Exploring puzzles in power-transition theory: Implications for Sino-American relations

Security Studies

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 103-141

  Chan, Steve ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 15944362786     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410490914077     Document Type: Review

References (171)

1. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958).
2. In addition to Organski's original statement, major works on the power-transition theory are Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
3. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980);
4. There is a reasonably large body of quantitative research seeking to test variations of the original power-transition theory. Selected examples include Brian Efird, Jacek Kugler, and Gaspare M. Genna, "From War to Integration: Generalizing Power Transition Theory," International Interactions 29 (2003): 293-313.
5. Daniel S. Geller, "Status Quo Orientation, Capabilities, and Patterns of War Initiation in Dyadic Rivalries," Conflict Management and Peace Science 18, no. 1 (fall 2000): 73-96.
6. Henk Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, "Power Transitions as a Cause of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 1 (Match 1988): 87-102.
7. Woosang Kim and James D. Morrow, "When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?" American Journal of Political Science 36, no. 4 (November 1992): 896-922.
8. Douglas Lemke and William Reed, "Power Is Not Satisfaction: A Comment on de Soysa, Oneal, and Park,"Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 4 (August 1998): 511-16
9. Douglas Lemke and William Reed, "Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: Power Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace," International Interactions 22 (1996): 143-64.
10. Douglas Lemke and Suzanne Werner, "Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 2 (June 1996): 235-60.
11. John R. Oneal, Indra de Soysa, and Yong-Hee Park, "But Power and Wealth Are Satisfying A Reply to Lemke and Reed," Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 4 (August 1988): 517-20.
12. Frank Whelon Wayman, "Power Shifts and the Onset of War," in Kugler and Lemke, Parity and War, 145-62.
13. Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War," in Kugler and Lemke, Parity and War, 187-207.
14. Woosang Kim, including "Power Parity, Alliance, Dissatisfaction, and Wars in East Asia, 1860-1993," Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 5 (October 2002): 654-72.
15. Woosang Kim, "Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo," World Politics 45, no. 1 (October 1992): 153-72.
16. Woosang Kim, "Alliance Transitions and Great Power War," American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 833-50.
17. Woosang Kim, "Power, Alliance, and Major Wars, 1816-1975," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 2 (June 1989): 255-73.
18. For an overview of this program, see Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack Levy, "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program," Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (December 1999): 675-704.
19. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, "The Power Transition Research Program," in Handbook of War Studies II, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 129-63.
20. Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler, "The Evolution of the Power-Transition Perspective," in Lemke and Kugler, Parity and War, 3-33.
21. Much of the discourse on China's rising power and its implications for the United States has been taken up by analysts who specialize in Chinese studies rather than international relations. A good example of the relevant debate was presented by an exchange between Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 18-32.
22. Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 33-44.
23. Other contributions to this debate come from Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security 25, no. 4 (spring 2001), 5-40.
24. Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," International Security 22, no. 3 (winter 1997/98): 36-73.
25. Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security 27, no. 4 (spring 2003): 57-85.
26. Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 149-68.
27. Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 107-35.
28. Further representative studies are offered by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Rise of China (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).
29. In contrast to these studies by Sinologists, contributions from international relations scholars taking a more general and quantitative approach can be found in a special issue of the journal International Interactions. Among other articles, it features Douglas Lemke and Ronald L. Tammen, "Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China," International Interactions 29 (2003): 269-71.
30. See also Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan C. Stam III, Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efird, and A. F. K. Organski, Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York: Chatham House, 2000).
31. An excellent account is given by Randall L. Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers," in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (London: Routledge, 1999), 1-31.
32. For a more jpurnalistic account, see Stephan Richter, "Repeating History," available at http://theglobalist.com/nor/news/2000/ 07-11-00.html.
33. John Mearsheimer is well known for his suggestion that, having secured its own hegemonic status in the Western Hemisphere, the United States only plays the role of an offshore balancer, seeking to prevent the emergence of another regional hegemon elsewhere, such as in Europe or Asia. As Christopher Layne points out, however, Mearsheimer offers a "diet" version of offensive realism because it eschews the logic that a great power such as the United States will not cease to expand until it has achieved global hegemony. See John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).
