Come home, America: The strategy of restraint in the face of temptation

International Security

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 5-48

  Gholz, Eugene ^a   Press, Daryl G ^a   Sapolsky, Harvey M ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0031475604     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.21.4.5     Document Type: Article

References (181)

1. Daryl G. Press and Eugene Gholz, "Searching for that Vision Thing," Breakthroughs, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 4-10.
2. Some analysts suggest that spreading American values is of equal importance in America's national interest. Most of these analysts, however, are actually arguing that engaging in moral crusades is necessary to mobilize Americans to prepare to defend their security. At heart, therefore, these arguments recognize security as the first priority. See, for example, Terry L. Deibel, "Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 79-108. See also James Kurth, "America's Grand Strategy," The National Interest, No. 43 (Spring 1996), p. 15.
3. Some analysts suggest that spreading American values is of equal importance in America's national interest. Most of these analysts, however, are actually arguing that engaging in moral crusades is necessary to mobilize Americans to prepare to defend their security. At heart, therefore, these arguments recognize security as the first priority. See, for example, Terry L. Deibel, "Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 79-108. See also James Kurth, "America's Grand Strategy," The National Interest, No. 43 (Spring 1996), p. 15.
4. Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 35-62, and especially p. 53, suggests - and soundly criticizes - this motivation. For examples of advocates of a general link between environmental degradation and national security, see Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 162-177; and Norman Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), especially pp. 12, 31-34. Better-specified work links the environment to national security by reference to the potential collapse of particular states in the developing world that might be important to U.S. security. See, for example, Norman Myers, Not Far Afield: U.S. Interests and the Global Environment (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 1987), p. 13. Below, we argue that there are no such pivotal states to protect.
5. Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 35-62, and especially p. 53, suggests - and soundly criticizes - this motivation. For examples of advocates of a general link between environmental degradation and national security, see Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 162-177; and Norman Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), especially pp. 12, 31-34. Better-specified work links the environment to national security by reference to the potential collapse of particular states in the developing world that might be important to U.S. security. See, for example, Norman Myers, Not Far Afield: U.S. Interests and the Global Environment (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 1987), p. 13. Below, we argue that there are no such pivotal states to protect.
6. Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 35-62, and especially p. 53, suggests - and soundly criticizes - this motivation. For examples of advocates of a general link between environmental degradation and national security, see Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 162-177; and Norman Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), especially pp. 12, 31-34. Better-specified work links the environment to national security by reference to the potential collapse of particular states in the developing world that might be important to U.S. security. See, for example, Norman Myers, Not Far Afield: U.S. Interests and the Global Environment (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 1987), p. 13. Below, we argue that there are no such pivotal states to protect.
7. Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 35-62, and especially p. 53, suggests - and soundly criticizes - this motivation. For examples of advocates of a general link between environmental degradation and national security, see Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 162-177; and Norman Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), especially pp. 12, 31-34. Better-specified work links the environment to national security by reference to the potential collapse of particular states in the developing world that might be important to U.S. security. See, for example, Norman Myers, Not Far Afield: U.S. Interests and the Global Environment (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 1987), p. 13. Below, we argue that there are no such pivotal states to protect.
8. Kenneth Keller, "Environmentalism and Security," presentation in the MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies Program Seminar Series, September 11, 1996. See also Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 18-31, 36-37, for a careful distinction between the effects of environmental collapse on intrastate violence in the developing world and on interstate violence that might affect the United States.
9. Kenneth Keller, "Environmentalism and Security," presentation in the MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies Program Seminar Series, September 11, 1996. See also Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 18-31, 36-37, for a careful distinction between the effects of environmental collapse on intrastate violence in the developing world and on interstate violence that might affect the United States.
10. Even if Japan reacted to American restraint by increasing defense expenditures (increasing Japanese consumption and diverting capital from investment), the effect would be balanced by America's tremendous reduction in defense spending. This is discussed in greater detail below.
11. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 15, 33-34, 46-47.
12. On the enormous size of military forces required for stability operations, see James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," Parameters, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Winter 1995-96), pp. 59-69.
13. Joshua Muravchik, "Affording Foreign Policy: The Problem Is Not Wallet, But Will," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2 (March/ April 1996), pp. 8-13.
14. Aaron Friedberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 109-142.
15. Thomas L. McNaugher, "Planning Future Defense: Time to Confront the Cold War Mindset," Brookings Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer 1996), p. 27.
16. Even $120 billion would still be generous. If the United States succeeded in reducing the defense budget to that level, it would be in a position to reassess the strategic environment and perhaps pare down the budget further.
17. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3.
18. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3.
19. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 32-33, 263-266.
20. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 40, 239-241.
21. By "nuclear armed adversary" we mean an adversary with a secure second-strike force. See Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 5-6, 28; Stephen Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy after the Cold War," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1990), pp. 4-5.
22. By "nuclear armed adversary" we mean an adversary with a secure second-strike force. See Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 5-6, 28; Stephen Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy after the Cold War," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1990), pp. 4-5.
23. One example of this is the 1973 Middle East War.
24. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies [IISS], 1981); John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66.
25. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies [IISS], 1981); John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66.
