Relocating the U.S. forces in south Korea: Strained alliance, emerging partnership in the changing defense posture

Asian Survey

Volumn 46, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 615-631

  Nam, Chang Hee ^a  

^a Inha University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Alliance; Defense posture; Korea; Military transformation; USFK

Indexed keywords

DEFENSE SPENDING; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; MILITARY INTERVENTION; PARTNERSHIP APPROACH;

ASIA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; HAN RIVER [SOUTH KOREA]; KOREA; NORTH AMERICA; SOUTH KOREA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 33748508630     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/as.2006.46.4.615     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. When the author interviewed the 2nd ID Command in 1997, the engineering commander complained about the encroachment of Korean farmers into the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) grant land, a restricted area. He said this seriously hampered combat readiness by impeding training and maneuvers of the U.S. forces.
2. Based on the Treaty of Mutual Security between Korea and the United States, the two nations signed the SOFA in 1966, regulating the legal status of the U.S. forces and the real estate required to station them. Korea is required by the accord to grant land and facilities without cost to the United States.
3. This was a fact verified during an interview with a researcher of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), Seoul, October 27, 2004.
4. U.S. DOD, Report on Allied Contributions to Common Defense (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2002), p. D-8.
5. In an interview with a Korean official of the Ministry of Defense on June 31, 2004, the USFK commander in a SOFA joint meeting in March 2000 is said to have proposed to consolidate and return small, urban camps. He further suggested increasing joint use of South Korea's training ranges while raising standards for new SOFA grant land at key installations to improve combat-readiness and public safety.
6. One division-strong troop presence was reduced in the early 1970s following the Nixon Doctrine that focused on naval and air power in planning the roles of the U.S. forces stationed overseas. In the early 1990s, 7,000 U.S. soldiers were pulled out of Korean bases in accordance with the East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI) plan to reduce U.S. troop levels in Asia, which was basically a case for peace dividend and burden-sharing at the dawn of the post-Cold War era.
7. Donald Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," Foreign Affairs 81:3 (May/June 2002), p. 24.
8. Office of Force Transformation, Elements of Defense Transformation (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2004), p. 8.
9. Brian R. Sullivan, "The Reshaping of the U.S. Armed Forces: Present and Future Implications for Northeast Asia," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 8:1 (Summer 1996), p. 137.
10. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," p. 27.
11. Office of Force Transformation, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2003), p. 30.
12. Ibid., p. 6.
13. A Heritage Foundation Report, "Defending the American Homeland," January 2002, also notes that "[a]s top priorities for military operations overseas the database should be interactive and networked, linking Federal agencies and sophisticated collation and analysis methods to develop intelligence on terrorists." See .
14. Office of Force Transformation, Military Transformation, p. 34.
15. Hankoo Kang and Chaiki Seong, Jungjanggi Gunsasiseol Boho Jeongchaek Yeongu [Mid-and long-term policy to protect military facilities] (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 1996), pp. 126-48.
16. Author's interview with KIDA researcher, Seoul, October 27, 2004.
17. Office of Force Transformation, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2005), pp. 4-10.
18. For a detailed introduction of the negotiation results, see the USFK's website, , accessed May 10, 2005.
19. "Result of the Second Meeting of the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative," press release, the ROK Ministry of National Defense (Seoul), June 5, 2003.
20. Ibid.
21. For a detailed explanation, see ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Yongsan Giji Hyeopjeong" [Agreement on relocation of Yongsan Garrison], a briefing booklet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Seoul), October, 2004.
22. According to the agreement, which later was combined with the LPP, including an unprecedented scale of base realignment, most of the support mission installations in Incheon, Daegu, Busan, and Chuncheon would be closed or consolidated in the Osan-Pyeongtaek hub (probably as the military operating base) and to the Daegu-Camp Carrol hub (logistical support base).
23. For a detailed introduction to the relocation project, see the website of the Korean Special Commission on USFK Affairs, , accessed July 8, 2006.
24. Author interview with Lt. Gen. Cha and the officers of the Ministry of National Defense, Seoul, September 24, 2003.
25. "Result of the Tenth Meeting of the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative," press release, the ROK Ministry of National Defense, Seoul, July 23, 2004.
26. For an extensive introduction of the arguments by the non-governmental organizations, see , accessed June 28, 2006; and , accessed June 28, 2006.
27. The "abandonment and entrapment" model was often used to describe the relations between the United States and its NATO allies. For the classic studies, see Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36:4 (July 1984), pp. 461-95
28. Jane M. O. Sharp, "Arms Control and Alliance Commitments," Political Science Quarterly 100:4 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 649-67.
29. Rodong Shinmun [Labor Daily] (Pyongyang), July 27, 2003, cited by Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), July 28, 2003.
30. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 6.
31. Office of Force Transformation, Military Transformation, p. 35.
32. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," p. 25.
33. Rodong Shinmun, July 20, 2004, cited by Yonhap News Agency, July 20, 2004.
34. Lt. Gen. Cha invited security specialists to the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul on September 24, 2003, and distributed an official pamphlet, titled "Concerning the Negotiation in the Future Alliance Policy Initiative," explaining in it why he believes the relocation has nothing to do with preparation for a preemptive attack on North Korea.
35. For detailed information, see , accessed July 8, 2006.