environment China will face in the Southeast Asia region in the next 10-15 years] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, November 2003), pp. 98-99, 309, at p. 309.
220. For a similar argument regarding the security hedge involved in Chinese multilateralism, see Tang Shiping, Suzao Zhonggw de Lixiang Anquan Huanjing [Constructing China's ideal security environment] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, December 2003), p. 241.
221. See Zhao Huanxin, "China, India Forging Strategic Partnership, China Daily, April 12, 2005;
222. and Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding, The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
223. Carlson, Unifying China, p. 79.
224. See "PRC Expert: Sino-Russian Cooperation Will Batter U.S. Offensives," Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), July 8, 2005, in FBIS, July 8, 2005, doc. CPP200507081477.
225. Zhang Guihong, "MeiYin Zhanlüe Huoban Guanxi yu Zhongguo: Yingxiang yu Duice" [U.S.-Indian strategic partner relations and China: Influence and countermeasures], Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific], No. 5 (May 2005), pp. 28-34, at pp. 33-34.
226. For the most radical constructivist argument along these lines, see Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 409, 420, where Wendt suggests that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union should have been appeased.
227. See Schriver, "The China Challenge";
228. and former Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's comments on Robert Zoellick's speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China relations delivered on September 21, 2005, in Kelly, "United States Policy toward China: A Timely Restatement," NBR Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 2005), p. 30.
229. Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, For other fine analyses of Beijing's hedging strategy,
230. see David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 64-99;
231. and Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging." For my general view of Chinese Communist Party grand strategy,
232. see "China," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, eds., Power and Purpose: Strategic Asia, 2001-02 (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001).
233. For a systematic analysis arguing that China has not yet shown signs of strong revisionism in its foreign policy, see Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?"