Horses for courses: Why not neorealist theories of foreign policy?

Security Studies

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 7-53

  Elman, Colin ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals

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EID: 0001873679     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419608429297     Document Type: Article

References (278)

1. For a competing account of postwar stability, see John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," International Security 13, no. 2 (fall 1988): 55-79;
2. and Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
3. For a review and refinement of Mueller's argument, see Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay," International Security 14, no. 4 (spring 1990): 42-64.
4. See also Robert Jervis, "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment," International Security 13, no. 2 (fall 1988): 80-90.
5. See, for example, Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," International Organization 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 249-77.
6. See also John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 5-58;
7. and Ted Hopf and John Lewis Gaddis, "Correspondence: Getting the End of the Cold War Wrong," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 202-15.
8. For an alternative view which suggests that neorealism can account for the end of the cold war see William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 91-129;
9. and the subsequent critique and rebuttal in Richard Ned Lebow, John Mueller, and William C. Wohlforth, "Correspondence: Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 20, no. 2 (fall 1995): 185-87.
10. Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security 14, no. 4 (spring 1990): 5-41;
11. and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed For Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 7-57.
12. For the argument that neorealism remains relevant see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," International Security 17, no. 4 (spring 1993): 5-51;
13. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56;
14. and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 44-79.
15. See, for example, James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 467-91.
16. For an alternative view see Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 427-66;
17. the subsequent critique by Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales: Neo-realist 'Science' and the Abuse of History," International Organization 47, no. 3 (summer 1993): 479-93;
18. and Markus Fischer's "On Context, Facts and Norms: Response to Hall and Kratochwil," International Organization 47, no. 3 (summer 1993): 493-500.
19. Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 108-48.
20. For a critique see Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 182-93.
21. For proponents of the democratic peace phenomenon see: Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1983): 624-38;
22. R. J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 1 (March 1983): 27-71;
23. Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993);
24. Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember and Bruce Russett, "Peace Between Participatory Polities: A Cross Cultural Test of the 'Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other' Hypothesis," World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 573-99;
25. Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (December 1986): 1151-69;
26. and James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
27. For skeptics see Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (fall 1994): 5-49;
28. David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (fall 1994): 50-86;
29. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 48-51;
30. and Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 77-79.
31. Note, however, that elsewhere Waltz observes that "peace has prevailed much more reliably among democratic countries than elsewhere. On external as well as on internal grounds, I hope that more countries will become democratic." See Waltz, "America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective," PS: Political Science and Politics, 24, no. 4 (December 1991): 667-70, 670.
32. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 15.
33. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Validation of International Political Theory" (paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association).
34. See also Susan Peterson, "How Democracies Differ: Public Opinion, State Structure, and the Lessons of the Fashoda Crisis," Security Studies 5, no. 1 (autumn 1995): 3-37, 7, 36.
35. Leading examples of works advancing neorealist readings of foreign policy include Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984);
36. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987);
37. Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990);
38. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990): 137-67;
39. and Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 383-416.
40. Examples of scholars who compare the accuracy of neorealist foreign-policy predictions against their preferred alternatives include Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995);
41. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995);
42. Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988);
43. and Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
44. Kenneth N. Waltz, "America as a Model for the World?" 667;
45. "On the Nature of States and Their Recourse to Violence," U.S. Institute of Peace Journal 3, no. 2 (April 1990): 6-7.
46. As Arthur Stein notes, Waltz "argues that he has no pretensions about presenting a theory of foreign policy, and yet proceeds to describe how specific states must react in a bipolar world." See Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 182.
47. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127, 110, 174, 166, 165.
48. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 45-46.
49. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Correspondence," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 198-99.
50. Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," 138 n. 3.
51. See also Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 660-991, 671.
52. For the purposes of this paper, a foreign-policy prediction can be either a retrodiction or a forecast Postdictive or retrodictive predictions deal with outcomes that have already occurred. Forecasts deal with future outcomes that are expected to occur. While it seems counterintuitive to talk about "predicting" events that have already taken place, in fact the great majority of predictions in international relations theories are of historical events.
53. A fourth possibility not listed here is that theories might make predictions about the formation of states' foreign-policy preferences. See, for example, Legro, Cooperation Under Fire, 218. Since Legro notes, however, that "with the exception of cases of reciprocity and sometimes inadvertence, the actions states took mirrored their preferences," I code his work as testing alternative theories of foreign policy.
