Reckless states and Realism

International Relations

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 241-256

  Mearsheimer, John J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Balancing; International outcomes; Normative theory; Rational actor assumption; Realism; State behavior; Status quo bias; Suboptimal behavior; Theory of foreign policy; Theory of international relations

Indexed keywords

EID: 69249178095     PISSN: 00471178     EISSN: 17412862     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0047117809104637     Document Type: Article

References (72)

1. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
2. For examples of scholars arguing that realists assume states to be rational actors, see Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 64-5
3. Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 7, 167;
4. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravscik, Is Anybody Still a Realist? International Security, 24(2), 1999, pp. 6-7, 12-13, 18.
5. For examples of scholars arguing that Waltz assumes that states are rational agents, see Colin Elman, Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy? Security Studies, 6(1), 1996, p. 43
6. Charles L. Glaser, Theory of Rational International Politics, unpublished book manuscript, University of Chicago, 3 April 2008, ch. 5, p. 4;
7. Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics, p. 173.
8. On realism's complicated relationship with the rational actor assumption, see Miles Kahler, Rationality in International Relations, International Organization, 52(4), 1998, pp. 919-25
9. Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War, Security Studies, 9(3), 2000, p. 70.
10. Kenneth N. Waltz, Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics, in Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics, p. 330
11. Waltz, Theory, p. 118
12. comment made by Kenneth Waltz at 'The King of Thought' conference, Aberystwyth, 17 September 2008. It is worth noting that Waltz maintains that, 'deterrence does not depend on rationality. It depends on fear.' Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), p. 154.
13. Waltz, Reflections, p. 330
14. Waltz, Theory, pp. 92, 118.
15. Waltz, Theory, p. 121.
16. For Waltz's theory to work, he also needs to assume that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. See Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part II), International Relations, 20(2), 2006, pp. 231, 240-1.
17. I cannot find any place in Waltz's work where he explicitly argues that states should seek to gain power at the expense of other states. I do think, however, that it is implicit in his work that states should seek to improve their position in the balance of power, although he makes clear that they should not attempt to gain too much power. The best discussion of his thinking about war is Kenneth N. Waltz, The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory, in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds), The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 39-52.
18. Waltz sometimes argues that wars are the result of uncertainty and miscalculation, which seems to imply that starting wars is a mistake. Origins of War, p. 47
19. Waltz, Theory, p. 168.
20. Waltz, Theory, pp. 190-1.
21. Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 54.
22. Waltz, Theory, p. 126.
23. Waltz, Origins of War, p. 49
24. Waltz, Theory, p. 127.
25. Also see Waltz, Realism and International Politics, p. 79.
26. Waltz, Origins of War, p. 40.
27. Waltz, Theory, p. 126.
28. Waltz, Theory, pp. 124, 128.
29. Waltz, Theory, p. 126.
30. On balancing and bandwagoning more generally, see Theory, pp. 124-8.
31. Randall L. Schweller, Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma? Security Studies, 5(3), 1996, pp. 90-121.
32. Although Schweller was the first person to describe Waltz's theory as having a 'status-quo bias', he does not argue it is due to balancing behavior, as I do. Instead, he argues that it is because Waltz focuses exclusively on security-seeking states and ignores revisionist or greedy states. Also see Deborah Boucoyannis, The International Wanderings of a Liberal Idea, or Why Liberals Can Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Balance of Power, Perspectives on Politics, 5(4), 2007, pp. 710-11, 719;
33. Elman, Horses for Courses;
34. Keith L. Shimko, Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism, Review of Politics, 54(2), 1992, pp. 281-301
35. I disagree with Waltz on this important point. I argue that the international system would be competitive and dangerous even if all the states were rational agents. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). As discussed below, Waltz's world becomes competitive and dangerous once he takes away the rational actor assumption and allows that great powers often act recklessly. Indeed, I maintain that states become even more aggressive than he appears to recognize. I do not explore our difference, however, because the focus here is on examining Waltz's theory on its own terms.
36. Recklessness is not simply misguided aggressiveness. A reckless state can also fail to take the necessary steps to defend itself against a dangerous adversary.
37. Waltz, Realism and International Politics, p. xii.
38. Comment made by Waltz at The King of Thought conference.