26. It seems quite conservative to assume that the U.S. could maintain a one-MRC force for $120 billion. The Clinton Bottom-Up Review (BUR) force, designed to conduct two nearly simultaneous MRCs, was estimated to cost approximately $250 billion (FY97 dollars). See Les Aspin, The Bottom-Up Review: Forces For A New Era (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1993). It appears that the United States could get one MRC for less than half of this total. In the BUR "building block" method, force packages were simply added to an unchanging "foundation," which alone costs $110 billion. But the $110 billion foundation, according to the Department of Defense analysis, is capable of supporting a two-and-a-half MRC "Base Force." Clearly the United States does not need a Base Force-sized foundation to support a one-MRC force. If America cuts one third out of the defense foundation then it would be left with $45 billion to buy a single MRC force package. This, incidentally, is twice as much money as it costs, in the BUR metric, to move from a single MRC to a two-MRC force. See Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), Table 2 and notes.
27. It seems quite conservative to assume that the U.S. could maintain a one-MRC force for $120 billion. The Clinton Bottom-Up Review (BUR) force, designed to conduct two nearly simultaneous MRCs, was estimated to cost approximately $250 billion (FY97 dollars). See Les Aspin, The Bottom-Up Review: Forces For A New Era (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1993). It appears that the United States could get one MRC for less than half of this total. In the BUR "building block" method, force packages were simply added to an unchanging "foundation," which alone costs $110 billion. But the $110 billion foundation, according to the Department of Defense analysis, is capable of supporting a two-and-a-half MRC "Base Force." Clearly the United States does not need a Base Force-sized foundation to support a one-MRC force. If America cuts one third out of the defense foundation then it would be left with $45 billion to buy a single MRC force package. This, incidentally, is twice as much money as it costs, in the BUR metric, to move from a single MRC to a two-MRC force. See Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), Table 2 and notes.
28. Robert W. Tucker, "The Future of a Contradiction," The National Interest, No. 43 (Spring 1996), p. 24.
29. Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances, Threats and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), p. 458; see also Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 175-198; John R. Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 379-402.
30. Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances, Threats and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), p. 458; see also Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 175-198; John R. Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 379-402.
31. Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances, Threats and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), p. 458; see also Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 175-198; John R. Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 379-402.
32. See Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 130-135, 164-167.
33. Steven Shavell, "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 93, No. 4 (November 1979), pp. 541-562. We owe the idea of applying the concept of moral hazard to alliances to Kenneth Oye.
34. Beverly Crawford, "Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 4 (July 1996), pp. 482-521, is a good, detailed summary of the diplomatic and German domestic political history; John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict, Adelphi Paper No. 270 (London: IISS, Summer 1992), pp. 64, 69-70.
35. Beverly Crawford, "Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 4 (July 1996), pp. 482-521, is a good, detailed summary of the diplomatic and German domestic political history; John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict, Adelphi Paper No. 270 (London: IISS, Summer 1992), pp. 64, 69-70.
36. Robert A. Manning, "Future Shock or Renewed Partnership? The U.S.-Japan Alliance Facing the Millennium," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), p. 88.
37. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 165, 168-170; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 65.
38. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 165, 168-170; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 65.
39. Proponents of U.S. engagement in Asia argue that the Japanese pay "Host Nation Support," which covers the costs of America's forward deployment. Their calculations, however, neglect the $60 billion that the United States spends each year to equip and train the forces to fight an Asian MRC.
40. Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 81-97. Also, Rick Atkinson and Bradley Graham," As Europe Seeks Wider NATO Role, Its Armies Shrink," Washington Post, July 29, 1996, p. 1.
41. Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 81-97. Also, Rick Atkinson and Bradley Graham," As Europe Seeks Wider NATO Role, Its Armies Shrink," Washington Post, July 29, 1996, p. 1.
42. POMCUS sets are "prepositioned overseas materiel, configured in unit sets," storehouses of military equipment in regions to which the United States may want to quickly deploy. In times of crisis, units can travel without carrying their equipment, "marrying up" with the weapons waiting at the POMCUS site.
43. Faced with the need to provide for their own defense for the first time in decades, the European allies are likely to realize that they have an immediate need for first-rate weapons that cannot currently be produced by their own industries. They may import American designs, at least until their industries catch up. Eugene Gholz, "Defense Industry Export Opportunities," Presentation at the DACS/Women in International Security Conference on the Arms Trade, Washington, D.C., October 1996.
44. For example, the United States should fulfill its promise to help if the French need logistics and mobility assets to evacuate their citizens from Algeria but should not provide ground troops for that mission, because the French have plenty of ground troops of their own.
45. IISS estimates Germany's GDP is 1.7 times that of Russia. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1996-97 (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 56, 113.
46. This picture of German strength need not worry Americans. The Russian defense against an invasion from the West retains its traditional bastions of strength: strategic depth, cold winters, and, ultimately, nuclear weapons.
47. Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M.S. Niou, "Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assault?" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 212-214 and 218-222; Steven E. Miller, "Assistance to Newly Proliferating Nations," in Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds., The New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), pp. 103-105.
48. Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M.S. Niou, "Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assault?" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 212-214 and 218-222; Steven E. Miller, "Assistance to Newly Proliferating Nations," in Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds., The New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), pp. 103-105.
49. Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 (July / August 1995), pp. 103-114.
50. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 (July / August 1995), pp. 90-102.