54. For a similar argument see Robert Jervis, "Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International Politics," Social Research 61 (winter 1994): 859-60.
55. While nominally independent from policy requirements, in fact social scientific endeavors are often influenced by them. These influences are often not obvious. First, instrumental intersubjective knowledge is usually causal in nature. That is, one of the reasons why political scientists employ a scientific model of knowledge is that it produces causal statements, which are the most powerful for controlling the social world. Second, there is a tendency to concentrate on "policy relevant" or "important" issue areas. There are many more international relations studies on war and economics than on art exchanges. Third, the social milieu within which social scientists operate generates perceived "policy needs" of the time. Those are the problems that tend to be addressed. Interest in deterrence and bipolarity as subjects for academic study, for example, was tied to, and will likely die with, the cold war. Fourth, the choice of variables may be influenced by their policy relevance and manipulability. Finally, there is the possibility of specific interference from, and feedback to, policy-making circles. Government agencies provide research moneys to universities, and frequently academics take government appointments.
56. For well-known statements about process tracing, see Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), 43-68, 46;
57. and Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol. 2, ed. Robert Coulam and Richard Smith (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), 21-58, 35.
58. These formulations notwithstanding, scholars have used the term process tracing in at least four different ways: 1. To discover "real" causal mechanisms: showing that a posited underlying mechanism connecting causal and dependent variables exists. See Legro Cooperation Under Fire, 33.
59. To the extent that the analyst is making ontological statements about links between independent and dependent variables, this approach is consistent with a scientific realist epistemology. See William Outhwaite, "Laws and Explanations in Sociology," in Classic Disputes in Sociology, ed. R. J. Anderson, J. A. Hughes, and W. W. Sharrock (New York: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 157-83;
60. Russell Keat and John Urry, Social Theory as Science 2nd ed. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), 1-45.
61. To establish interstitial covariation: demonstrating constant conjunction and temporal sequence, not just between the two variables at the opposite ends of the causal chain, but also of some of the links joining them. Jack Snyder, correspondence with author, 15 November 1995.
62. To establish multiple congruence: here, process tracing increases the number of observable implications that a theory predicts, asking the question "If this theory is true, what else do we expect to see?" but narrows the search for additional observable implications to those that are directly implicated by the causal path between the independent and dependent variables. Stephen Van Evera, "What Are Case Studies? How Should They Be Performed?" memorandum, ver, 1.5, 19 November 1995.
63. To operationalize variables: measuring independent and dependent variables, by going back down the decision-making path to search for relevant evidence. With respect to independent variables, see Snyder, Myths of Empire, 61.
64. On metascientific units or paradigmatism in general, see Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989): 235-54, esp. 239-41.
65. On paradigms see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
66. On research programs see Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 91-196.
67. For an overview of the Lakatosian position see Donald Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry. A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives," in Handbook of Political Science, vol. 1, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975), 131-228.
68. For a discussion of how Kuhn's views compare to Lakatos' see Terence Ball, "From Paradigms to Research Programs: Toward a Post-Kuhnian Political Science," American Journal of Political Science 20, no. 1 (February 1976): 151-77.
69. For an exchange that includes a discussion of the use of paradigms and research programs in international relations, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Stephen D. Krasner, and Robert Jervis, "Symposium: Methodological Foundations of the Study of International Conflict," International Studies Quarterly 29 (1985): 119-54.
70. Kuhn and Lakatos differ on the definition of the metatheoretical unit, tempo of change, standards for shifts between competing metatheoretic units, view of progress, and attitudes toward anomalies and dissent. Both, however, reject dogmatic falsificationism as a standard of theory evaluation. While lack of space prevents a full discussion of the choice between paradigms and research programs as alternative metascientific constructs, my own preference is for the latter. For explicit formulations of realism as a research program see Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 158-203, esp. 163-70;
71. and John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm as a Degenerating Research Program: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition" (paper prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, April 1996).
72. See, for example: Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: 3-4;
73. and Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507, 488;
74. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," 164-65;
75. Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, 301-21, 304-5;
76. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-59, 9-12;
77. Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," Security Studies, 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 448-82, 473-74;
78. James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds," 470-72;
79. Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War," vol. 1, "The Structure of Power and the Roots of War," manuscript, 30 September 1994, 11 n. 16;
80. Jack S. Levy, "The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder's International System," International History Reviews 26, no. 4 (November 1994): 718-21.
