The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?

World Development

Volumn 39, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 673-685

  Haggard, Stephan ^a   Tiede, Lydia ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Developing countries; Economic growth; Economic volatility; Institutions; Rule of law

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; DEVELOPING WORLD; ECONOMIC GROWTH; ECONOMIC THEORY; PROPERTY RIGHTS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 79953063117     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.10.007     Document Type: Article

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