Free hand abroad, divide and rule at home

World Politics

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 155-187

  Snyder, Jack ^a   Shapiro, Roberty ^a   Bloch Elkon, Yaeli ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POLITICS;

EID: 69249109277     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887109000069     Document Type: Article

References (112)

1. Robert Jervis, "The Compulsive Empire," Foreign Policy, no. 137 (July-August 2003), 82-87.
2. Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princ-eton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
3. Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 340.
4. Morris P. Fiorina, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2006);
5. Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006);
6. Barbara Sinclair, Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006).
7. 5Larry M. Bartels, "What's the Matter with What's the Matter with Kansas?" Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1 (March 2006), 218.
8. 6Nicholas Lemann, "The Controller: Karl Rove Is Working to Get George Bush Reelected, but He Has Bigger Plans," New Yorker, May 12, 2003.
9. Colin Dueck, "Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major Military Interventions"(Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1, 2007), 17. Dueck. argues that domestic political considerations were at most secondary in several. U.S. inter-ventions.
10. Office of the President, National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
11. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 33-40.
12. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), 374-75;
13. see also Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and SinoAmerican Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
14. See also Arnold Wolfers, '"National Secu-rity' as an Ambiguous Symbol," Political Science Quarterly 67 (December 1952).
15. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1976), chaps. 2, 3, 8, 9.
16. Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).
17. Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
18. 14Dueck (fn. 2), 26-30.
19. 15Ibid., 31.
20. 16Ibid., chap. 3.
21. For two somewhat different ways of making this case, see Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), chap. 7;
22. and Chris-tensen (fn. 10), chaps. 2-4.
23. Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 5, 22-43.
24. Ibid., 29.
25. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield: Merriam, 1969), 413.
26. Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy," International Security 29 (Spring 2005);
27. George Lakoff, Don't Think of an Elephantl Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (White River Junction, Vt.: Chelsea Green, 2004).
28. Steven KuIl, "Americans and Iraq on the Eve of the Presidential Election," Program on Interna-tional. Policy Attitudes (PIPA), October 28, 2004;
29. see also Steven KuIi, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis, "Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War," Political Science Quarterly 118 (Winter 2003-4).
30. 23Leon Festinger, When Prophecy Fails (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).
31. Democrats should have been under more pressure from, cognitive dissonance than Republicans, who could rationalize their support for the war in terms of the partisan imperative to back their own team's policy.
32. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922).
33. Dan Reiter and Allan C. Starn, Democracies at War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 19-25.
34. Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," International Security 29 (Summer 2004);
35. Ronald Krebs, "Selling the Market Short?"; and rebuttal, by Kaufmann, both in International Security 29 (Spring 2005).
36. For an assessment of the argument that democratic publics are only as rational as the information they have, see Robert Y. Shapiro and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, "Do the Facts Speak for Themselves? Partisan Disagreement as a Challenge to Democratic Competence," Critical Review 20, no. 1-2 (2008).
37. Snyder (fn. 17), 49-52 and chaps. 3, 4.
38. Ibid., chaps. 5, 7; Jack Snyder, "Imperial. Temptations," National Interest, no. 71 (Spring 2003).
39. Hendrik Sprayt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), 26-28;
40. see also Miles Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
41. According to Rumsfeld, "If we left Iraq prematurely as the terrorists demand, the enemy would tell us to leave Afghanistan and then withdraw from, the Middle East. And if we left the Middle East, they'd order us and all those who don't share their militant ideology to leave what they call the occupied Muslim lands from Spain to the Philippines"; testimony of August 3, 2006, before the Sen-ate Armed Services Committee; subject of a New York Times editorial, "The Sound, of One Domino Falling," August 4, 2006.
42. 32Douglas C. Foyle, "Leading the Public to War? The Influence of American Public Opinion on the Bush Administration's Decision to Go to War in Iraq," International Journal of Public Opinion Research 16, no. 3 (2004), 284.
43. Jon Western, Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 14-23.
44. On the selling of the Iraq intervention, see Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, "Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration's Rhetoric," Perspectives on Politics 3 (September 2005).
45. For an innovative treatment of President Bush's framing of the "war on terror," see Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer K. Lobasz, "Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq," Security Studies 16 (July-September 2007).
46. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 49-51;
47. Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, News That Matters: Television and American Opinion (Chicago: Uni-versity of Chicago Press, 1987);
48. John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge, 1992).
49. John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 39, 56-58.
50. Alastair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly 40 (March 1996).
51. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
52. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, "Modern Hate," New Republic, March 22, 1993.
53. Paul R. Brass, Theft of an Idol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997);
54. Steven I.Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
55. 42Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1986), 76-83.
56. On Bush, see Richard W. Stevenson, "Bush Contends Partisan Critics Hurt War Effort," New York Times, November 12, 2005, A1, A10;