81. See Kjell Goldman, "The Concept of 'Realism' as a Source of Confusion," Cooperation and Confict 23 (1988): 1-14, 1.
82. As indicated in Diagram 1, neorealism is only one of several systemic approaches that are based on the assumption of anarchy. Both neoliberal institutionalism and some constructivist approaches, for example, assume an anarchical environment.
83. Keith Shimko, "Realism, Neo-realism, and American Liberalism," Review of Politics 54, no. 2 (spring 1992): 281-301, 299.
84. Again, neoliberal institutionalists share this assumption with neorealists. By contrast, as shown in Diagram 1 (p. 49), some constructivists hold that self-help is not an inevitable corollary of anarchy, and that other-regarding identities are possible. See, for example, Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: the Social Construction of Power oli-tics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391-425.
85. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 12.
86. See also Robert G. Gilpin, "No One Loves à Political Realist," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 3-26, 7.
87. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," 10.
88. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, 38.
89. In her review of Cooperation Among Nations, Helen Milner questions the assumption of constant threat, arguing that "the degree of fear states have for their survival varies importantly and independently of the lack of common authority. The more prevalent are conditions that mitigate states' vulnerabilities, the less germane will be Grieco's argument." See Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466-96, 483.
90. While Grieco argues that relative gains concerns will always be present, however, he does not argue that they will be uniformly high. See, for example, Cooperation Among Nations, 45-46.
91. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," 17.
92. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 94-95.
93. See Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," 395.
94. See, further, Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300", 463;
95. and Fischer, "On Context, Facts and Norms," 494;
96. Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist," 7, 18-26.
97. For an interesting discussion of whether, and if so to what extent, neorealist theories rely on rational choice, see Joao Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870-1930," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 193-260, 209 n. 56.
98. Hence, neorealism is a "third image" theory. On levels of analysis generally see: Kenneth N. Waltz, Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959);
99. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 13-31;
100. James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 27-92;
101. Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 5-24.
102. For support for this argument, see Shimko, "Realism, Neo-realism, and American Liberalism";
103. Baldev Raj Nayar, "Regimes, Power and International Aviation," International Organization 49, no. 1 (winter 1995): 139-70, 139.
104. For a contrasting view, see Keohane, "Neorealism and World Politics," 15.
105. Levy, "The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder's International System," 719-20.
106. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", World Politics 30 (January 1978): 167-214;
107. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 61-64.
108. An unfortunate side-effect of neorealism's emphasis on systemic variables has been the retrospective reformulation of classical realism as also being a primarily third-image enterprise. Scholars such as Jack Snyder have attempted to set the record straight, arguing that: "Realism must be recaptured from those who look only at politics between societies, ignoring what goes on within societies. Realists are right in stressing power, interests, and coalition making as the central elements in a theory of politics, but recent exponents of Realism in international relations have been wrong in looking exclusively to states as the irreducible atoms whose power and interests are to be assessed." See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire, 19 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding his explicit claim to the contrary, Snyder's domestic-level analysis has not been recognized by every scholar as falling within the classical realist tradition. Andrew Moravcsik, for example, argues that because Snyder explores the nature of links between societal pressures and state policies, he is not a realist but a "Republican Liberal."
109. See Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberalism and International Relations Theory," Working Paper no. 92-6, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, April 1993, 25-29.
110. This list of objections aims to be inclusive if not exhaustive. Accordingly, some objections will strike readers as being more consequential than others. Interestingly, while several readers of previous drafts were adamant that "only one of these objections deserves serious consideration, the others are strawmen," each chose a different objection as their favored alternative.
111. For an example of the explicit description and testing of competing realist approaches, see Benjamin Miller, "Competing Realist Perspectives on Great Power Crisis Behavior," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 309-57.
112. For a discussion of how different realist theories employ different secondary assumptions about the importance of the Third World, and how these produce different predictions and policy guidance, see Michael C. Desch, "Why Realists Disagree About the Third World (and Why They Shouldn't)," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 358-81, 359-65.
113. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 12.
114. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 23.
115. For the view that territorial expansion remains profitable, see Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 125-53.
116. See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
117. See also A. F. K. Organski, "Power Transition," Enyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 415-18;
118. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), chap. 8;
119. Miller, "Competing Realist Perspectives on Great Power Crisis Behavior," 323-25.
120. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 161-93.