51. Nick Beldecos and Eric Heginbotham, "The Conventional Military Balance in Korea," Breakthroughs, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 1-8. The analysis focuses on the ability of a joint U.S.-South Korean force to stop an attack, but in sensitivity analyses they confirm that the current South Korean force could provide a robust defense without American assistance.
52. North Korean GDP is approximately $21 billion, compared with $422 billion for South Korea. IISS, Military Balance, pp. 186-188.
53. Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), p. 124.
54. Gary Klintworth, New Taiwan, New China: Taiwan's Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 206-207.
55. One of Taiwan's largest ports, Keelung, is on the northeastern tip of the island. It is shielded from the Chinese mainland by a twenty-mile long peninsula that juts out to the north. Keelung handles a full range of port cargo, including petroleum. Taiwan has two other major ports on the eastern side of the island, one of which handles petroleum. See Lloyd's Maritime Atlas of World Ports and Shipping Places (London: Lloyd's Publishing Company, 1995); and Guide to Port Entry, 1995/6 (London: Shipping Guides Limited, 1995), pp. 1899-1907.
56. One of Taiwan's largest ports, Keelung, is on the northeastern tip of the island. It is shielded from the Chinese mainland by a twenty-mile long peninsula that juts out to the north. Keelung handles a full range of port cargo, including petroleum. Taiwan has two other major ports on the eastern side of the island, one of which handles petroleum. See Lloyd's Maritime Atlas of World Ports and Shipping Places (London: Lloyd's Publishing Company, 1995); and Guide to Port Entry, 1995/6 (London: Shipping Guides Limited, 1995), pp. 1899-1907.
57. For an excellent analysis of the history of strategic coercion, see Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). See especially pp. 343-346 on the Blitz and pp. 314-316 on the difficulty of strategic coercion in general.
58. Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," MIT Japan Program Working Paper No. 96-22, pp. 30-31, 36, suggest that Japanese economic policy is aimed at maintaining just such an advantage. Also, Mark Z. Taylor, "Dominance Through Technology," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 6 (November/December 1995), pp. 14-20; and Eiichi Katahara, "Japan's Concept of Comprehensive Security in the Post-Cold War World," in Susan L. Shirk and Christopher P. Twomey, eds., Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security Linkages in Asia-Pacific (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), pp. 213-232.
59. Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," MIT Japan Program Working Paper No. 96-22, pp. 30-31, 36, suggest that Japanese economic policy is aimed at maintaining just such an advantage. Also, Mark Z. Taylor, "Dominance Through Technology," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 6 (November/December 1995), pp. 14-20; and Eiichi Katahara, "Japan's Concept of Comprehensive Security in the Post-Cold War World," in Susan L. Shirk and Christopher P. Twomey, eds., Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security Linkages in Asia-Pacific (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), pp. 213-232.
60. Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," MIT Japan Program Working Paper No. 96-22, pp. 30-31, 36, suggest that Japanese economic policy is aimed at maintaining just such an advantage. Also, Mark Z. Taylor, "Dominance Through Technology," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 6 (November/December 1995), pp. 14-20; and Eiichi Katahara, "Japan's Concept of Comprehensive Security in the Post-Cold War World," in Susan L. Shirk and Christopher P. Twomey, eds., Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security Linkages in Asia-Pacific (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), pp. 213-232.
61. In the 1973 Middle East War, Israel achieved a 14:1 air exchange ratio against the Arab air forces; in 1982, Israel did even better, shooting down 87 Syrian planes and losing no aircraft in air-air duels and only one airplane and two helicopters to ground fire. In the 1990-91 Gulf War, the U.S.-led Coalition shot down 36 Iraqi aircraft against only one probable Coalition loss from aerial combat. See Trevor N. Dupuy and Paul Martel, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon (Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1986), pp. 144-145; Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1984), p. 609, Table E on the 1973 air war; and James A. Winnefeld et al., A League of Airmen: U.S. Airpower in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1994), Table A-13, on the war against Iraq.
62. In the 1973 Middle East War, Israel achieved a 14:1 air exchange ratio against the Arab air forces; in 1982, Israel did even better, shooting down 87 Syrian planes and losing no aircraft in air-air duels and only one airplane and two helicopters to ground fire. In the 1990-91 Gulf War, the U.S.-led Coalition shot down 36 Iraqi aircraft against only one probable Coalition loss from aerial combat. See Trevor N. Dupuy and Paul Martel, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon (Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1986), pp. 144-145; Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1984), p. 609, Table E on the 1973 air war; and James A. Winnefeld et al., A League of Airmen: U.S. Airpower in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1994), Table A-13, on the war against Iraq.
63. In the 1973 Middle East War, Israel achieved a 14:1 air exchange ratio against the Arab air forces; in 1982, Israel did even better, shooting down 87 Syrian planes and losing no aircraft in air-air duels and only one airplane and two helicopters to ground fire. In the 1990-91 Gulf War, the U.S.-led Coalition shot down 36 Iraqi aircraft against only one probable Coalition loss from aerial combat. See Trevor N. Dupuy and Paul Martel, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon (Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1986), pp. 144-145; Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1984), p. 609, Table E on the 1973 air war; and James A. Winnefeld et al., A League of Airmen: U.S. Airpower in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1994), Table A-13, on the war against Iraq.
64. Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainmenf of China," pp. 123, 127, 131. For a consideration of the South China Sea military balance, see Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194.
65. Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainmenf of China," pp. 123, 127, 131. For a consideration of the South China Sea military balance, see Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194.
66. China, of course, has nuclear weapons. North Korea is also rumored to have a small nuclear capability.
67. Christopher W. Hughes, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Japanese Security," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), p. 82.
68. Christopher Layne, "Less Is More: Minimal Realism in East Asia," The National Interest, No. 43 (Spring 1996), p. 73.
69. Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 12-23.
70. Thomas Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 37-52.
71. Hans Binnendijk, "U.S. Strategic Objectives in East Asia," National Defense University Strategic Forum, No. 68 (March 1996), pp. 2-3.
72. Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon, "The Marines Should Come Home: Adapting the U.S.-Japan Alliance to a New Security Era," Brookings Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 10-13, and Chalmers Johnson, "Go-banken-sama, go home!" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July / August 1996), pp. 22-29.
73. Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon, "The Marines Should Come Home: Adapting the U.S.-Japan Alliance to a New Security Era," Brookings Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 10-13, and Chalmers Johnson, "Go-banken-sama, go home!" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July / August 1996), pp. 22-29.
74. Robert Gilpin, "The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 370-371.
75. Michael C. Webb, "International Economic Structure, Government Interests, and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies," International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 309-342; and Jeffry A. Frieden, "Invested Interests: Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Autumn 1991), pp. 425-452.
76. Michael C. Webb, "International Economic Structure, Government Interests, and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies," International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 309-342; and Jeffry A. Frieden, "Invested Interests: Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Autumn 1991), pp. 425-452.
77. Jeffrey A. Frankel, "Still the Lingua Franca: The Exaggerated Death of the Dollar," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 (July / August 1995), pp. 9-16.
78. Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement," p. 96.
79. For an earlier consideration of the effects of tactical air power against a hegemonic bid in the Gulf, see Daryl G. Press, "What If Saddam Hadn't Stopped?" Breakthroughs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-11.
80. This "no-drive" zone is already in effect.
81. Robert H. Johnson, "The Persian Gulf in U.S. Strategy: A Skeptical View," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 126-160, raises some well-reasoned objections to this logic, both with respect to Soviet capabilities and with respect to the political ramifications of a Soviet move.
82. According to IISS figures, the U.S. GDP is roughly $7.5 trillion. If Iran conquered all of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates and consolidated these economies into its own without any loss, its new GDP would still be only approximately 4 percent of the American GDP. See The Military Balance 1996-97, pp. 22, 131, 133, 137, 145, and 148.
83. David Henderson, "Sorry Saddam, Oil Embargoes Don't Hurt the U.S.," Wall Street Journal, August 29, 1990, p. A10, argues that the price of a barrel of oil would only rise to $30 if all Middle Eastern production were consolidated and the output quantity were reduced to the monopoly level, for a loss of only $20.5 billion to the U.S. economy. Henderson claims to be making extremely unfavorable estimates of the price elasticity and demand response to the price shock. Earl C. Ravenall, Designing Defense for a New World Order: The Military Budget in 1992 and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 1991), pp. 43-59, suggests that the cost of committing troops to the Gulf is quite high in terms of peacetime yearly funding and the risk-adjusted cost of wars - higher than the cost to the United States of foregoing Middle Eastern oil.
84. David Henderson, "Sorry Saddam, Oil Embargoes Don't Hurt the U.S.," Wall Street Journal, August 29, 1990, p. A10, argues that the price of a barrel of oil would only rise to $30 if all Middle Eastern production were consolidated and the output quantity were reduced to the monopoly level, for a loss of only $20.5 billion to the U.S. economy. Henderson claims to be making extremely unfavorable estimates of the price elasticity and demand response to the price shock. Earl C. Ravenall, Designing Defense for a New World Order: The Military Budget in 1992 and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 1991), pp. 43-59, suggests that the cost of committing troops to the Gulf is quite high in terms of peacetime yearly funding and the risk-adjusted cost of wars - higher than the cost to the United States of foregoing Middle Eastern oil.
85. Michael Sterner, "Navigating the Gulf," Foreign Policy, No. 81 (Winter 1990-91), pp. 39-52.
86. Robert J. Lieber, "Oil and Power after the Gulf War," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 155-175.
87. Eric A. Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 83-88.
88. See M.A. Adelman, "Oil Fallacies," Foreign Policy, No. 82 (Spring 1991), pp. 3-16. Adelman notes that unstable political regimes, dominated by minority elites, might rationally emphasize short-term interests in their oil pricing strategies.
89. Sterner, "Navigating the Gulf," p. 41.
90. In both the 1990 and 1994 American deployments to the Persian Gulf, the first squadron of American combat aircraft (approximately 24 planes) arrived in the theater in 48 hours; for the next two weeks, U.S. ground attack planes arrived at roughly ten per day. See Press, "What If Saddam Hadn't Stopped," pp. 5-11.