34. Christopher Layne, "The 'Poster Child for Offensive Realism': America as a Global Hegemon," Security Studies 12, no. 2 (winter 2002/3): 120-64.
35. See, for example, the major study by Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001).
36. For an analysis suggesting that newly democratizing countries are more prone to war involvement, see Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 5-38.
37. This proposition, however, is contested. For an opposing view, see William R. Thompson and Richard Tucker, "A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 3 (June 1997): 428-54.
38. Kugler and Lemke, "The Power Transition Research Program".
39. Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
40. Randolph M. Siverson and Ross A. Miller, "The Power Transition: Problems and Prospects," in Kugler and Lemke, Parity and War, 57-73.
41. John A. Vasquez, "When Are Power Transitions Dangerous? An Appraisal and Reformulation of Power Transition Theory," in ibid., 35-56.
42. The power-transition theory has been extended beyond its original focus on great powers in the central system to the study of conflict patterns in regional systems consisting of minor powers. See, for example, Lemke, Regions of War and Peace
43. Lemke and Werner, "Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War."
44. The U.S. gross national product had exceeded that of the United Kingdom by the 1870s, and it had become about twice as large by the start of the twentieth century; see Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System (New York: Knopf, 1984), 56.
45. The American ascendance was recognized by British leaders, who settled for a policy of appeasement and accommodation with the United States in the Western Hemisphere; see Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
46. Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, 45.
47. Organski, World Politics, 318, 323-25.
48. Although dissatisfaction with the international status quo is supposed to be one of the necessary conditions for a power transition to occasion war, this variable has until recently not been explicity incorporated in quantitative studies of war outbreak. Recent attempts at distinguishing between status quo and revisionist states can be found in Steve Chan, "Can't Get No Satisfaction? The Recognition of Revisionist States," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4 (2004): 207-38.
49. Geller, "Status Quo Orientation,"
50. Kim, "Power Parity"
51. Lemke and Reed, "Power Is Not Satisfaction"
52. Lemke and Reed, "Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations"
53. Oneal, de Soysa, and Park, "But Power and Wealth Are Satisfying."
54. Analyses focusing specifically on the question of whether China is a status-qou power can be found in Steve Chan, "Realism, Revisionism, and the Great Powers," Issues & Studies 40, no. 1 (March 2004): 135-72.
55. Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?"
56. If one assumes that there are more dissatisfied states than satisfied ones, why are there not more states fighting to revise the international status quo? One would expect from the historical episodes discussed by Randall Schweller that "bandwagoning for profit" should be a rather pervasive phenomenon. States do not always balance against another that is more powerful or even one that is perceived to be more threatening. They may instead choose sides in a conflict based on expectations of gaining the largest amount of spoil. see Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-97.
57. I use the terms "hegemon" and "challenger" stylistically to refer, respectively, to a once-dominant power that is suffering relative decline and a latecomer that is in ascendance. These labels are used without implying that the former is somehow domineering or that the latter is bent on undermining the hegemon's interests and attempts to assert its own global mastery.
58. Dale Copeland's dynamic differentials theory points precisely to Germany's preventive motivation in starting both the First and Second World Wars, emphasizing that "both conflicts were rooted in a common cause: the German fear of the rise of Russia, a state with three times Germany's population and forty times its land mass." Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 8.