57. Cheney said in Des Moines, Iowa, on September 8, 2004, that if Americans elect Kerry, "then the danger is that we'll get hit again in a way that will be dev-astating from, the standpoint of the United. States."
58. Sinclair (fn. 4), chap. 2; Nicolas Guilhot, The Democracy Makers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005);
59. Mark. Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chap. 6.
60. 45Lemann (fn. 6).
61. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).
62. Fiorina (fn. 4), 167-82.
63. Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders, "Why Can't We All Just Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America," Forum 3 (2005), at http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/iss2/artl.
64. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, (fn. 4), 11.
65. Fiorina (fn. 4), 57-77.
66. Robert Y. Shapiro and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, "Ideological Partisanship and American Public Opin-ion toward Foreign Policy," in Morton H. Halperin, Jeffrey Laurenti, Peter Rundlet, and Spencer P. Boyer, eds., Power and Superpower: Global Leadership and Exceptionalism in the 21st Century (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2007).
67. Gary C. Jacobson, A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 41-44.
68. 53McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (fn. 4), 108 and chap.4.
69. James A. Stimson, Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jacobs and Shapiro (fn. 36), 17-19.
70. 55Jacobs and Shapiro (fn. 36), chap. 2.
71. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (fn. 4),108.
72. 57Stimson(fn.54),7.
73. Ibid., chap. 3.
74. Ibid., 90.
75. Ibid, 94-95.
76. Ibid., 71-74.
77. Bartels (fn. 5), 218.
78. Mueller (fn. 37), 119.
79. Jacobson (fn. 52), 132.
80. Ibid., 134-38.
81. 66OIe R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2004), 168-74.
82. Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), chap. 7;
83. Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon (fn. 51).
84. She wrote that "the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration"; Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 79 (Janu-ary-February 2000), 61.
85. More generally, see George Packer, The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), chaps. 1,2.
86. 69Foyle(fn.32),274.
87. Lakoff (fn. 21), 11; The Office of the President, National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.
88. On valence and positional issues, see Stimson (fn. 54), 62.
89. 72Lemann (fn. 6).
90. Jacobson (fn. 52), 89.
91. 74Ibid., 89, n. 30.
92. 75Packer (fn. 68), 388.
93. James Carney, "General Karl Rove, Reporting for Duty," Time Magazine, September 29, 2002.
94. 77Jacobson (fn. 52), 191. See John H. Aldrich, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson Sharp, "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection," Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006);
95. the authors review the debate on the electoral impact of the Iraq issue. Writing about J. E. Campbell, they note that he "argues that Bush's margin of victory was smaller than one would predict based on economic variables. He attributes the gap to Iraq and notes that respondents who believed that the war was not going well voted heavily for Kerry." By contrast, they note that Christopher Wlezein and RobertErikson "conclude-based, on their aggregate predictive model-that the Iraq war did not substantially hurt the president's electoral performance." See Campbell , "The Presidential Election of 2004: The Fundamentals and the Campaign," Forum 2 (2004), at http://www .bepress.com/forum/vol2/iss4/artl/;
96. and Wlezein and Erikson, "Post-election Reflections on Our Pre-election Predictions," PS: Political Science and Politics 38 (January 2005), 25-26.
97. Gary Langer and Jon Cohen, "Voters and Values in the 2004 Election," Public Opinion Quarterly 69, no. 5, special issue (2005);
98. Sunshine D. Hillygus and Todd G. Shields, "Moral Issues and Voter Decision Making in the 2004 Presidential Election," PS: Political Science & Politics 38 (April 2005), 201-9.
99. 79Jacobson (fn. 52), 131-33;
100. New York Times, March. 27, 2006.
101. 80ABC News/Time/Stanford poll, Global Warming, March 26, 2006.
102. Jacobson (fn. 52), 130,143.
103. 82Ibid., 140-41.
104. 83Ibid., 144,155-59.
105. Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas Carsey, "Party Polarization and 'Conflict Extension' in the American Electorate," American Journal of Political Science 46 (October 2002).
106. 85While party identification and ideology appear to affect individual issue opinions much more than the reverse, further data analysis could not reject the possibility of an effect on partisanship and ideology of simultaneous opinion changes on multiple issues.
107. The surveys interviewed samples of the American public and a sample of leaders who have foreign policy powers, specialization, or expertise. The leaders include members of Congress or their senior staff, presidential administration officials, and senior staff in agencies or offices dealing with foreign policy issues, university administrators or academics who teach in the area of international relations, journalists and editorial staff who handle international news, presidents of large labor unions, business executives of Fortune 1000 corporations, religious leaders, presidents of major private foreign policy organizations, and presidents of major special, interest groups relevant to foreign policy. Mar-shall M. Bouton, Catherine Hug, Steven Kull, Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro, Jennie Taylor, and Christopher B. Whitney, Global Views 2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago Council, on Foreign Relations, 2004).
108. For a fuller analysis, see Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon (fn. 51). There was a public survey but no elite survey for 2006 and 2008.
109. Robert Y. Shapiro and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, "Political Polarization and the Rational Public" (Paper presented, at the annual, conference of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Mon-treal, Quebec, Canada, May 18-21, 2006);
110. and Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon, "Partisan Conflict, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy" (Paper presented at the Inequality and Social Policy Seminar, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, December 12, 2005).
111. For more on elite polarization, see Peter Trubowitz and Nicole Mellow, "Going Bipartisan: Politics by Other Means," Political Science Quarterly 120 (Fall 2005), fig. 2.
112. Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon (fn. 87, 2006, 2005).