91. Anthony H. Cordesman, Perilous Prospects: The Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996). Cordesman concludes that Israel can defend itself conventionally from attack by any of its neighbors. A combined Egyptian-Jordanian-Syrian attack would push Israel to its limits, but the timing of this attack would be difficult to work out because Egyptian forces would need many weeks to cross the Sinai and establish logistics depots for an attack on Israel. This would give Israel the chance to fight its adversaries piecemeal. For an analysis of the military balance on the Golan Heights, see Aryeh Shalev, Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994). For an excellent analysis of the military effectiveness of Arab countries over the past fifty years, see Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, June, 1996.
92. Anthony H. Cordesman, Perilous Prospects: The Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996). Cordesman concludes that Israel can defend itself conventionally from attack by any of its neighbors. A combined Egyptian-Jordanian-Syrian attack would push Israel to its limits, but the timing of this attack would be difficult to work out because Egyptian forces would need many weeks to cross the Sinai and establish logistics depots for an attack on Israel. This would give Israel the chance to fight its adversaries piecemeal. For an analysis of the military balance on the Golan Heights, see Aryeh Shalev, Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994). For an excellent analysis of the military effectiveness of Arab countries over the past fifty years, see Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, June, 1996.
93. Anthony H. Cordesman, Perilous Prospects: The Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996). Cordesman concludes that Israel can defend itself conventionally from attack by any of its neighbors. A combined Egyptian-Jordanian-Syrian attack would push Israel to its limits, but the timing of this attack would be difficult to work out because Egyptian forces would need many weeks to cross the Sinai and establish logistics depots for an attack on Israel. This would give Israel the chance to fight its adversaries piecemeal. For an analysis of the military balance on the Golan Heights, see Aryeh Shalev, Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994). For an excellent analysis of the military effectiveness of Arab countries over the past fifty years, see Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness," Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, June, 1996.
94. "Stalking Modern Pirates," Boston Globe, May 10, 1993, p. A14.
95. See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991), pp. 5-53; Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-39; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," and John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," which can both be found in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects For Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). Van Evera and Art believe that great power war is relatively unlikely today, and would be even less likely with continued American military presence overseas. They advocate continued engagement as a form of insurance. See Art, "Defensible Defense," pp. 10, 46-47 and Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 195-218. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, is less optimistic and suggests that without American engagement the likelihood of future great power war is quite significant.
96. See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991), pp. 5-53; Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-39; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," and John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," which can both be found in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects For Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). Van Evera and Art believe that great power war is relatively unlikely today, and would be even less likely with continued American military presence overseas. They advocate continued engagement as a form of insurance. See Art, "Defensible Defense," pp. 10, 46-47 and Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 195-218. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, is less optimistic and suggests that without American engagement the likelihood of future great power war is quite significant.
97. See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991), pp. 5-53; Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-39; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," and John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," which can both be found in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects For Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). Van Evera and Art believe that great power war is relatively unlikely today, and would be even less likely with continued American military presence overseas. They advocate continued engagement as a form of insurance. See Art, "Defensible Defense," pp. 10, 46-47 and Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 195-218. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, is less optimistic and suggests that without American engagement the likelihood of future great power war is quite significant.
98. See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991), pp. 5-53; Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-39; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," and John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," which can both be found in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects For Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). Van Evera and Art believe that great power war is relatively unlikely today, and would be even less likely with continued American military presence overseas. They advocate continued engagement as a form of insurance. See Art, "Defensible Defense," pp. 10, 46-47 and Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 195-218. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, is less optimistic and suggests that without American engagement the likelihood of future great power war is quite significant.
99. See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991), pp. 5-53; Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-39; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," and John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," which can both be found in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects For Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). Van Evera and Art believe that great power war is relatively unlikely today, and would be even less likely with continued American military presence overseas. They advocate continued engagement as a form of insurance. See Art, "Defensible Defense," pp. 10, 46-47 and Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 195-218. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, is less optimistic and suggests that without American engagement the likelihood of future great power war is quite significant.
100. See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991), pp. 5-53; Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-39; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," and John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," which can both be found in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects For Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). Van Evera and Art believe that great power war is relatively unlikely today, and would be even less likely with continued American military presence overseas. They advocate continued engagement as a form of insurance. See Art, "Defensible Defense," pp. 10, 46-47 and Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 195-218. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, is less optimistic and suggests that without American engagement the likelihood of future great power war is quite significant.
101. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, Volume I: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 5.
102. Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January/February 1996), pp. 31-32.
103. Most of the members of the "selective engagement" camp agree that nuclear weapons are a significant cause of peace. See, for example, Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 155-156; Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 198-200.
104. Most of the members of the "selective engagement" camp agree that nuclear weapons are a significant cause of peace. See, for example, Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 155-156; Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 198-200.
105. Art, "Defensible Defense," p. 51.
106. Posen and Ross estimate that a force structure adequate for selective engagement might cost between $246 and $270 billion in FY97 dollars, or roughly comparable to what the United States spends today. See Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," p. 21 and Table 2. Suggestions that America could save by shifting to small, "tripwire" forces are exaggerated (e.g., Art, "Defensible Defense," pp. 39-42, 51-53, and footnote 94). Tripwires are unlikely to deter aggressors or reassure allies. First, potential aggressors may not be deterred. Recent adversaries appear to believe that early American casualties will force a withdrawal, but unless aggressors believe that causing American casualties will bring dramatic escalation, token forces will not reliably strengthen deterrence. Second, allies will be unlikely to depend on tripwires for their defense; they will not be comforted by America's pledge to reconquer them after the tripwire is brushed aside. Instead they will build up their own defenses, and potentially trigger the spirals that the tripwire was supposed to prevent.