59. In a well-known article, Schweller argued that a democratic hegemon in decline would not wage a preventive war against a democratic upstart that is poised to overtake it. He drew attention particularly to two cases: France's reaction to Germany's resurgence in the 1930s (especially Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland) and the U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1950s (during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, when the United States had a huge edge in nuclear weapons over the Soviet Union), in order to suggest that established democracies would rather mobilize a defensive alliance against an emerging autocratic challender than launch a preventive war against it. Schweller recognized that Israel's attack on Iraq and its invasion of Lebanon posed exceptions to the rule that democratic culture and institutions would strongly discourage the initiation of a preventive war, and he pointed to Israel's strategic vulnerability in the midst of hostile neighbors as a mitigating factor. it is doubtful, however, that the United States was ever in danger of being overtaken by the Soviet Union during the cold war years or that Israel is facing or has faced this prospect, militarily of economically, with respect to the frontline Arab adversaries. Germany had overtaken France long before the 1930s, with its defeat in the First World War causing only a temporary aberration in these countries' relative power. In other words, the condition of ongoing or impending power transition did not exist in any of these cases. Moreover, the argument that democracies eschew preventive war due to their moral and legal reservations is weakened by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which was justified by the Bush administration to prevent the latter from ever acquiring weapons of mass destruction. A preventive motivation (to avoid a Bolshevik victory) also applied to the democracies' intervention in the Russian civil war. That hardly anyone believed that Iraq or Russia posed a threat to overtake the democracies made the decisions to attack them more problematic for a theory emphasizing the moral and political restraints that are supposed to discourage democracies from taking this course of action. If the democracies were willing to invoke the logic of preventive war when there was little credible evidence of a power transition, one would expect that the impulse to resort to violence would be even stronger when the possibility of a power transition is actually present. See Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics 44, no. 2 (January 1992): 235-69.
60. Robert Powell, "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement," American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (December 1996): 749-64.
61. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-414.
62. Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
63. On the status-inconsistency theory, see, for example, Maurice A. East, "Status Discrepancy and Violence in the International System: An Empirical Analysis," in The Analysis of International Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis, and Maurice A. East (New York: Free Press, 1972), 299-319.
64. Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," Journal of Peace Research 1 (1964): 95-119.
65. Michael D. Wallace, War and Rank among Nations (Lexington: Heath, 1973).
66. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31.
67. The idea that differential growth among states can cause an incongruity or disjuncture in the distribution of power and the distribution of benefits in the international system was emphasized by Gilpin. See ibid., 13-15.
68. Organski, World Politics, 327-28.
69. Ibid., 328, 332.
70. Gilpin agreed that "in international society the distribution of power among coalitions of [states] determines who governs the international system and whose interests are principally promoted by the functioning of the system," and that the "dominant states have sought to exert control over the system in order to advance their self-interests" (Gilpin, War and Change in the World Politics, 29). That the system's rules are designed to favor the interests of the dominant states in turn raises the question of why these states decline. Paul Kennedy offers a possible answer. He points to these states' tendency to assume increasing foreign commitments beyond available domestic means. Imperial overstretch has been a common cause behind the demise of great powers. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987).
71. Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
72. Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger.
73. Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
74. Charles F. Doran, Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
75. Charles F. Doran, "System Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle: Challenges for Research Design," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 3 (September 1989): 371-401.
76. See also the original study by Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," American Political Science Review 74, no. 4 (December 1980): 947-65.
77. Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
78. This proposition is quite compatible with Organski's observation that states such as the United Kingdom and France are satisfied powers because "they realized their full power potential before the present order was established, and thus their power assured them a full measure of what they regarded as their rightful share of benefits." See Organski, World Politics, 327.
79. Pertinent discussions can be found in Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
80. James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577-92.
81. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War".
82. Erik Gartzke, "War Is in the Error Term," International Organization 53, no. 3 (summer 1999): 567-87.
83. Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization 51, no. 3 (summer 1997): 335-64.
84. The Yom Kippur war and the Vietnam offer two examples. Neither Answar Sadat nor Ho Chi Minh expected to defeat his enemy on the battlefield, but both evidently believed that their relative power (including intangibles such as morale and skills) entitled them to a better deal than their opponent was willing to accept in the absence of war. In 1941, Japanese leaders decided to attack Pearl Harbor even though they, too, realized that the United States was eight to nine times stronger than Japan. See Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).
85. When the distribution of power is very lopsided, private information will make less of a difference in causing discrepant expectations on the part of the contestants about their relative strength and the likely outcome of war.
86. Organski, World Politics, 324.
87. Whether one places more emphasis on culture or on geography depends in part on whether one stresses states' intentions or their capabilities. Liberals (such as those who support the proposition of the democratic peace) and constructivists (who emphasize the ideational basis of politics) tend naturally to give more weight to culture. They see the foreign policy intentions of states to be a variable rather than a constant. Conversely, for offensive realists, all states are assumed to harbor aggressive intentions. Geographic factors, such as physical distance and ocean barriers, are given consideration as constraints on the exercise of power.
