Rational appeasement

International Organization

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 345-373

  Treisman, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042676366     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S002081830458205X     Document Type: Review

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