107. Posen and Ross estimate that a force structure adequate for selective engagement might cost between $246 and $270 billion in FY97 dollars, or roughly comparable to what the United States spends today. See Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," p. 21 and Table 2. Suggestions that America could save by shifting to small, "tripwire" forces are exaggerated (e.g., Art, "Defensible Defense," pp. 39-42, 51-53, and footnote 94). Tripwires are unlikely to deter aggressors or reassure allies. First, potential aggressors may not be deterred. Recent adversaries appear to believe that early American casualties will force a withdrawal, but unless aggressors believe that causing American casualties will bring dramatic escalation, token forces will not reliably strengthen deterrence. Second, allies will be unlikely to depend on tripwires for their defense; they will not be comforted by America's pledge to reconquer them after the tripwire is brushed aside. Instead they will build up their own defenses, and potentially trigger the spirals that the tripwire was supposed to prevent.
108. See Harvey M. Sapolsky, "War Without Killing," in S. Sarkesian and J. Flanagin, eds., U.S. Domestic and National Security Agendas (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 34 and Table 2.2. In World War II, 292,000 American military personnel died in combat; another 114,000 were non-combat fatalities.
109. Paul Krugman, "Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March/ April 1994), p. 34.
110. There have been many wars involving nuclear armed countries since World War II, and none has resulted in nuclear use. Note also that Nazi Germany, a country obviously willing to take risks, never used its arsenal of chemical weapons against the Allies during World War II because it feared retaliation. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), pp. 314, 324-328.
111. Layne, "Less Is More," pp. 71-72.
112. See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January/February 1991), pp. 3-17; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 87-107; Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-isolationism (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1996); William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July / August 1996), pp. 18-32; Charles Lane, "Habsburgism," New Republic, No. 4229 (February 5, 1996), p. 10. A draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-99 echoed these views. See "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: Prevent Re-Emergence of a New Rival," New York Times, March 8, 1992, p. 14.
113. See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January/February 1991), pp. 3-17; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 87-107; Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-isolationism (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1996); William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July / August 1996), pp. 18-32; Charles Lane, "Habsburgism," New Republic, No. 4229 (February 5, 1996), p. 10. A draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-99 echoed these views. See "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: Prevent Re-Emergence of a New Rival," New York Times, March 8, 1992, p. 14.
114. See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January/February 1991), pp. 3-17; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 87-107; Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-isolationism (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1996); William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July / August 1996), pp. 18-32; Charles Lane, "Habsburgism," New Republic, No. 4229 (February 5, 1996), p. 10. A draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-99 echoed these views. See "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: Prevent Re-Emergence of a New Rival," New York Times, March 8, 1992, p. 14.
115. See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January/February 1991), pp. 3-17; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 87-107; Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-isolationism (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1996); William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July / August 1996), pp. 18-32; Charles Lane, "Habsburgism," New Republic, No. 4229 (February 5, 1996), p. 10. A draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-99 echoed these views. See "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan:
116. See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January/February 1991), pp. 3-17; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 87-107; Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-isolationism (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1996); William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July / August 1996), pp. 18-32; Charles Lane, "Habsburgism," New Republic, No. 4229 (February 5, 1996), p. 10. A draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-99 echoed these views. See "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: Prevent Re-Emergence of a New Rival," New York Times, March 8, 1992, p. 14.
117. See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January/February 1991), pp. 3-17; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 87-107; Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-isolationism (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1996); William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July / August 1996), pp. 18-32; Charles Lane, "Habsburgism," New Republic, No. 4229 (February 5, 1996), p. 10. A draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-99 echoed these views. See "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: Prevent Re-Emergence of a New Rival," New York Times, March 8, 1992, p. 14.
118. One advocate even implies that the United States should annex Europe in order to deter or win a new Cold War with an Asian superpower. See Michael Lind, "Pax Atlantica: The Case for Euramerica," World Policy Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-7.
119. Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment," pp. 101-103; Kristol and Kagan, "Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," p. 26.
120. Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment," pp. 101-103; Kristol and Kagan, "Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," p. 26.
121. This paper is about American military policy, so the group of primacy advocates to whom we respond are those who advocate military policies to counter the emergence of a new rival. On the other hand, Samuel Huntington proposes an economic strategy to maintain American primacy by spurring domestic savings and investment. We favor these policies because they would increase America's long-term prosperity, but we do not fear the security consequences of a united Europe or a richer Japan. Furthermore, we argue that the best way to implement Huntington's plan for economic growth would be to adopt a military policy of restraint. See Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests"; and Huntington, "Why Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83. For a lucid analysis of the exaggerated concerns of "primacists," see Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 52-67.
122. This paper is about American military policy, so the group of primacy advocates to whom we respond are those who advocate military policies to counter the emergence of a new rival. On the other hand, Samuel Huntington proposes an economic strategy to maintain American primacy by spurring domestic savings and investment. We favor these policies because they would increase America's long-term prosperity, but we do not fear the security consequences of a united Europe or a richer Japan. Furthermore, we argue that the best way to implement Huntington's plan for economic growth would be to adopt a military policy of restraint. See Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests"; and Huntington, "Why Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83. For a lucid analysis of the exaggerated concerns of "primacists," see Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 52-67.