88. For an alternative theory to power transition, one that places more emphasis on culture and location, see William R. Thompson, The Emergence of Global Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2000).
89. David Rapkin and William R. Thompson, "Power Transition, Challenge, and the (Re)Emergence of China," International Interactions 29 (2003): 315-42.
90. Charles Kupchan also stressed the influence of cultural affinity and geographic distance in the United Kingdom's decision to accept rising U.S. power but to resist Germany's ascendance. See Charles A. Kupchan, "Benign States and Peaceful Transition," in Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order, ed. Charles A. Kupchan, Emanuel Adler, Jean-Marc Checked, and Yuen Foong Khong (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001), 18-33.
91. Exemplary works on prospect theory and related topics are offered by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982);
92. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, eds., Choices, Values, and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
93. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica 47, no. 2 (March 1979): 263-91.
94. Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 87-112.
95. Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict," International Political Science Review 17, no. 2 (April 1996): 179-95.
96. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty," Science 185 (27 September 1997): 1124-31.
97. See, for example, Efird, Kugler, and Genna, "From War to Integration," 300, 304-5.
98. Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 39, no. 1 (October 1987): 88.
99. Ibid., 102-3.
100. Copeland, The Origins of Major War.
101. This motivation, however, is not easily pinned down. Certainly, whether the leaders of a declining but still stronger state care about particular changes in relative national capabilites and, by extension, whether they are motivated to wage a preventive war will depend on the nature of the power metric (or metrics) that is (are) of key concern to them. Thus, British leaders would not be disturbed to learn that Germany's population had overtaken that of the United Kingdom, bur they would be seriously alarmed if Germany's naval armament were approaching the British level. Similarly, U.S. leaders would not be bothered if China has been producing more steel than the United States has, but they would presumably be seriously concerned if China were beginning to develop a competitive aerospace industry. As these illustrations suggest, the metrics of parficular concern to national leaders tend to vary from case to case. Without knowing the relevant metrics, however, it becomes difficult to decide which specific changes in relative national capabilities would induce the preventive motivation. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the importance of specifying the relevant capability metrics. On the topic of preventive and preemptive wars, in addition to the major studies by Copeland and Levy already cited, see Douglas Lemke, "Investigating the Preventive Motive for War," International Interactions 29 (2003): 273-92.
102. Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth," International Security 20, no. 2 (fall 1995): 5-34.
103. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 15.
104. In his article "Investigating the Preventive Motive for War," Lemke sought to determine the extent to which the preventive motivation was associated with past conflicts. He defined this motivation to include occasions when a once-dominant power became weaker and also occasions when a weak state became even weaker. Power-transition theory, at least in its original form, concerns itself with only great-power contenders in the central system experiencing the former, but not the latter, kind of downward mobility. Moreover, as mentioned in the text, the preventive motivation stems not so much from concerns about past setback but rather is due to expectations about a further weakening of one's position in the future and the costs associated with appeasing additional demands from the challenger.
105. For a discussion of how leaders' time horizons interact with their concern for relative gains and preventive strikes, see Gerald Geunwook Lee, "To Be Long or Not to be Long - That Is the Question: The Contradiction of Time-Horizon in Offensive Realism," Security Studies 12, no. 2 (winter 2002/3): 196-217.
106. Of course, the number of states fighting on the victorious side tends to be inflated due to the tendency to "pile on" when the outcome of a war is no longer in doubt. The decisions by Turkey, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union to fight Japan in the closing days of the Second World War exemplified this phenomenon. In part for this reason, the overall size of the eventual winning coalition is less determinative of the war outcome than the power of its strongest partner, which happened to be the United States in both world wars.