39. Waltz told Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg in May 1993, 'I've been a fierce critic of American military policy and spending and strategy, at least since the 1970s.' See Interview with Ken Waltz, Review of International Studies, 24(3), 1998, p. 373.
40. He elaborates his criticisms throughout this interview. Also see Waltz, Realism and International Politics, ch. 23.
41. Waltz, Origins of War, p. 44.
42. In Theory, Waltz emphasizes that socialization and competition are important processes that tend to produce 'sameness' among states. 'Competition', he argues, 'spurs the actors to accommodate their ways to the socially most acceptable and successful practices. Socialization and competition are two aspects of a process by which the variety of behaviors and of outcomes is reduced.' Theory, pp. 74-7, 127-8. One might think that socialization and competition lead states to become increasingly rational over time in Waltz's world. But he does not make that argument; there is no evidence from his writings that he believes that states have learned to act more strategically over time. As he remarked at the 'King of Thought' conference, 'state learning is not impressive'. Of course, in a world where reckless states are commonplace, socialization might very well perpetuate the presence of reckless states, and undermine smart learning.
43. Waltz, Theory, p. 72. Also see pp. 67-73, 121-3.
44. Waltz, Reflections, p. 340.
45. Waltz, Theory, p. 65.
46. Waltz, Theory, pp. 65, 69, 71, 125.
47. Elman, Horses for Courses, pp. 7-53.
48. Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy, and Colin Elman, 'A Response to Kenneth Waltz', in Security Studies, 6(1), 1996, pp. 54-61.
49. Elman, Horses for Courses, pp. 33, 37, 40.
50. This subheading is based on Waltz's comment that, 'A theory is not a statement about everything that is important in international-political life, but rather a necessarily slender explanatory construct.' Waltz, Realism and International Politics, p. 76.
51. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984):
52. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991)
53. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
54. Neoclassical realists also combine realist and unit-level variables in ways that are consistent with Waltz's thinking. See Brian Rathbun, A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism, Security Studies, 17(2), 2008, pp. 294-321.
55. The fact that realists like Posen, Snyder, and Van Evera incorporate domestic political factors into their theories leads Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravscik to question whether they should be categorized as realists. 'Is Anybody Still a Realist?' There is no question that these scholars have developed compound theories, not straightforward realist theories, and thus one can legitimately raise questions about whether they should be categorized as realists. But this is simply a labeling issue, which is of little consequence.
56. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 18. Also see p. 60.
57. Nevertheless, Waltz does appear to make some policy predictions, as Colin Elman points out in Horses for Courses, pp. 10-11.
58. Of course, Waltz's theory allows for rational as well as misguided states. He is not saying that all great powers behave foolishly all of the time. Indeed, there have to be some savvy states if balancing coalitions are to form against especially aggressive great powers. His theory should be able to predict how those rational states will act, and he says as much when he writes: 'The theory leads us to expect states to behave in ways that result in balances forming.' Theory, p. 125. Also see pp. 71-2, 128
59. Waltz, Realism and International Politics, p. 167.
60. It is the behavior of reckless states that his theory cannot explain. And given how commonplace they are in his world, he has little choice but to concentrate on explaining outcomes, while maintaining that 'the behavior of states and of statesmen ... is indeterminate'. Theory, p. 68.
61. Waltz, Reflections on Theory, p. 331.
62. Waltz, Reflections on Theory, p. 329.
63. Also see Waltz, Theory, p. 70.
64. Two other studies which emphasize the connection between behavior and outcomes in Waltz's work are Elman, 'Horses for Courses', and James D. Fearon, Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations, Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 1998, pp. 289-313.
65. Waltz, Realism and International Politics, pp. xii-xiii
66. Waltz, Theory, p. 170.
67. Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), develops this line of argument.
68. Waltz, Realism and International Politics, p. xiii.
69. Stephen Van Evera, Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War, International Security, 15(3), 1990/1, p. 36.
70. Glaser, Theory of Rational International Politics, ch. 1, p. 24; ch. 2, p. 1; ch. 6, p. 1. Another option is to view Waltz's theory as a Weberian 'ideal type' that helps to make the workings of the international system intelligible, but does not explain how it works in practice.
71. Stephen Turner, The Importance of Social Philosophy to Morgenthau and Waltz, in G. O. Mazur (ed.), Twenty-Five Year Memorial Commemoration to the Life of Hans Morgenthau (1904-2005) (New York: Semenenko Foundation, 2006), pp. 174-93.
72. Also see Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 141.