123. This paper is about American military policy, so the group of primacy advocates to whom we respond are those who advocate military policies to counter the emergence of a new rival. On the other hand, Samuel Huntington proposes an economic strategy to maintain American primacy by spurring domestic savings and investment. We favor these policies because they would increase America's long-term prosperity, but we do not fear the security consequences of a united Europe or a richer Japan. Furthermore, we argue that the best way to implement Huntington's plan for economic growth would be to adopt a military policy of restraint. See Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests"; and Huntington, "Why Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83. For a lucid analysis of the exaggerated concerns of "primacists," see Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 52-67.
124. Ronald Steel, "The Hard Questions: We're Number One," New Republic, No. 4260 (September 9, 1996), p. 35.
125. William Kristol and Robert Kagan assert that "no serious analyst of American military capabilities today doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far," but this overstates the case. Is it really self-evident that spending more than twice as much on defense as the Russians and the Chinese combined is inadequate? Kristol and Kagan, "Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," pp. 23-24.
126. James Shinn, "Introduction," in James Shinn, ed., Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp. 7-8.
127. David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
128. Ronald Steel, "When Worlds Collide," New York Times, July 21, 1996, Sec. 4, p. 15.
129. Christopher Layne describes what he sees as the beginning of coalitions to balance American military preponderance. See Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 33-39.
130. Adam Garfinkle, "Road Hogs," The National Interest, No. 44 (Summer 1996), p. 103.
131. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, April, 1996), pp. 48-50, 52-54.
132. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1993), p. 79.
133. David A. Kay, "Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 85-106.
134. Tony Smith, "A Wilsonian World," World Policy Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 62-66.
135. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
136. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
137. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
138. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
139. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
140. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
141. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
142. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
143. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
144. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
145. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
146. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
147. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, one of the foundations of U.S. national security strategy is to spread and consolidate democracy abroad. See William Perry, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), p. 2. For other supporters of spreading democracy, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996); Chester A. Crocker, "All Aid Is Political," New York Times, November 21, 1996, p. 29; J. Brian Atwood, "On the Right Path in Haiti," Washington Post, October 14, 1994, p. A27. For advocates of collective security, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 105-111. For advocates of interventions for humanitarian reasons, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War I: The Broken Tradition," The National Interest, No. 45 (Fall 1996), pp. 35-36; J. Bryan Hehir, "World of Fault Lines: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention," Commonweal, Vol. 119 (September 25, 1992), pp. 8-9; Fouad Ajami, "Beyond Words: History Rewards the Aggressors," New Republic, No. 4203 (August 7, 1995), pp. 15-17; Charles A. Kupchan, "Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: What Does the West Stand for If It Does Nothing?" Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1995, p. M1; James A. Barry, "President Who 'Feels Others' Pain' Should Take Steps to Help Burundi," Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1996, p. 19.
148. For example, see Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," pp. 48-49.
149. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 7, 28-30; Anna Simons, "Shades of Somalia," Washington Post, November 17, 1996, p. C7. In Somalia, America's decision to impose democracy threatened the local warlords and encouraged them to resist.
150. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 7, 28-30; Anna Simons, "Shades of Somalia," Washington Post, November 17, 1996, p. C7. In Somalia, America's decision to impose democracy threatened the local warlords and encouraged them to resist.
151. See Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), especially chaps. 2, 5, 8, and 9, for a description of the difficulties of counterinsurgency operations. The case of Vietnam might overstate the damage that a weak country could inflict on the United States if America tried to force its social system on them, because the PRC and the Soviet Union played roles in the Vietnam War. But the point is that small countries do have the power to resist, and this resistance can be fierce and costly. See Alistair Home, Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: Viking Press, 1978), p. 538, for the costs of the Algerian civil war.
152. See Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), especially chaps. 2, 5, 8, and 9, for a description of the difficulties of counterinsurgency operations. The case of Vietnam might overstate the damage that a weak country could inflict on the United States if America tried to force its social system on them, because the PRC and the Soviet Union played roles in the Vietnam War. But the point is that small countries do have the power to resist, and this resistance can be fierce and costly. See Alistair Home, Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: Viking Press, 1978), p. 538, for the costs of the Algerian civil war.
153. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements for Stability Operations." See Barry R. Posen, "A Balkan Vietnam Awaits 'Peacekeepers,'" Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1993, p. B7, for an application of Quinlivan's force sizing methods to Bosnia. The cost of operations, even ones in which there is almost no resistance, can be substantial. Keeping twenty thousand troops in Bosnia for the past year had a price tag of more than $3.5 billion. John Hillen, "Having It Both Ways on Defense," Investors' Business Daily, September 25, 1996, p. A2. Had there been resistance, the costs would have gone up substantially.
154. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements for Stability Operations." See Barry R. Posen, "A Balkan Vietnam Awaits 'Peacekeepers,'" Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1993, p. B7, for an application of Quinlivan's force sizing methods to Bosnia. The cost of operations, even ones in which there is almost no resistance, can be substantial. Keeping twenty thousand troops in Bosnia for the past year had a price tag of more than $3.5 billion. John Hillen, "Having It Both Ways on Defense," Investors' Business Daily, September 25, 1996, p. A2. Had there been resistance, the costs would have gone up substantially.
155. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements for Stability Operations." See Barry R. Posen, "A Balkan Vietnam Awaits 'Peacekeepers,'" Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1993, p. B7, for an application of Quinlivan's force sizing methods to Bosnia. The cost of operations, even ones in which there is almost no resistance, can be substantial. Keeping twenty thousand troops in Bosnia for the past year had a price tag of more than $3.5 billion. John Hillen, "Having It Both Ways on Defense," Investors' Business Daily, September 25, 1996, p. A2. Had there been resistance, the costs would have gone up substantially.
156. Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," p. 21.
157. Stephen Van Evera, presentation at the Joint MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies-Harvard Olin Institute for Strategic Studies Conference on Force Projection and Sustainment, March 23-24, 1995, summarized by Richard Wilcox, Force Projection and Sustainment, MIT DACS Working Paper, pp. 19-20.
158. Stephen Van Evera, presentation at the Joint MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies-Harvard Olin Institute for Strategic Studies Conference on Force Projection and Sustainment, March 23-24, 1995, summarized by Richard Wilcox, Force Projection and Sustainment, MIT DACS Working Paper, pp. 19-20.
159. Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," pp. 18-19, 34-35.
160. Walter Russell Mead, "On Bosnia - Don't Let Lloyd George Be a Guide," Los Angeles Times, July 30, 1995, p. M2; Ian Traynor, "Muslims Proffer Olive Branch to Avert Bloodshed in Serb Bastion," The Guardian, September 19, 1995, p. 2; Elaine Sciolino, Roger Cohen, and Stephen Engelberg, "In U.S. Eyes, 'Good' Muslims and 'Bad' Serbs Did a Switch," New York Times, November 23, 1995, p. A1.
161. Walter Russell Mead, "On Bosnia - Don't Let Lloyd George Be a Guide," Los Angeles Times, July 30, 1995, p. M2; Ian Traynor, "Muslims Proffer Olive Branch to Avert Bloodshed in Serb Bastion," The Guardian, September 19, 1995, p. 2; Elaine Sciolino, Roger Cohen, and Stephen Engelberg, "In U.S. Eyes, 'Good' Muslims and 'Bad' Serbs Did a Switch," New York Times, November 23, 1995, p. A1.
162. Walter Russell Mead, "On Bosnia - Don't Let Lloyd George Be a Guide," Los Angeles Times, July 30, 1995, p. M2; Ian Traynor, "Muslims Proffer Olive Branch to Avert Bloodshed in Serb Bastion," The Guardian, September 19, 1995, p. 2; Elaine Sciolino, Roger Cohen, and Stephen Engelberg, "In U.S. Eyes, 'Good' Muslims and 'Bad' Serbs Did a Switch," New York Times, November 23, 1995, p. A1.
163. Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," p. 30 and Table 2.
164. See Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," pp. 52-61.
165. For example, in Bosnia the combatants blocked aid supplies to facilitate ethnic cleansing.
166. Art, "Defensible Defense," pp. 30-42. Richard Rosecrance, "Post-Cold War U.S. National Interests and Priorities," in L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr, eds., Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 23-37, combines the argument linking American engagement and global economic growth with advocacy of American leadership of a collective security regime.
167. Art, "Defensible Defense," pp. 30-42. Richard Rosecrance, "Post-Cold War U.S. National Interests and Priorities," in L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr, eds., Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 23-37, combines the argument linking American engagement and global economic growth with advocacy of American leadership of a collective security regime.
168. A classic statement is in Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, revised and enlarged edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). Of course, many hegemonic stability theories have a declinist undertone - the hegemon suffers over time under the burden of providing the collective goods; however, others believe that the selective benefits that the hegemon derives from the open international economic environment are quite large. For example, Webb, "International Economic Structure," p. 342.
169. A classic statement is in Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, revised and enlarged edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). Of course, many hegemonic stability theories have a declinist undertone - the hegemon suffers over time under the burden of providing the collective goods; however, others believe that the selective benefits that the hegemon derives from the open international economic environment are quite large. For example, Webb, "International Economic Structure," p. 342.
170. Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175.
171. For example, Joanne Gowa, Closing the Gold Window (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 172 and 192, argues that Europeans' monetary policy in the 1960s was influenced by the Soviet threat, and the American decision to end the gold standard in the early 1970s was an effort to generate power.
172. Kenneth Oye, Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
173. See, for example, Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't," p. 9.
174. Mark Helprin, "Mr. Clinton's Foreign Policy," Wall Street Journal, August 12, 1996, p. A10.
175. Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't," p. 9.
176. Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 125-153.
177. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 63-66, 203, 208-212.
178. Although it is difficult to imagine the mechanics, an empire or alliance linking Western Europe and East Asia but excluding Russia would also consolidate dangerous quantities of industrial might.
179. Nordlinger does allow that there may have been a brief period just after World War II when limited aid to Western Europe was appropriate, but that window closed during the 1950s with European economic reconstruction.
180. See Art, "Defensible Defense." We responded to Art's specific security and non-security arguments for engagement in earlier sections.
181. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., "A Bankrupt Military Strategy," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 263 (June 1989), p. 34.