107. Vasquez, "When Are Power Transitions Dangerous?" 41-42.
108. That the United States and the United Kingdom had an acrimonious relationship in the Western Hemisphere and the Asia-Pacific region before 1895 means that it is difficult to invoke the nature of their regimes as the explanation for the peaceful overtaking of the latter by the former. Their supposed democratic regimes cannot explain the reversal from acrimony to cordiality. Moreover, this reasoning seems to stretch the definition of democracy, given that neither country allowed female suffrage (not to mention voting rights for minorities) before the First World War. If one wishes to adopt a looser definition of democracy (or, for that matter, for libertatianism), one still faces the challenge of explaining why the British-French and British-Dutch transitions were not entirely peaceful.
109. Friedberg, The Weary Titan.
110. As Mearsheimer remarked in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 238, "the United States was bent on establishing regional hegemony, and it was an expansionist power of the first order in the Americas." In the name of its Manifest Destiny, it increased its territory fourfold during the first half of the nineteenth century. By 1900, it had achieved regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, realizing James Monroe's doctrine enunciated in 1823. It had also acquired the Philippines as a colony.
111. Indeed, as an anonymous reviewer pointed out, "in the end, it was Britain that joined the Franco-Russian alliance, not the French and the Russians who joined Britain against Germany." This situation does not quite support the standard interpretation of power-transition theory, suggesting a British-German contest for primacy in which France and Russia became British.
112. Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Global War and the Political Economy of Structural Change," in Midlarsky, Handbook of War Studies II, 310.
113. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of lt: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (spring 1992): 391-425.
114. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer, who suggested that I give more serious consideration to the ideational foundations of international rivalry and cooperation. A good discussion on this topic is provided by Kupchan et al., Power in Transition.
115. Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, 45.
116. Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, 92-93.
117. Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?"
118. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
119. Yuen Foong Khong, "Negotiating 'Order' during Power Transitions," in Kupchan et al., Power in Transition, 40.
120. Ibid., 49. Washington's unilateral invocation of the Monroe Doctrine was used to jusfify its right to intervene in any controversy in the Western Hemisphere involving a nonresident power, such as in the 1895 dispute with the United Kingdom about Venezuela's border.
121. For comparative assessments of China's and other great powers' status-quo orientations, see Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?"
122. Chan, "Realism, Revisionism, and the Great Powers."
123. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990): 137-68.
124. The U.S. entry in the First World War came in April 1917. In November of that year, the Bolshevik revolution overthrew the tsar. The new regime subsequently concluded the Brest-Litovsk treaty with Germany, taking the Soviet Union out of the conflict.
125. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
126. Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
127. Ibid., 192.
128. Paul Schroeder, "History versus Neorealism," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 193-95.
129. Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," International Security 19, no. 2 (fall 1994): 108-38.
130. For instance, Copeland, The Origins of Major War, Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War";
131. Lemke, "Investigating the Preventive Motive for War."
132. Powell, In the Shadow of Power, and Powell, "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement."
133. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 243.
134. Ibid., 15.
135. David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 180-209.
136. Peter H. Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
137. Peter H. Gries, "China Eyes the Hegemon," manuscript (Boulder: University of Colorado, 2004), 7.
138. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957).
139. Russett and Oneall, Triangulating Peace.
140. Powell, In the Shadow of Power, 199.
141. Analysis generally agree that China will remain in the foreseeable future substantially behind the United States in its military capabilities. See, for instance, Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up".
142. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power."
143. This observation does not, however, imply that an armed clash between the two is unlikely, as there have been many instances of belligerence between asymmetric contestants. Christensen's article offers an especially penetrating analysis of plausible conditions under which Beijing may resort to violence in the Taiwan Strait even with an acknowledged weaker military. History offers numerous instances of a weaker military power's initiating or accepting a war with a stronger adversary. Among other studies, see Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175-200;
144. T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiations by Weaker Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
145. Lemke, Regions of War and Peace.
146. Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, 45. As already noted, however, the United States was exempted from this status prior to 1945 on the grounds that it did not view itself as a great-power contender.