121. It is not clear whether Waltz means that (a) even when buck-passing or chainganging occurs, balancing is still a better strategy than bandwagoning, hiding, or transcending; or (b) these alternative strategies would be better when buck-passing or chainganging occur, but they do not happen very often, so balancing is on aggregate the best strategy. For more on how the structural features of multipolarity influenced states' alignment patterns prior to the First World War and the Second World War, see Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy";
122. and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 22-24.
123. For a general theoretical discussion of multipolar pathologies such as chainganging and buck-passing, see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks."
124. Layne concurs, arguing that "during unipolar moments several new great powers simultaneously enter the international system." See Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," 31.
125. Walt, The Origins of Alliances,
126. Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy." Since Walt asserts, however, that it is mainly small states that bandwagon, it is not clear that their failing to balance will have any significant effect on systemic outcomes. With respect to unit outcome, bandwagoning may lead to a complete loss of autonomy.
127. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 70-71, 195;
128. Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 301-38, 328-31;
129. Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations";
130. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," 13;
131. and Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist," 4 n. 4.
132. Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 261-306, 286-89;
133. Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-realist Research Programme," Review of International Studies 21, no. 1 (January 1995): 21-40.
134. Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 50-90, 58, 51.
135. Charles L. Glaser, International Security Ibid, 52.
136. See, for example, Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm as a Degenerating Research Program."
137. Paul W. Schroeder, "Correspondence: The Author Replies," International Security 20 no. 1 (summer 1995): 194.
138. Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," 250.
139. See Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It."
140. For an opposing view see Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," International Organization, 49, no. 2 (spring 1995): 229-52. Wendt prefers to use the phrase "pro-social", whereas Mercer favors "other-help".
141. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm as a Degenerating Research Program," 19.
142. It should be noted that neorealism is not the only research program that is construed so broadly. Moravcsik, for example, shows how several different theories fit within the liberal research program. See Moravcsik, "Liberalism and International Relations Theory."
143. Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War. Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics, 44, no. 2 (January 1992): 267.
144. The following discussion on offensive and defensive neorealism owes a great deal to conversations with Randall Schweller, and to his article "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 90-121.
145. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," 11-12, and n. 27;
146. Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems," 204 n. 34.
147. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," 11-12. Mearsheimer does note that "States are...both offensively-oriented and defensively-oriented." He argues, however, that states are principally interested in maximizing relative power.
148. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 94-95;
149. Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security 17 no. 1 (summer 1992): 177-98, 194.
150. Classical realism differs from neorealism in assuming that statesmen have a "will to power," that is, they are driven by an insatiable lust for power. See Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," in Discord and Collaboration, 81-102, 82-85.
151. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 91;
152. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 40;
153. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 121.
154. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation," 303.
155. See also Cooperation Among Nations, 37-40.
156. Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," 86.
157. For a critique of Wolfers's observation, see Bahman Fouzani, "Confutation of Political Realism," International Studies Quarterly, 39 (1995): 479-510, 489.
158. For offensive neorealist arguments critical of defensive neorealism, see Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," 190-95.
159. For a critique of offensive realism, see Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," 70-73.
160. For arguments suggesting that offensive and defensive neorealist theories both produce flawed predictions concerning the Third World see Desch, "Why Realists Disagree About the Third World," 365-68.
161. Logically, specifying which assumption the scholar is relying on in any particular theoretical formulation does not require that they forswear the use of the alternative at other times. Indeed, a single theoretical framework can incorporate the choice. That is, a fully specified neorealist model can incorporate both offensive and defensive variants as alternatives. Neorealists, however, have tended to see (if not clearly to pronounce) this distinction as a basic and predicate component of their understanding of international relations. Hence we can distinguish between offensive and defensive neorealists, rather than offensive and defensive neorealist formulations by the same neorealist scholars.
162. See Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," 174;
163. Snyder, Myths of Empire, 22.
164. See also Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," 70-72.
165. Inis L. Claude Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962).
166. Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," 188-96.
167. See, for example, Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems," 216-17 n. 72.
168. See Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," 116-19 for an excellent critique of this argument.
169. Johnston, Cultural Realism, 56 n. 32.
170. Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security 19, no. 4 (spring 1995): 32-64, 35 n. 7. Note that Johnston's use of the term "survival-first" to describe the Waltzian camp is unfortunate, in that it obscures the fact that Mearsheimer's justification for power-maximization also rests on the notion of state survival.
171. Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," 138.
172. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 78. See also 41, 47, 48-49, 87.
173. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 195-99.
174. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 194-95.
175. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 194-95. Ibid.