147. If these figures are adjusted for purchasing power parity, China's economy would be about half (51.4 percent) of that of the United States ($5,027 billion compared to $9,781 billion). These data, derived from the World Bank, are in line with information from the Penn World Tables (per capita income figures reported in table 1 and stated in purchasing power parity are based on this latter source). The evidence presented by Tammen et al. suggests a smaller gap separating the Chinese and U.S. economies. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer, who called my attention to table 7.2 in Power Transitions, showing that China's economy, after adjusting for purchasing power parity, was more than 75 percent of the size of the U.S. economy in the mid-1990s. Tammen et al. used Angus Maddison's data based on estimates by the Organization for Econornic Cooperation and Development. The different data sources indicate a rather obvious and substantial discrepancy in estimating the size of the Chinese and U.S. economies. As Tammen et al. observed, "It is no exaggeration to assert that any projection of Chinese GDP [gross domestic product] is fraught with peril. Anyone who has delved into the arcane issues surrounding purchasing power parity (PPP) and exchange rate calculations understands there is no agreed upon standard of measurement. Even among PPP advocates, with expenditure and production approaches, numbers may vary widely." See Tammen et al., Power Transitions, 210.
148. Because PPP estimates can be very different, I rely on a multi-indicator approach. I present several other indicators of putative national power, such as military expenditures and Internet usage. Although none of the indicators is flawless, multiple indicators can offer convergent validation. For a more extensive analysis of the relative positions of China and the United States as revealed by different measures of national power, see Steve Chan, "Is There a Power Transition between the U.S. and China? The Different Faces of National Power," Asian Survey, forthcoming.
149. See, for instance, Ashley J. Tellis, Janise Bially, Christopher Layne, and Melissa McPherson, Measuring National Power in the Post industrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000).
150. Schweller made a similar criticism about the manner in which the term "bandwagoning" has been used as the opposite of "balancing," repeating Felix Oppenheim's injunction that "avoidance of unnecessary departures from common usage" is an important analytic virtue. See Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 81.
151. Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, 45.
152. Lemke and Werner, "Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War," 243.
153. Kupchan, "Benign States and Peaceful Transition."
154. Organski, World Politics, 327.
155. Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" 49.
156. David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International Security 27, no. 4 (spring 2003): 68.
157. Chan, "Realism, Revisionism, and the Great Powers";
158. Chan, "Can't Get No Satisfaction."
159. Schweller, among others, has remarked that the anti-French alliance in 1814 would not have come about "had Napoleon not attacked his own allies and neutrals. By repeatedly thwarting the bandwagoning strategies of Russia, Prussia, Spain, and Austria. Napoleon finally succeeded where the British had failed in creating a coalition with the strength and resolve to defeat Imperial France." See Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 92.
160. In the Second World War, Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union after taking on the United Kingdom and France, and Japan's attack on Pearl harbor after invading China also typified this behavior. By forcing war on their reluctant adversaries, these aggressor nations were their own worst enemies. As Schweller suggested in referring to Taylor's classic study, Hitler brought about his own defeat when he declared war on the Soviet Union and the United States, "two world powers who asked only to be left alone." A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1961), 278.
161. Students of China's conflict behavior generally agree that Beijing has been cautious rather than reckless in its use of military force. It has, however, been known to undertake offensive operations, even under unfavorable military and political conditions. Still, it has typically taken precautionary steps to limit the risk of escalation. For a discussion of historical episodes lending support to these generalizations see Allen S. Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan," International Security 26, no. 2 (fall 2001): 103-31.
162. Measured in purchasing power parity, Taiwan would add about 8.5 percent to China's gross domestic product in the event of reunification. Naturally, there can also be large returns to scale in psychological and political terms. Concerns about the domino effect, resulting from the perception that a particular state has gathered a strong momentum of charge in its favor, encompass considerations about material as well as these less-tangible factors.
163. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
164. Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Dell, 1962).
165. The same, however, cannot be said of Germany's actions before and during the Second World War, specifically in view of Hitler's deliberate attempt to precipitate a showdown with the United Kingdom and France and his declaration of war against the United States.
166. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up."
167. James D. Fearon, "Signalling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs" Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68-90.
168. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences," 577-92.
169. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 136.
170. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong."
171. A well-known study shows that the peace-through-parity and the peace-through-preponderance models receive empirical support from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, respectively. See J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major-Power War, 1820 - 1965," in Peace, War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce M. Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48.