176. Most neorealists agree that the greater a state's power the more likely unit-level influences will determine its foreign policy. By contrast, the smaller a state's power the more its behavior will reflect systemic-level constraints. For a review of this scholarly consensus, see Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neo-realism In Its Own Backyard," British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 2 (April 1995): 171-217.
177. For an extended critique see Miriam Fendius Elman, "When the Weak Go to War: Domestic Institutional Choices and Their Foreign Policy Legacies" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1996).
178. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 72-73, 184-85.
179. For more on how small states are prone to hiding and "irresponsibility" due to their position in the international system, see Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 26-27, 233.
180. See, for example, Labs's investigation of weak states' preference rankings for policy options based on the different costs and benefits of each policy. See Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?"
181. Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks."
182. As King, Keohane, and Verba note, "for any interesting social theory, there is always a possibility of some unknown omitted variables, which might lead to an unpredicted result even if the basic model of the theory is correct" (King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 211). The question is how best to incorporate that expectation into our theories, or into the standards by which we evaluate them.
183. Bueno de Mesquita also favors using Imre Lakatos's standard of sophisticated methodological falsificationism. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View," in Bueno de Mesquita, Krasner, and Jervis, "Symposium: Methodological Foundations of the Study of International Conflict," 122.
184. See further Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes";
185. Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry";
186. Ball, "From Paradigms to Research Programs."
187. For a critique of sophisticated methodological falsificationism, see Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science, 49-50.
188. Walt, Origins of Alliances. Note, however, that some critics claim that Walt's theory actually brings domestic-level factors in through the back door. His definition of threat includes "aggressive intentions," which is arguably not a system-level variable.
189. See, for example, Stephan Haggard, "Structuralism and Its Critics: Recent Progress in International Relations Theory," in Progress in Postwar International Relations, ed. Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 420-21.
190. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 71, 92, 118-19, 122, 124-25, 174-75;
191. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, 322-45, 331, 343.
192. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 72; see also ibid., 121-23;
193. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics" 339-40. As was noted above, despite his protestations to the contrary, at times Waltz does appear to make such foreign-policy predictions.
194. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 70.
195. See also Glenn Snyder, "Process Variables in Neorealist Theory," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 167-92, 167.
196. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 72. See also 166.
197. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics," 331-32.
198. For a discussion of the comparative merits of dogmatic and sophisticated falsificationism see Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes";
199. Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry";
200. Ball, "From Paradigms to Research Programs."
201. Arguments about judging the validity of a theory based on a single measurement have appeared prominently in several other guises. On the debate over the utility of single case studies, see Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (September 1971): 682-93;
202. Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-137,
203. reprinted in Harry Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 117-76;
204. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 209-12. Debate about the significance of single cases also arises in discussions on the value and validity of process tracing. See references in n. 20 above.
205. It is sometimes difficult to tell where Waltz stands on these broader epistemological questions. At various points, he suggests several standards for theory evaluation, for example arguing that "we should exploit all the ways of testing I have mentioned - by trying to falsify, by devising hard confirmatory tests..." (Theory of International Politics, 124).
206. Insofar as he is a falsificationist, he clearly rejects a naïve or dogmatic falsificationist metric, arguing that the "unfavorable results of tests should not lead to the hasty rejection of theories" (Theory of International Politics, 14).
207. Elsewhere he suggests that "[i]n the end, one sticks with the theory that reveals most, even if its validity is suspect" (Theory of International Politics, 124).
208. Somewhat inconsistently, however, he also advises us to hold to a confirmationist or justificationist standard (see Theory of International Politics, 14, 124).
209. Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems," 215 n. 67.
210. See Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks."
211. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 43.
212. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 20.
213. King, Keohane, Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, Ibid., 30.
214. King, Keohane, Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, Ibid., 104-5.
215. Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," 133;
216. Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," 151;
217. Ball, "From Paradigms to Research Programs," 164-65.
218. Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 7 n. 14.
219. Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," 118-19;
220. Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," 152, 200-204;
221. Ball, "From Paradigms to Research Programs," 164-71.
222. Ball, "From Paradigms to Research Programs," 166;
223. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories," 287.
224. See, for example, Benjamin Miller, "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management," World Politics 45, no. 1 (October 1992): 1-46.
225. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," 191.
226. The following is a suggestive and non-exhaustive list of ways in which unit-level factors might usefully be seen as "dirtying up" a systemic argument. As I noted above, each of these would be judged individually as to the extent that they were incompatible with the Lakatosian hard core, or amount to a regressive problem shift.
227. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," 183: "Sensible Realists are highly cognizant of the role of domestic politics and of actor choices within the constraints and incentives provided by the system. Since systemic theory cannot predict state interests, it cannot support deterministic conclusions."
228. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," 125.
229. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics;
230. Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics 20, no. 3 (April 1968): 454-79;
231. Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, The World In Their Minds: Information Processing Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990);
232. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
233. See, for example, Graham Allison's Model II in Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 67-100.
234. For the argument that significant external threat will motivate civilian intervention to overcome organizational inertia in the military, see Posen The Sources of Military Doctrine.
235. See, for example, Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," 273-74.
236. For discussions of the relationship between rational choice and evolutionary accounts of behavior see remarks by Kenneth J. Arrow in "Discussion by the Commentators,"
237. part of a symposium following Jack Hirshleifer's "Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law," Research in Law and Economics 4 (1982): 120-21, 124-25;
238. and Miles Kahler, "Evolution, Choice and International Change," in Strategic Choice and International Relations, ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell (forthcoming).
239. Barry Schwartz, The Battle For Human Nature: Science, Morality and Modern Life (New York: Norton, 1986), 106, 111, 197-99.
240. Barry Schwartz, The Battle For Human Nature: Science, Morality and Modern Life ( Ibid., 99.
241. Barry Schwartz, The Battle For Human Nature: Science, Morality and Modern Life ( Ibid., 194.
242. Hirshleifer, "Author's Reply," in Hirshleifer, "Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law," 113.
243. Note that quite apart from their difficulties with predicting behavior, applying evolutionary accounts to international relations is problematic in other respects. For wide-ranging discussions of the promise of, and problems with, evolutionary accounts in different disciplines, see Kahler, "Evolution, Choice and International Change";
244. Hendrik Spruyt, "Why Do All Roads Lead To Rome? Convergence by Selection, Learning and Coercion" (paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1994);
245. Richard R. Nelson, "Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change," Journal of Economic Literature 33 (March 1995): 48-90;
246. Hirshleifer, "Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law."
247. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 118.
248. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Ibid., 73-77.
249. See also Resende-Santos, who follows Waltz in depending on a mixture of limited rationality and selection in his neorealist theory of the emulation of military systems. He also claims to rely on socialization, but his redefinition of the concept as "structural adjustment or adapative learning" seems to reduce it to a subset of rational choice. See Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems," 206-9.
250. For more on this point see Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politic," 331;
251. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 108, 117, 118;
252. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," 166-67, 173.
253. Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping A Conceptual Minefield," International Organization, 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 279-312, 298;
254. Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy," 473.
255. For an outstanding discussion of how variables are best conceptualized
256. On anarchy see Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make Of It";
257. and Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," Review of International Studies 17 (1991): 67-85;
258. on power see David A. Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power,
259. and Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 3-25, 15-22;
260. on polarity see Joseph L. Nogee, "Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept," Orbis 18, no. 4 (winter 1975): 1193-224;
261. and Wagner R. Harrison, "What Was Bipolarity?" International Organization 47, no. 1 (winter 1993);
262. on the offense-defense balance see Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics";
263. and Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 (June 1984): 219-38;
264. on the assumption of rationality see Neil J. Smelser, "The Rational Choice Perspective: A Theoretical Assessment," Rationality and Society, 4, no. 4 (October 1992): 381-410;
265. on balancing see Inis L. Claude Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962);
266. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, and the Walt and Kaufman citations below;
267. on bandwagoning see Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 17, 19-21;
268. and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107.
269. Walt, "Alliances, Threats and U.S. Grand Strategy," 454.
270. Dale Copeland agrees, noting that Britain "stereotyped as the ultimate buckpasser...[spent] about five times as much on the military in 1938 than in 1933." See Dale C. Copeland, "Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 29-89, 45.
271. Robert G. Kaufman, "'To Balance or to Bandwagon?' Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 417-47, 420.
272. Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy," 454.
273. "Validity" means measuring what we think we are measuring. "Reliability" means that applying the same procedure in the same way will produce the same result See King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 25-26.
274. See also W. Phillips Shiveley, The Craft of Political Research, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1990), 48-56.
275. Haggard, "Structuralism and Its Critics", 408-9.
276. Although, as was noted above, contrary to a popular misconception, not all neorealist theories predict balancing behavior.
277. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127.
278. Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," 115-16.